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2SUMMARY
This thesis contains of a review of the law of the three statutory 
offences of fraud, wilful default, and neglect, in direct taxation, 
together with an analysis of the consequences of these offences. The 
study is confined to offences, and their consequences, under the law of 
income tax, capital gains tax, and corporation tax. Value added tax 
law has not been considered, except to the extent that it has a bearing 
on direct taxation.
Taxation is imposed, by statute, on the United Kingdom as a whole, but 
insofar as they apply to Scotland, the statutes must be construed in 
accordance with the common law of Scotland, except where the statutes 
themselves direct otherwise. Accordingly, although the three statutory 
taxation offences of fraud, wilful default, and neglect are common to 
both England and Scotland, the application of the law in Scotland may 
differ to that in England because of the differences in the Scots legal 
system. This thesis is designed to explain how the law applies in 
Scotland. The application of the law in England, therefore, is not 
studied in detail except to the extent that it applies with equal force 
in Scotland.
Income tax is an old tax, and much of it is better understood with an 
appreciation of how and why it came to be there. The thesis begins, 
therefore, with an outline of the income tax administration and penalty 
code from its origin in Pitt's Act of 1799, and continues with an 
examination of the reports of the Royal Commissions, Parliamentary 
Committees, and other factors which have influenced the development of 
the law to its present state. The three offences of fraud, wilful 
default and neglect are of comparative recent origin. The words used 
are barely defined in the legislation itself, but a large, and at 
times, complex, body of case law has developed giving guidance as to 
what the words mean. Chapter 2 of the thesis contains an analysis of 
these offences, and shows how, in practice, the Courts have interpreted 
the statutory material. Chapter 2 also sets out the powers of the 
Inland Revenue to make assessments to tax on a guilty taxpayer.
3The main consequence of fraud, wilful default or neglect in direct 
taxation is that the offending taxpayer may become liable to pay 
interest on overdue tax and a penalty based on the tax lost. These 
aspects are considered in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 4 contains, in 
addition to a review of the law, a comment on the practice of the 
Inland Revenue in exercising its jurisdiction in the application of the 
statutory code.
The final chapter, Chapter 5, contains a review of the remedies open to 
a taxpayer who is accused by the Inland Revenue of fraud, wilful 
default or neglect. Such a review is a necessary part of the study, 
because much of the law on Inland Revenue offences has been developed 
by the Courts in considering appeals by taxpayers against assessments 
to tax. Although many of the legal decisions are based on their own 
facts, and have little value as precedents, much useful information can 
still be gleaned from a review of the decisions. In addition, Chapter 
5 contains a summary of judicial review procedures in both England and 
Scotland. These procedures exist to provide justice in cases where the 
statutory appeals procedure is deficient, and judicial review is being 
increasingly used by taxpayers in situations where administrative 
discretion has been abused.
The material studied for the purpose of this thesis, apart from the 
legislation itself, consists of the leading legal decisions on the 
statutory provisions, together with such commentaries as are available 
in the major text books on taxation and related subjects. A computer 
search of U.K. legal decisions back to 1950 was carried out. It will 
be apparent, however, from the thesis itself, that the application of 
the law by the Inland Revenue is of considerable importance, and so the 
study has been influenced by the writer’s experience in practice, and 
includes commentary and material not published elsewhere.
The law is stated at December 31, 1987.
4INDEX OF CASES
Adcock v. Archibald 1925 J.C. 58 2.07
Amis v. Colls (1960) T.R. 213, 39 T.C. 148, 39 A.T.C. 249 5.15 2.37
Argosam Finance Co. Ltd. v. Oxby (1965) Ch.390,
(1964) 3 WLR 774 (1964) 3 AER 561, 42 T.C. 86,
43 ATC 249 5.42
Ayrshire Pullman Motors & David Ritchie Ltd. v. IRC (1929)
14 T.C. 745 1.04
A-G v. Canter 22 T.C. 422 4.29
A-Gv. Johnstone (1926) 136 L.T. 31, 10 T.C. 2758 4.36
A-G v. Midland Bank Exec. & Trustee Co. Ltd. (1934)
19 T.C. 136 4.37
A-G v. Seccombe (1911) K.B. 688 1.03
A-G v. Sefton (1865) 11 H.L. Cases 257 1.03
A-G v. Till 5 T.C. 440 1.16
A-G v. White 38 T.C. 666 4.30
A-G of Irish Free State v. White (1931) 38 T.C. 666 3.10
Barney v. Pybus (1957) T.R. 13, 37 T.C. 106, 36 A.T.C. 14 2.15
Bolson & Son Ltd. v. Farrelly (1953) 34 T.C. 161,
22 A.T.C 80 5.25
Bookey v. Edwards 55 T.C. 486 5.11
Brentwood Commissioners (x.p. Chan) R v. 1986 STC 65 5.41
Brimelow v. Price (1965) T.R. 339, 44 A.T.C. 335,
49 T.C. 41 5.10
Broat v. Wells General Comm. The Times, Feb. 14, 1987 4.34
Brown v. I.R.C. 42 T.C. 583 2.15
Brown v. Hamilton District Council 1983 SLT 396 5.53
Bruce v. Burton (1901) 85 L.T. 227, 65 J.P. 440,
4 T.C. 399 5.65
Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. IRC v. 54 T.C. 200 1.04
5Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC (1921) 2 K.B. 403, 1.03
125 L.T. 108 37 T.L.R. 402, 12 T.C. 358 3.16
Carco Accessories Ltd. v. IRC (1985) STC 518 4.42
City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. (1925) Ch.407, 2.13
133 L.T. 520 40 T.L.R. 853
Clixby v. Pountney (1968) 1 Ch. 719, (1968) 2 W.L.R. 865 3.16
46 A.T.C. 398, 44 T.C. 515 
Cullens Tr. v. Johnstone 1865 3m 935 2.08
Day v. Williams (1969) T.R. 409 2.18
Deacon (George) & Sons Ltd. v. IRC (1952) T.R. 21, 5.29
33 T.C. 66, 31 A.T.C. 50 
Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 A.C. 337 2.08
Duchy Maternity Ltd. v. Hodgson 1985 STC 764 3.08
Edwards v. Bairstow (1956) A.C. 14, 36 T.C. 207, 5.09
34 A.T.C. 131
Fen Farming Co. Ltd. v. Dunsford (1974) STC 373 5.15
(1974) T.R. 187 49 T.C. 246 
Forestside Properties (Chingford) Ltd. v. Pearce 5.04
(1961) T.R. 143 39 T.C. 665 40 A.T.C. 155 
Forth Investments Ltd. v. IRC 50 T.C. 617 5.24
Fraser IRC v. (1942) 24 T.C. 498 5.08
Frowd v. Whalley 42 T.C. 599 5.06
Furniss v. Dawson 55 T.C. 324 1.04 5.10
Gibson’s Trustees 1933 S.C. 190 
Gibbs I.T.C. v. (1942) A.C. 402, 1 All E.R. 415, 
24 T.C. 221
5.48
4.23
6Hammersmith and City Railway Co. v. Brand 1.03
(1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 171 
Harrison v. Willis Bros. (1966) 2 W.L.R. 183 4.23
(1965) 3 All E.R. 753 43 A.T.C. 415
Havering Comm. (x.p. Knight) R v. 49 T.C. 161 4.17
Haythornwaite v. Kelly (1927) 11 T.C. 657 5.11
Hillenbrand v. IRC 1966 S.L.T. 213, 42 T.C. 617 5.12
Hinchy IRC v. (1960) A.C. 748 2 W.L.R. 448 1.26
38 A.T.C. 197 38 T.C. 625 3.10 4.03
Holborn Commissioners (x.p. Rind's Settlement Tr) R v. 3.07 3.11
49 T.C. 656
Holyhead Commissioners (x.p. Roberts) R v. 5.47
T.C. Leaflet 2903
Hood-Barrs IRC v. 27 T.C. 358 5.61/62/63
Horowitz v. Farrand (1952) 33 T.C. 221 5.30
Hudson v. Humbles (1965) T.R. 135 42 T.C. 380 5.26/27
Hudson R v. (1956) 2 G.B. 252 36 T.C. 561 4.35
35 A.T.C. 63
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. R v. 5.42
Simons Tax Intelligence 20 March 1986 
Inspector (x.p. Frost) R v. (1973) STC 579 5.42
Inspector (x.p. Kissane) R v. (1986) STC 152 5.46
Inspector (x.p. Lansing Bagnal Ltd.) R v. 1986 STC 117 5.45
Jacobs v. Eaves 36 T.C. 576 5.06
Kelly v. Monkland District Council 1986 SLT 165 5.52
Kennedy v. De Trafford (1897) A.C. 80 3.16
Kensington Commissioners (x.p. Wyner) R v. 49 T.C. 571 5.42
Khan v. Edwards 1986 STC 331 4.10 5.47
Knight v. IRC (1974) STC 156, 49 T.C. 179 3.07
7Lack v. Doggett (1970) T.R. 69, 46 T.C. 497,
49 A.T.C. 68 
Latilla v. IRC (1951) A.C. 421, 32 T.C. 159 
Lear v. Leek General Comm. 1986 STC 842 
Lennon v. Co-operative Insurance Soc. Ltd. 1986 SLT 98 
Lethbridge v. A-G 1907 A.C. 19 
Livingston, H.M. Advocate v. 15 R 48 
Lord Advocate v. A.B. (sub nom LA v. Sawers) 5 T.C. 440 
Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co. (1912) A.C. 716
McDonald & Ors. v. Lanarkshire Fire Brigade Joint
Committee 1959 SLT 309 5.50/51 5 56
McKerron (R & D) Ltd. v. IRC 53 T.C. 28 5.56/58
MacKinlay v. Arthur Young McClelland Moores & Co.
1988 STC 116 4.23
Mair v. Wood 1948 S.C. 83 4.23
Mankowitz v. Special Comm. 46 T.C. 707 3.16
Mavji R v. 1986 STC 508 1.13
Moray (Countess of) L.A. v. 1905 A.C. 501 2.04
Moschi v. Kelly 33 T.C. 442 5.31
Moschi v. Kensington General Comm. 1980 STC 1 4.11
Muir v. Glasgow Corporation 1943 SC(HL) 3 2.22
Mousell Bros Ltd. v. London & N.W. Railway 1917 2 K.B.836 3.19
National Federation of Self Employed & Small 4.37 4.39
Business Ltd. v. IRC 1981 STC 260 5.38/9 5.42
G. Newton (G) Ltd. v. Smith 1962 2 Q.B. 278 3.20
Nicholson v. Morris 1976 STC 269 5.27
O’Brien (x.p. Lissner) R v. 1984 STC 710 5.47
J. 0’Mullen & Co. v. Walmsley (1965) 42 T.C. 573 3.08
44 A.T.C. 501
2.12
1.06
4.34
5.15
1.04
2.05
1.16 
3.19
8Parikh v. Birmingham North Commissioners 1976 STC 365 5.42
Partington v. A-G (1869) 38 L.J. Ex205 21 L.T. 370 1.03
Pattison, H.M. Advocate v. 1901 3 Ad. 420 2.06
Pearlberg v. Varty (1970) T.R. 25, (1972) 48 T.C. 14 5.42 2.34
Pierson v. Belcher 38 T.C. 387 5.11
Pilkington v. Randall (1966) 42 T.C. 662, 45 A.T.C. 32 5.10
Pott’s Exec v. IRC (1951) A.C. 443, 32 T.C. 211 3.16
Potter (Robert) 1844 2 Brown 151 2.39
Q.T. Discount Food Stores Ltd. v. Warley General Comm. 4.33
1982 STC 40
W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. I.R.C. 54 T.C. 101 1.04
Reynolds & Gibson v. Crompton (1952) 1 All E.R. 88, 4.23
31 A.T.C. 184, 33 T.C. 288 
Rosetta Franks (King Street) Ltd. v. Dick (1955) 5.31 5.07
34 A.T.C. 130 36 T.C. 100
Ross & Coulter v. IRC 27 ATC 209 5.58
Royal Bank of Scotland v. Gillies 1987 SLT 54 5.49
Rossminster IRC v. 52 T.C. 106 1.23 5.38/40
Ruffle LA v. 1979 SC 371 4.20 4.26
Salmon v. General Comm, for Havering (1968) T.R. 357, 4.33
45 T.C. 77
St. Marleybone Commissioners R v. 1981 STC 557 5.42
Schister v. Scott 1978 STC 48 5.24(a)
Sen v. IRC 1983 STC 415 4.34
Simms v. Registrar of Probates 16 LJPC 56 1.01
Special Commissioner (x.p. Morey) R v. 49 T.C. 71 5.42
Special Commissioner (x.p. Elmbirst) R v. 20 T.C. 381 5.42
Special Commissioners (x.p. Phillipi) R v. 44 T.C. 31 5.42
Special Commissioners (x.p. Stipplecboice) R v. 2.34 5.42
1986 STC 474 5.14
Special Commissioners (x.p. Rogers) R v. 8 T.C. 46 5.42
9Spedding v. Sabine (1954) T.R. 185, 35 T.C. 239, 5.23 5.24
33 A.T.C. 205
Stapleforth v. Liverpool General Comm. 1983 STC 162 4.34
Stevenson v. Midlothian District Council 1983 SLT 433 5.55
Stoneleigh Products Ltd. v. Dodd 30 T.C. 1 5.11
Strathearn v. Fogal 1922 SLT 543 2.05
Tavistock Commissioners (x.p. Adam) R v. 46 T.C. 154 5.47
Taylor v. Bethnal Green General Comm. 1977 STC 44 4.34
Taylor v. Wilson’s Trustees 1974 SLT 298 2.39
Thurgood v. Slarke (1971) T.R. 155, 47 T.C. 130, 3.08
50 A.T.C. 188
Watson & Everitt v. Blunden 18 T.C. 402 4.23
Wellington v. Reynolds (1962) T.R. 57, 40 T.C. 209, 2.13 5.27
41 A.T.C. 90
Westminster (Duke of) IRC v. (1936) A.C. 1, 19 T.C. 490 1.04
White Bros Ltd. IRC v. 36 T.C. 587 5.27
Willey v. IRC 1985 STC 56 4.34
Winchester Commissioners R v. 1922 ATC 49 5.42
10
INDEX OF STATUTES
Act of Union 1707, Article 19 5.59
Income Tax Act 1799 S92 4.03
Income Tax Act 1805 S181 4.03
Income Tax Act 1842 S 23 1.15.3
S 52 1.15.4
S 55 1.15.1
S166 1.17
S178 1.16.2
S197 4.02
Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act 1856 S 6 1.16.1
514 5.60
515 5.60
S17 5.60, 5.64, 5.66
Taxes Management Act 1880 S63 1.15.2
Bills Of Exchange Act 1882 S92 3.03
Inland Revenue Regulations Act 1890 S22 1.16.1
S23 5.62
Partnership Act 1890 S10 4.25/6
Finance Act 1907 S22 1.15.4
S23 1.15.3
Perjury Act 1911 S 5 1.13
Finance Act 1914 S16 1.06
Income Tax Act 1918 S 30 1.17
S 34 5.62, 5.63
S 99 4.04
S100 1.15.4
S107 1.15.1, 1.16.1, 1.20
5125 3.16
5126 1.15.2
S132 1.16.2
S146 1.15.3
Finance Act 1922 S21 1.07
Finance Act 1923 S23 1.20
Trustee Act 1925 S30 2.14
Finance Act 1927 S42 1.21
False Oaths (Scotland) Act 1933 S2 1.13
11
Finance Act 1936 S21
Finance Act 1939 S19
Finance Act 1942 S33
S35
Finance (No 2) Act 1947 S8
Income Tax Act 1952 S25
S47
Ssl69 & 170
Road Traffic Act 1960 S134
Theft Act 1968 Ssl6-20
Taxes Management Act 1970 S 7
S 8
S 9
S 10 
S 11 
S 12 
S 20A 
S 20C 
S 29 
S 34 
S 36
S 37
S 38 
S 39
S 40 
S 41 
S 46 
S 50 
S 51 
S 52 
S 53
S 54 
S 56 
S 69 
S 70 
S 86 
S 88
S 93
1.07
1.21
1.22, 2.25, 3.16
1.23
1.24
4.03
3.16
1.08
3.20
2.03
1.21, 4.04, 4.08
4.07, 4.11, 4.12
4.15, 4.18
4.07, 4.15, 4.24
4.25
2.17, 4.04, 4.24
4.07, 4.18
4.07
4.21
5.40
3.08, 5.46
2.25
2.25, 2.28, 2.34
5.26
2.27, 2.28, 2.29
2.31, 2.32, 2.34
2.35, 2.42
2.30, 2.31
2.31, 2.34, 2.35
4.42
2.33, 4.42, 4.43
2.34, 5.44
3.12
5.03, 5.04, 5.17
4.06, 5.17
4.06
4.06, 4.29, 4.32
4.33
2.27
5.05, 5.41, 5.58
3.09
3.10, 3.12
3.02
2.19, 2.20, 3.03
4.35
4.06, 4.07, 4.08
4.09, 4.10, 4.11
4.13, 4.14, 4.18
4.34
12
S 94 4.06, 4.07, 4.14
4.18, 4.27
S 95 4.08, 4.15, 4.17
4.18, 4.25
S 96 4.16, 4.17, 4.18
S 97 2.05, 2.23, 3.16
S 98 4.05, 4.06, 4.27
S 99 4.19, 4.20(a),
4.21, 4.44
S100 4.27,
4.32
4.29, 4.31
S102 4.33, 4.45
S103 4.35, 4.36, 4.40
4.41, 4.43
S109 3.05
S115 4.04
S118 2.01, 2.17, 4.09
4.14,
4.25
4.18, 4.24
Taxes Act 1970 S 39 4.07
S152 4.22
S170 2.06
S204 4.05
S286 3.04
Finance Act 1972 Sch 16 Para 3 5.45
Sch 16 Para 19 3.04
Sch 20 3.03
Finance Act 1978 S30 4.10
Finance Act 1985 S15 2.20
Finance Act 1986 S42 3.05
13
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Note: Abbreviations are shown in square brackets)
Reports of Session Cases [S.C.]
Scots Law Times Reports [S.L.T.]
Reports of Tax Cases [T.C.]
Simon’s Tax Cases [S.T.C.]
Annotated Tax Cases [A.T.C.]
Simon’s Tax Intelligence [S.T.I.]
British Tax Review [BTR]
The Juridical Review [JR]
Simon's Taxes 3rd Ed. Butterworth & Co. 1970 (9 vols)
Whiteman & Wheatcroft on Income Tax 2nd Ed. Sweet & Maxwell 1976
A History of Taxation and Taxes in England, by Stephen Dowell
3rd Ed. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1965 (4 vols).
Tax Investigation Handbook by Michael Reader Butterworth & Co. 1981
Tax Appeals Handbook by Basil Sabine Butterworth & Co. 1983
Back Duty Law & Practice by Sidney Simon Oyez 1970
Accounts Investigation by F.S. Dodd Gee & Co. Ltd. 1983
Introductory Essays in Scots Law by W.A. Wilson 2nd Ed.
W. Green & Son Ltd. 1984
Judicial Review in Scotland by J. St. Clair & M.R. Davidson 
W. Green & Son Ltd. 1986
The Criminal Law of Scotland by G.H. Gordon 2nd Ed.
W. Green & Son Ltd. 1978
The Law of Partnership in Scotland by J. Bennett Miller 
W. Green & Son Ltd. 1973
Gloag & Henderson’s Introduction to the Law of Scotland 8th Ed. 
by J.A.D. Hope et.al. W. Green & Son Ltd. 1980
14
Principles of Scottish Private Law 3rd Ed. by D.M. Walker 
Clarendon Press Oxford 1982
The Law of Evidence in Scotland by A.G. Walker & N.M.L. Walker
Wm. Hodge & Co. Ltd. 1964
The Scottish Law of Evidence by A.B. Wilkinson
Butterworth & Co. 1986
Accountants and the Law of Negligence by R. Dickerson Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants 1966
Modern Cases on Negligence by R. Bingham 3rd. Ed.
Sweet & Maxwell 1978
Delict by D.M. Walker 2nd Ed. W. Green & Sons 1981
Tort - Cases & Materials by Hepple & Matthews 3rd Ed. 
Butterworth & Co. 1985
Tort by Clerk & Lindsell 14th Ed. Sweet & Maxwell 1975
Stroud1s Judicial Dictionary by John S. James (5 vols.) 4th Ed.
Sweet & Maxwell 1971
Intolerable Inquisition? by H.H. Monroe, Q.C. Stevens & Sons 1981
Report of the Committee on Enforcement Powers of The Revenue
Departments - (The Keith Committee) (3 vols.) Cmnd 8822 1983/1984
Final Report of The Royal Commission on the Taxation of Income and 
Profits (The Radcliffe Commission) Cmnd 9474 1955
Report of the Royal Commission of the Income Tax (The Colwyn 
Commission) Cmnd 615 1920
Annual Reports of the Board of Inland Revenue
Harrison1s Inland Revenue Index of Tax Cases (3 vols.)
Oyex Longman Publishing Ltd. 1982
15
PREFACE
"Whatever you do in regard to income tax, you must be bold, you must be 
intelligible, you must be decisive, you must not palter with it."
William Gladstone 
Hansard April 18, 1853
"The flotsam and jetsam of a century’s legislation have nowhere 
accumulated into a greater confusion than in the mass of enactments 
which prescribe penalties for failure to make returns or for the making 
of incorrect returns or claims."
Quoted from the 1936 Income Tax 
Codification Committee. (Cmnd 5131)
"I can give (the House) the assurance asked for........... (T)he
Revenue will adhere broadly to the present practice of reasonableness 
which it has adopted heretofore. If it had not adopted a reasonable 
practice there would have been great public disquiet and public 
complaint many years ago."
The Attorney-General,
Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller, Q.C., 
Hansard May 31, 1960
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CHAPTER 1
TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX EVASION
1.01 This dissertation deals with tax evasion and its consequences.
Tax lost due to evasion is usually referred to as "back duty". In
1900, in Simms v. Registrar of Probates^- before the Privy Council, the
meaning of the word "evade" was explained in the following way
"Everybody agrees that "evade" is capable of being used in two senses;
(1) which suggests underhand dealing; and (2) which means nothing more
than the intentional avoidance of something disagreeable". In
taxation, "evasion" is normally used in the first of these senses, as
2
the 1955 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income— stated 
in its Report:- "Tax evasion denotes all those activities which are 
responsible for a person not paying the tax that the existing law 
charges on his income. Ex hypothesi he is in the wrong, although his 
wrongdoing may range from the making of a deliberately fraudulent 
return to a mere failure to make his return or pay his tax at the 
proper time. By tax avoidance, on the other hand, is understood some 
act by which a person so arranges his affairs that he is liable to pay 
less tax than he would have to pay but for the arrangement. Thus the 
situation which it brings about is one in which he is legally in the 
right except so far as some special rule may be introduced that puts
3
him in the wrong".—
1.02 Thus the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion is 
the difference between right and wrong. The avoider, seeing the 
possibility of tax being charged on him, takes legal steps to avoid the 
charge, so that the law produces a liability less than that which it 
would otherwise have been. The evader, on the other hand, prevents the 
law from being properly applied, by neglecting or refusing to meet 
those obligations which have been imposed on him. It may be found, 
however, that what starts as legal tax avoidance spills over into 
illegal evasion. For example, a taxpayer may adopt a tax-saving scheme 
or arrangement which he believes to be legal, but to avoid searching
17
enquiries from the Inspector, he may be tempted to disguise the true
facts. Another example might be where a taxpayer seeks to cure a
defect in a tax-avoidance arrangement by back-dating or altering a
document. Thus an element of wrongful evasion may find its way into an
otherwise lawful course of conduct. In evidence to the Committee on
4
Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments— (The Keith Committee) a 
witness put the problem this way:-
"The taxpayer builds a tax proof castle; if the Inspector could see
inside it he would see the weaknesses in the castle's structure, but 
the taxpayer does all he can to make sure that the Inspector never 
sees inside it."—
Restricting the Inspector's view may amount to evasion.
1.03 The distinction between avoidance and evasion is in principle 
a clear one. In practice, it is often narrow and blurred. A brief 
examination of judicial comments on statutory construction and tax 
avoidance is therefore merited.
In United Kingdom law, tax avoidance is possible because taxation is a 
pure creation of statute, the statute being construed strictly in
determining the scope of the charge. In Attorney-General v. Seccome—
Mr. Justice Hamilton said, "The burden of proof is upon the Crown. It 
is for the Crown to bring the subject within the charge. In construing 
a Taxing Act, the presumption is that the legislature has granted 
precisely that tax to the Crown which it has described, and no more; 
and there is no presumption in favour of extending the scope of theg
Act" Similarly, in the earlier case of Attorney-General v. Sefton—
Lord Wensleydale said, "However likely it may be that (property) should
not be omitted, the subject cannot be taxed unless there are words
clear enough to impose taxation. There must be clear words." And in
9
Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC— Mr. Justice Rowlett said, ".... in a
Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no 
room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no 
presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be
18
implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.11—  It
follows, therefore, that matters of equity, fairness, the mischief
against which a section is directed, and presumption or substance, are
not matters to which the Courts can direct themselves. In the early
case of Partington v. Attorney-General—  a case on probate and
succession duties, Lord Cairns stated that "If a person sought to be
taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however
great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other
hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the
subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however
apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear
to be. In other words, if it would be admissible in any statute what
is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is
not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the
words of the statute". It seems that Lord Cairns, a former Member of
Parliament who had been both Solicitor General and Attorney General,
regarded the "literal approach" to legislation as confined to fiscal
statutes. In the same volume of the law reports, in
11aHammersmith and City Railway Co. v. Brand, he took a much wider view
of the intendment and purpose of the legislation there under review.
1.04 Given that taxing statutes must be construed strictly, it
follows that the tax consequences of a transaction must be determined
by the form which the transaction takes, and not by any supposed
substance which the transaction could have, or might have, taken.
Although the preference for form over substance has not always been
applied in taxation (see the dicta of Lord Atkinson in Lethbridge
12v. Attorney-General)—  the principle was finally settled in favour of
13the form of a transaction in IRC v. Duke of Westminster.-—  In the
course of a celebrated and extensively quoted judgement, Lord Tomlin
said "Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so that
the tax payable is less than it otherwise would be, however
unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow
taxpayers may be of his ingenuity."—  In the Scottish case of
15Ayrshire Pullman Motors & David Ritchie Ltd v. IRC-—  Lord Clyde was 
more candid "No man in this country is under the slightest obligation,
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moral or otherwise, to so arrange his affairs that the Inland Revenue
16can put its largest possible shovel into his stores."—  These rather
grudging acceptances of the principle of tax avoidance were echoed by
Viscount Simon in Latilla v. IRC in the following terms "There is, of
course, no doubt that (taxpayers) are within their legal rights (in
avoiding tax) but that is no reason why their efforts, or those of the
professional gentlemen who assist them in the matter, should be
regarded as a commendable exercise of ingenuity or as a discharge of
the duties of good citizenship. On the contrary, one result of such
methods, if they succeed, is, of course, to increase the load of tax on
the shoulders of the great body of good citizens who do not desire, or
do not know how, to adopt these manoeuvres."—  More recently,
18judgements of the House of Lords in W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. IRC,—  IRC
19 20v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd.,-—  and Furniss v. Dawson,-—  show that although
the form of a transaction is to be the basis on which it is taxed, the
true form can only be determined by reference to the transaction taken
as a whole, and that in particular, where in a pre-ordained scheme or
arrangement, a step or steps are introduced which have no commercial
purpose other than the avoidance of tax, the Courts are entitled to
determine the form of the transaction without regard to these
interposed steps.
1.05 Until the true meaning of the Westminster case was explained
by the decision in Furniss v. Dawson the only satisfactory way of
preventing tax avoidance was by means of legislation. The history of
anti-avoidance legislation is relatively short. The phrase "legal
avoidance" was first officially used by the 1906 Select Committee,
chaired by Sir Charles Dilke. It seems that the 1906 Committee was the
first such body to appreciate the extent to which tax law might be
21manipulated to minimise the tax burden. Asquith— - considered that
nothing could be done about it. "Income tax under the present law, and
probably under any improvement they could make in the law could be
evaded (sic) to a large extent." Apparently Asquith regarded avoidance
22and evasion as more or less the same. But Austen Chamberlain—  saw it 
rather differently. "Evasion is the illegitimate denial of the tax and 
avoidance is the legitimate denial of the imposition of the tax. Hon.
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Gentlemen spoke of avoidance as if it were the refusal to recognise a 
moral obligation. I do not think that there is any moral obligation on 
the part of any taxpayer to pay more taxes than he is legally liable to 
pay."
231.06 The first anti-avoidance legislation was introduced in 1914,—  
in connection with Excess Profits Duty. The legislation dealt with 
so-called "artificial transactions" but it seems to have been easily 
circumvented. The sale of trading stock at contrived prices seems to 
have been a common and successful arrangement.
1.07 In 1922 following the recommendation of the 1920 Royal
Commission on Income Tax (the Colwyn Committee) legislation was
introduced to prevent the avoidance of super-tax through the
commercially unjustified retention of profits in closely controlled 
25companies.—  In 1936, a provision was introduced to restrict the
avoidance of income tax and super-tax through the use of trusts and 
26settlements.—  The Finance Act 1936 also contained the first attempt
at preventing tax avoidance through the transfer abroad of
27income-producing assets.—  However, until the Second World War, 
relatively low rates of income tax, and the absence of a comprehensive 
tax on capital gains, meant that there was often little incentive for 
taxpayers to adopt artificial and complex arrangements to avoid paying 
tax. With the increase in tax rates during and after the War, and in 
particular, following the introduction of corporation tax and capital 
gains tax in 1965, the benefits of tax avoidance grew substantially, 
and as a result, the trickle of anti-avoidance legislation developed 
into a flood. It is not difficult to appreciate why this should be so. 
The tax avoider, anxious to stay within the law although not to pay 
tax, must accept a degree of disclosure to the Inspector of Taxes. By 
presenting the tax avoidance symptoms, the taxpayer puts the Inland 
Revenue in a position to diagnose the malaise in the tax system, and to 
devise a cure, particularly if the scheme or arrangement is in 
widespread use, and results in a substantial loss of tax to the 
Exchequer. Tax evasion is quite different. The evader often 
volunteers no information, unless forced to do so. It is, of course,
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true that tax evasion is likely to be at its worst when tax rates are 
at their highest, but unlike tax avoidance, it seems that evasion has a 
long history.
1.08 Income tax in Great Britain was introduced by William Pitt the
Younger in 1799, to finance the Napoleonic Wars. The rate of tax was 2
shillings in the £1. Pitt resigned office in 1802, and was succeeded,
as Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, by Henry Addington
who repealed income tax when peace was declared following the Treaty of
Amiens. It is clear, however, from the Parliamentary Debates, that the
repeal of the tax had been forced on Addington by public demand, and
28that he himself saw much in its favour.—  Accordingly, in June 1803, 
after the resumption of the War with France, income tax was 
reintroduced, but subject to a number of amendments and safeguards to 
prevent the widespread fraud and evasion which had characterised Pitt’s 
income tax. Addington's Act is important in a number of respects, in 
particular, for the introduction of the principle of taxation at 
source, contained in Section 208 of the Act, which was carried forward, 
almost unchanged, into Sections 169 and 170 of the Income Tax Act 
1952.-^^ In addition, Addington altered Pitt’s heads of charge into 
the five schedules, A to E, which are still in use today. When Pitt 
succeeded Addington as Prime Minister and Chancellor he retained the 
new income tax, with a number of amendments, in the Act of 1805, while 
the final structure of income tax for the remainder of the War was 
settled by the Act of 1806 which was largely based on the Acts of 1803 
and 1805, and which continued in force until income tax was repealed in 
1816, when hostilities ceased.
1.09 In 1842, income tax was reintroduced by Sir Robert Peel. 
Although the 1842 Act was based on the Act of 1806, there were 
important differences reflecting economic and social developments since 
the turn of the 19th Century. But the administrative provisions of the 
1806 Act were reintroduced, largely unaltered, and so the Act of 1842 
is a convenient starting point for a survey of the development of the 
prevention of tax evasion.
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1.10 Income tax evasion had concerned both Pitt and Addington. The 
1799 Act was prefaced with these words "We your Majesty’s most dutiful
and loyal subjects .... taking notice that the provisions made for
that purpose (i.e. taxation)  have been greatly evaded, and
that many persons are not assessed ....". The references were to the
assessed taxes, on items such as clocks and watches, dogs, wigs, and 
servants, which preceded income tax. These taxes had always been 
resented. The poet, Robert Burns (1759-1796), himself an excise 
officer, expressed his disapproval of one such tax in the following 
fragment, entitled "On Mr. Pitt’s Hair-Powder Tax":-
"Pray, Billy Pitt, explain thy rigs 
This new poll-tax of thine!
’I mean to mark the GUINEA pigs 
From the other common SWINE’ "
1.10a Pitt’s concern to stamp out tax evasion is evident from the 
explanation he gave Parliament for the introduction of the new tax:-
"How then, it will be asked, is evasion and fraud to be checked? 
Knowing the difficulty of guessing what a man’s real liability is, 
I do not think that the charge of fixing what is to be the rate
ought to be left to the Commissioners. It would .... be most
acceptable .... to make it the duty of a particular officer, as
surveyor, to lay before the Commissioners such grounds of doubt as 
may occur to him on the amount of the rate at which the party may 
have assessed himself".—
1.10b The Acts of 1799 and 1803 both contained penalty provisions, 
and these were reproduced in Peel’s Income Tax Act of 1842. But 
although the penalties for evasion were severe, they had little effect 
because of the absence of administrative provisions to support them. 
Thus the Surveyor of Taxes could impose a penalty in a case of fraud, 
but was virtually powerless to collect it.
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1.11 In 1851 a Select Committee under William Hume M.P. met to
consider, inter alia, income tax evasion, and what should be done about 
it. The Committee was charged with the duty of collecting evidence of 
evasion, and making recommendations. The Committee certainly collected 
evidence, and concluded that there was widespread evasion of income tax 
under Schedule A. The Clerk to the London General Commissioners 
stated, in evidence, that "(taxpayers) seemed to have ascertained what
sum will pass (under Schedule A) and are content to go on with it". It
seems that the Committee had little grasp of evasion under Schedule D, 
and in any event, although it identified the problem, it was unable to 
come up with any solutions. It therefore presented Parliament with all 
the evidence which it had collected, and left it at that. An 
appreciation of Schedule D evasion might have escaped the grasp of the 
1851 Committee, but it did not escape the Board of Inland Revenue. The 
Board's Report of 1870 covering the years from 1856 to 1869, referred 
to a case where Schedule D profits of £6,500 were returned, but the 
true profit was £32,000, and another case where the reported profit of 
£190,000 was £60,000 understated. Yet no effective steps were taken to 
deal with the problem.
1.12 There was another Select Committee, the Hubbard Committee, in
1862. This Committee was primarily concerned with income tax
differentiation, although other matters were also before it, including
tax allowances for depreciation of plant and machinery. Income tax
evasion was also considered and the Committee concluded that it was
widespread and that something should be done about it. But the
Committee could not decide on what should be done, and seems to have
had some difficulty in separating the question of evasion from the
other matters under consideration. One member, Sir Stafford Northcote,
criticised the proposals for tax depreciation as defective, and stated
"the plans which are under consideration might, if adopted, increase
30rather than reduce the mischief (of evasion)".—  His statement was
never published in the official report. Nevertheless, some of the
deficiencies highlighted by the 1862 Committee were eventually dealt
with. The Taxes Management Act 1880 consolidated and improved the
machinery and administration of income tax. At that time, the General
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Commissioners were responsible for making most assessments, and the 
1880 Act gave the surveyor power to correct errors within four months 
from the end of the year of assessment. In addition, provision was
made to rectify omissions by means of a surcharge made within 12 months 
of the year end. These powers were, of course, hopelessly inadequate 
to deal with cases of serious evasion, particularly where fraud had to 
be established. This aspect was recognised in the next review of 
evasion, by a Departmental Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. C.T. 
Ritchie, M.P., which reported in 1905. The Committee took evidence, 
inter alia, from Mr. Stoodley, Secretary to the Board of Inland 
Revenue, and seems to have adopted many of the suggestions which he 
made. The Committee recommended that:-
1. Penalties should be imposed for failing to make a return, when 
asked to do so. The existing penalty code was almost powerless to 
deal with this weakness.
2. The existing penalty of £20 plus three times the tax due 
should be changed, to differentiate between fraud, and errors due
to ignorance or carelessness.
3. The period during which assessments could be made to recover 
lost tax should be increased to three years, and
4. There should be more frequent prosecutions for fraud, and the 
names of guilty taxpayers should be published, together with 
details of their cases.
The Finance Act 1907 incorporated all these recommendations, except the
31one about publishing the names of tax evaders.—
1.13 In 1911, the Inland Revenue, in its battle against evasion, 
received support from an unexpected source. Section 5 of the Perjury 
Act 1911, (which did not apply in Scotland) enabled prosecutions to be 
made against individuals who submitted false income tax returns, and 
made false claims. The Perjury Act was the basis of most public
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prosecutions for tax fraud up to the Second World War. It is still
available to the Revenue, although prosecutions are now usually made
under the Theft Act 1968. The Theft Act defines a number of offences
for the purposes of English law, including theft and fraud. It is an
English Act and may only form the basis of criminal prosecution in
England. It is to be observed that although the Theft Act abolished
the crime of "cheating" in English law, the crime was retained by
Section 36 of the Act in relation to taxation offences, and was the
basis of the criminal charge in the recent English case of R. v. 
31aMavji,--- a case on VAT fraud.
The nearest Scottish equivalent to the Perjury Act is the False Oaths 
(Scotland) Act 1933. Section 2 of the Act created a statutory offence 
of (a) making a false statutory declaration and (b) making a false
statement in any "abstract, account, balance sheet .... report,
returns, or other document". The penalty is a fine and/or
imprisonment. According to Gordons Criminal Law 2nd Edition para 
48-23, the 1933 Act is not used if the offence falls under another 
statutory provision, or constitutes perjury at common law.
1.14 In 1918, the Income Tax Act 1842, and subsequent Acts, were
consolidated into a new Income Tax Act. The 1918 Act extended to 239
Sections and 7 Schedules. Part 5 of the Act dealt with Administration, 
Part 6 with Assessments, Part 7 with Appeals, and Part 8 with
Collection. Unlike modern Acts, there was no penalty code as such;
instead, the penalty provisions were scattered throughout the Act. 
They may be summarised thus:-
A - MONETARY PENALTIES
1.15 1. Section 107 of the 1918 Act, consolidating Section 55 of the
Act of 1842, imposed a penalty on "A person who neglects or 
refuses to deliver, within the time limit in any general or 
particular notice, or wilfully makes delay in delivering a true
and correct list, declaration, or statement, which he is required
under this Act to deliver ......... " For this offence, the
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General Commissioners had power to impose a penalty of up to £20 
plus three times the tax with which the taxpayer ought to have 
been charged. In an action before the Court, however, the 
penalty was limited to £50, and if the taxpayer could show that 
he was not liable to tax, no penalty could be imposed.
2. Section 126, consolidating, inter alia, Section 63 of the 
Taxes Management Act 1880, provided that "If the surveyor 
discovers that a person liable to tax has not been charged in
respect thereof ......  he may, at any time within three years
after the expiration of the year of assessment for which that 
person ought to have been charged, surcharge, to the best of his 
judgement, the person liable, to the amount which ought to have 
been charged for that year". However, Section 127 provided that 
if a person surcharged made a complete and accurate return within 
10 days of the notice of surcharge, and the surveyor was 
satisfied with the return, the surcharge was to be withdrawn, 
while Section 129 provided for an appeals procedure by which, if 
he was successful, the taxpayer could have the surcharge quashed. 
In practice, therefore, a surcharge could not be effectively made 
in the absence of fraud.
3. Section 146, consolidating Section 127 of the 1842 Act, as 
amended by Section 23 of the Finance Act 1907, empowered the 
General Commissioners to impose a penalty where tax which ought 
to have been charged under Schedule D had not been charged due to 
an omission from a "statement or schedule" of the taxpayer. The 
maximum penalty was three times the tax with which he ought to 
have been charged, and could be made within three years of the 
end of the relevant year of assessment. However, no such .charge 
could be made if the taxpayer could satisfy the Commissioners 
that the omission did not proceed from any "fraud, covin, art, or 
contrivance, or any gross or wilful neglect".
4. Section 100, which consolidated Section 52 of the Act of 
1842, as amended by Section 22 of the Finance Act 1907, was the
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section which imposed on a taxpayer the obligation to make an 
income tax return when required to do so, and whether or not he 
was chargeable to tax. But the penalty imposed on a person who 
failed to comply with the section but was not liable to tax was 
limited to £5 for any one offence.
B - FALSE RETURNS
1.16 1. Section 107 of the Act, which has previously been described,
was concerned not only with the failure to make a return, but 
also with the making of a false return. The penalty for each 
offence was the same. The phrase used in the section - "failure
to make a true and correct return11 - was considered in Lord
32 33Advocate v. A.B.-—  and Attorney-General v. Till.—
Attorney-General v. Till was an English case about whether the
requirement to deliver a return meant a requirement to deliver a
return which was true and correct. In a lengthy judgement, the
House of Lords decided that it did, and that the person who made
a return which was incorrect was in the same position, as regards
a penalty, as someone who failed to make a return at all. The
leading judgement was delivered by the Lord Chancellor, who
attached "great importance to the rule that unless penalties are
imposed in clear terms they are not enforceable". In finding for
the Revenue, his Lordship not only reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeal, but confirmed the judgement of the Court of
Session in the earlier case of Lord Advocate v. A.B.(sub.nom.
32Lord Advocate v. Sawers).—  An interesting historical feature of 
the Scottish case is that it was brought, not in terms of tax 
legislation itself, but under Section 22 of the Inland Revenue 
Regulation Act 1890, by way of information placed before the Lord 
Ordinary in the Outer House. The decision of the Lord Ordinary 
was reclaimed (appealed) to the First Division of the Inner 
House, where the Lord President confirmed the Lord Ordinary's 
finding. The taxpayer then elected, in terms of Section 6 of the 
Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act, for trial by jury, but the Lord 
Ordinary found that since he had a discretion over the procedure
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to be adopted, and since in practice over many years, Revenue 
cases had been heard by a Judge without a jury, the taxpayer’s 
application for trial by jury should be refused. A note at the 
end of the case states that within a few days, the taxpayer 
settled with the Revenue.
2. Section 132, which consolidated Section 178 of the 1842 Act,
provided that "Where a person who ought to be charged with tax, 
as directed by this Act, is not duly assessed and charged by 
reason that he has:-
(a) fraudulently changed his place of residence or 
fraudulently converted, or fraudulently released assigned or
conveyed, any of his property or,
(b) made or delivered any statement or schedule which is false 
or fraudulent, or,
(c) fraudulently converted any of his property .........  in
order not to be charged for the same or any part thereof, or
(d) been guilty of any falsehoods, wilful neglect, fraud covin 
art or contrivance whatsoever ............. " -
he was to be assessed and charged three times the amount of the 
charge which ought to have been made upon him. The section also 
provided that if any charge had been made which was less than the 
amount due, the penalty was to be treble the amount of the 
difference. Section 132 also provided that any person who
"wilfully aids, abets, assists, incites, or induces another 
person to make or deliver a false or fraudulent account,
statement, or declaration.......... " was to be liable to a
fixed penalty of £100 for every offence.
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C - FALSE CLAIMS FOR RELIEFS OR ABATEMENT
1.17 The principal statutory weapon here was Section 30 of the 1918 
Act, consolidating Section 166 of the Act of 1842. The Section applied 
where a person, in making a claim for any "exemption abatement or 
relief" (subsequently amended by the Finance Act 1920 to "allowance or 
deduction"), was guilty of any fraud or contrivance, or made a 
fraudulent claim, the penalty being £20 plus three times the tax 
chargeable on all his income. A person wilfully aiding or abetting 
anyone to commit such an offence was liable for a fixed penalty of 
£500. There was no power to mitigate either penalty, which was imposed 
by the Court.
1.18 If this summary of the 1918 Act provisions does anything, it
shows that even before the days of sophisticated income tax law, the
penalty code was already in a hopeless mess. Other parts of the tax
system, for example the taxation of life insurance companies, were also
piecemeal and inadequate. Income tax evasion was a major cause for
concern. Ever since the Ritchie Committee of 1905, therefore, there
had been calls for a thorough review of all aspects of income tax. In
341919, a Royal Commission on Income Tax, chaired by Lord Colwyn,—  was 
set up. It reported in 1920. The Colwyn Committee had an immense 
impact on the tax system, and until well after the Second World War, it 
was the point of reference for any serious discussion on tax reform.
1.19 In framing its recommendations on the prevention of tax 
evasion, the Colwyn Committee seems to have been much influenced by the 
evidence presented, on behalf of the Board of Inland Revenue, by Mr. E. 
Stanford London, CBE, a Deputy Inspector of Taxes. The line taken by 
Mr. Stanford London was that the penalty provisions were designed to 
have a deterrent effect, and that such an effect could not be achieved 
unless
(a) the penalty code was seen and understood as a code of 
punishment, and,
(b) it was seen to be effective.
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The Committee adopted many of Mr. Stanford London’s proposals and made 
the following recommendations:-
1. that the existing three year time limit for penalty proceedings 
should be increased to six years
2. that the High Court should be able to impose the same penalties 
as could be imposed by the Commissioners
3. that penalties for false returns made by a company should be 
capable of being charged on the company or on its directors, and that 
where penalties were imposed on a partnership, any partner should be 
capable of being charged
4. that it should no longer be possible for a taxpayer to purge the 
offence of an incorrect return, by making a correct one, and
5. that the penalty for aiding or abetting the making of a false 
return should be increased.
1.20 The first of the Colwyn Committee’s recommendations to be 
enacted was contained in the Finance Act 1923. Section 23(1) of the 
1923 Act said that proceedings for the recovery of any fine or penalty 
incurred under the Income Tax Acts in relation to income tax, charged 
for the year 1920-21 or any subsequent year, could be commenced at any 
time within six years next after the date on which it was incurred. 
Sub-section (2) of Section 23 enacted that the penalty in Court 
proceedings, under Section 107 of the Income Tax Act 1918, should be 
increased to the same penalty as was exigible in proceedings before 
Commissioners. And finally, Section 23(3) increased to £500 the 
penalty for aiding and abetting another person to make or deliver a 
false or fraudulent return, etc.
1.21 The next important alteration to the administrative and 
penalty code came in 1927. Section 43 of the 1927 Act, the forerunner 
of Section 7 of the Taxes Management Act 1970, laid on taxpayers an 
obligation, when required to do so by the Inspector, to make a return
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of all sources of income, and of the amount derived from each source. 
The section also provided that the penalty provisions regarding the 
delivery of lists, declarations, statements, and other information 
should apply to Section 43. Section 19 of the Finance Act 1939 was 
also concerned with notices and information, by placing on employers
the obligation to make a return of emoluments and other sums paid to
employees.
1.22 1942 was a watershed in the Revenue's fight against tax
evasion. Until then, the Revenue time limit of six years in making an
assessment had the effect that, where fraud or evasion had been
committed over a long period, the Revenue could get tax for only the 
immediately preceding six years of assessment. From the point of view 
of the Revenue, therefore, Section 33 of the Finance Act 1942 was a 
major step forward, because it provided that, in respect of the fiscal 
year 1936/37 and subsequent years, assessments could be made at any 
time, for the purposes of making good any loss of tax attributable to 
fraud or wilful default committed by or on behalf of any person. The 
time limit of 1936/37 ensured that the legislation was not 
retrospective. In addition to extending the time limit for assessment, 
Section 33(2) provided that proceedings for the recovery of any penalty 
connected with such an assessment could be commenced within three years 
from the final determination of the amount of tax covered by the 
assessment. Tax payable under such an assessment was finally 
determined when the assessment could no longer be varied by the 
Commissioners or the Court, and any objection to the making of an 
assessment was to be made by way of an appeal.
1.23 Section 35 of the 1942 Act was a further weapon in the 
Revenue's anti-evasion armoury. This section provided that where a 
person engaged in a trade, profession, or vocation, failed to deliver a 
statement of profits or gains, or where such a statement was delivered, 
but was regarded as incorrect, the Revenue could serve on that person a 
notice requiring him to deliver his accounts to the Inspector, and 
where these accounts have been audited, to provide a copy of the 
auditor's certificate; and to provide the Inspector with all books
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documents and accounts in his possession or power relative to his
trade, profession or vocation. Where a person failed to comply with
such a notice without a reasonable excuse, he was to be liable to a
penalty of £50, plus £50 for every day during which the offence
continued after judgement had been given against him. The section was
strengthened by giving Commissioners power to issue precepts ordering
the production of the matters specified in the section, and empowering
the Inspector to take copies or extracts from any books or documents
which were made available. The Finance Act 1942 had thus enacted a
recommendation of the Colwyn Committee made more than 20 years earlier.
But it was not without criticism in Parliament. Clauses 32 to 34 took
up more Parliamentary time than any other single topic in the 1942
Finance Bill. The Attorney-General, in answering criticisms, admitted
that existing procedures were vulnerable, but maintained that the
taxpayer's protection was adequate - the power was vested in the Board
of Inland Revenue, not the Inspector, and so the Inspector could only
act with Board approval. In the light of the recent case of
36I.R.C. v. Rossminster—  such assurances might well be regarded by some 
as having a somewhat hollow ring.
1.24 The final change of importance in the penalty code, before the
law was consolidated in 1952, came in 1947, when Section 8 of the 
Finance (No. 2) Act of that year made provision for statutory interest 
on overdue tax, at the rate of 3%, where tax remained unpaid for more 
than three months after the due date for payment. It will be observed 
that the tax had to have been assessed before interest was due. The 
idea of "default" interest on tax lost due to tax evasion was not
considered until 1960.
1.25 The Income Tax Act 1952 was a consolidation of the 1918 Act
and subsequent Finance Acts. The Act of 1952 was, in a sense, a
catalyst whereby the existing system, with its roots firmly in the 1842
Act, was prepared for the radical, and far reaching, changes which were
to come. Many of these changes were recommended in the reports of
37another Royal Commission on Taxation, the Radcliffe Committee—  of 
which the final two volumes were published in 1954 and 1955. The 
Radcliffe Committee was charged with a wide-ranging enquiry into all
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aspects of the existing income tax system, and so it was inevitable 
that some consideration was given to tax evasion. The Committee 
rightly concluded that the key to preventing tax evasion was a good 
system of information about taxable income, and so it recommended that 
every taxpayer engaged in a trade, profession or vocation should be 
obliged to keep elementary business records, and that accounts 
submitted to the Inspector in support of an income tax return should 
form part of the return. The Committee also recommended an extension of 
the power of the Inspector to examine business records, and said that 
this power should also cover the examination of private records, where 
these had a bearing on income tax liabilities. On penalties, the 
Committee found itself "in something of a quandary" (para. 1070) since 
it was plain from the evidence taken, and from the work of the Income 
Tax Codification Committee, that the penalty code was complex and 
confusing, yet the Board of Inland Revenue considered that the penalty
sections "though they contain some dead wood and overlapping, .......
work satisfactorily in practice". (para. 1069). Accordingly, the 
Committee found itself unable to make specific recommendations, but it 
made a number of general recommendations including:-
(a) the restructuring of the penalty code to avoid confusion and 
overlap,
(b) the extension of the time limit for assessment on deceased 
taxpayers, where tax has been lost due to fraud, wilful default or 
neglect, to a period of six years from the date of death, the 
assessments to be raised within three years of death, and,
(c) a sharper distinction between fraud where intent to deceive was 
present, and lesser offences involving carelessness or negligence.
1.26 The Radcliffe Report was a milestone in the development of the
modern tax system. Another milestone, although a somewhat embarrassing
one for the Revenue, was the decision of the House of Lords in I.R.C. 
38v. Hinchy,—  where a retired civil servant who had omitted to return 
interest of £18.30, found himself liable for a penalty of £438.72. The 
case is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. It was plain, following
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the Hinchy case, that something was seriously wrong with the penalty 
provisions, any doubts being dispelled by the caustic comments of their 
Lordships in the House. The Finance Act 1960 therefore introduced an 
entirely new, and modern, penalty code. The 1960 Act swept away the 
somewhat antiquated language of the 1952 consolidation, and provided 
for three offences; fraud, wilful default, and neglect. The 1960 Act 
also upgraded the fixed penalties for offences, and ensured that 
tax-geared penalties were based on the tax lost, and not on the 
taxpayer’s total liability, which is what had emerged from the Hinchy 
case. In addition, the new law differentiated between the offences, by 
prescribing heavier maximum penalties for fraud and wilful default than 
for the less serious offence of neglect. The existing Revenue power to 
mitigate penalties was retained.
1.27 The income tax machinery provisions and the new penalty code
were consolidated, first in the Income Tax Management Act 1964, and
again, in the Taxes Management Act 1970. Since 1970 there have been
three legislative changes of importance. First, in 1975 the provisions
governing the payment of interest on overdue tax, and the payment of
tax under appeal, were changed, to ensure that taxpayers could not
obtain a financial advantage merely by delaying the settlement of an
outstanding appeal. Next, there were a number of administrative
changes in 1984, to ensure that "delay cases" and non-contentious
appeals are heard by the General Commissioners and not by the Special
Commissioners. Finally, the Revenue were given new powers of entry and
search in the Finance Act 1975. These powers were subsequently used by
the Revenue against Rossminster Bank Ltd. and a number of its
directors. In consequence of the Revenue's behaviour, the Bank
unsuccessfully sought a Judicial Review of the way in which the Revenue
36had operated the relevant legislation.—  Shortly after that
unsuccessful application, the Revenue announced that criminal
proceedings were not to be taken against the Bank or any of its
directors and as a result, the Bank raised an action for damages
against the Revenue. That action has not yet been heard by the Courts.
However, the considerable disquiet caused by the attitude of the
36Revenue in the Rossminster—  case, led to the appointment of a 
Committee, the Keith Committee, to review the powers of the Revenue
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Departments. The Keith Committee reported in 1983 and its 
recommendations, or some of them, may become law in due course. Some
of the recommendations on value added tax are already in force.
1.28 Until such time as the Keith Committee recommendations reach 
the Statute Book, the Taxes Management Act 1970 is the point of 
reference for any analysis of the administrative provisions of the 
income tax system, and of the penalties exigible for tax offences. A 
brief examination of the structure of the 1970 Act serves to round off 
this historical survey of the development of the system, and to 
introduce the later chapters of this dissertation.
1.29 It is self-evident that no direct tax system can operate 
without procedures for identifying those persons who are liable to pay 
tax, and obtaining from them sufficient information for their tax 
liabilities to be calculated. Parts II and III of the Act of 1970 
contain 22 sections which (a) impose on taxpayers the obligation to 
notify the Revenue if they are liable to tax; (b) require taxpayers to 
make returns of income and capital gains, when asked to do so by the 
Inspector; and (c) require from certain third parties information 
about income and gains received by others. Failure to comply with 
these provisions is examined in Chapter 2, in the context of fraud, 
wilful default and neglect.
1.30 In addition to finding out who is liable to pay tax, a good 
tax system must ensure that the tax due is properly calculated, and 
that taxpayers know what they are due to pay, and when they must pay 
it. Taxpayers who have been wrongly assessed must have a right of 
appeal. Part IV of the 1970 Act is concerned with the assessing 
procedure; with the time limits for assessments; and with appeals 
against assessments, and other remedies open to taxpayers. The appeals 
procedure itself is dealt with in Part V, while Part VI is concerned 
with the collection and recovery of outstanding tax. Chapter 2 deals 
with assessments to tax so far as relevant to this dissertation, while 
Chapter 5 deals with appeals and other remedies.
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1.31 Default interest and pecuniary penalties are dealt with in 
Parts IX and X of the Act. Part IX deals with interest on overdue tax, 
including interest on tax not properly or timeously assessed due to 
fraud, wilful default, or neglect. Part X deals with penalties. The 
civil offences of fraud, wilful default, and neglect, are discussed in 
Chapter 2. Default interest is dealt with in Chapter 3, and penalties 
in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 2
FRAUD, WILFUL DEFAULT, AND NEGLECT
2.01 Of the three civil offences of fraud, wilful default, and 
neglect, only one - fraud - is a crime, and only one other - neglect - 
is statutorily defined in the Taxes Management Act 1970. That 
definition says that "neglect" means negligence, or a failure to do 
something which the Taxes Acts require a taxpayer to do,— except that 
failure is not neglect if the taxpayer has a reasonable excuse for the 
failure, and puts it right within a reasonable time after the excuse 
has ceased.—
FRAUD
2.02 In the absence of a statutory definition of fraud for taxation 
purposes, it is submitted that the civil offence of fraud and the crime 
of fraud have the same characteristics, except that the standard of 
proof needed to establish the crime is the higher - criminal - standard 
of "evidence beyond reasonable doubt".
2.03 The crime of fraud, in Scots law, is a crime at common law. 
In this respect, it is fundamentally different from the English crime, 
which is the subject of an elaborate statutory framework continued in 
Sections 16 to 20 of the Theft Act 1968 which codified, and amended, 
the English common law. This difference raises an immediate problem. 
It is clear that if a taxpayer in Scotland is charged with the crime of 
fraud, he will be tried according to Scots procedure, and his guilt or 
innocence will be determined according to the law of Scotland. But 
what is the position of a taxpayer against whom the Revenue allege
fraud before a hearing in Scotland of the General or Special
Commissioners? Tax statutes apply to the United Kingdom as a whole. 
Is, therefore, a taxpayer likely to find himself being criminally 
prosecuted under one set of rules, but subject to a different, civil, 
code of law for the same offence? The writer considers that the answer
to this question is "no". In Scotland, Scots law must apply to both
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the civil and criminal offences. So the Commissioners, in dealing with
a case of alleged fraud in Scotland, must apply the principles of Scots
law. Questions of jurisdiction, as between England and Scotland, may
be relevant in criminal prosecutions for tax fraud. In civil cases,
jurisdiction is likely to be determined by the place of residence of
the taxpayer as determining the place where Commissioners hear the
appeal. In the case of a criminal prosecution, however, there may be a
conflict where, for example, a fraud is started in England and finished
in Scotland. In Laird v. H.M. Advocate, a fraud was performed partly
in Scotland partly in England, against an English company. The High
Court of Justiciary,in Scotland, held that since the main, and
originating act took place in Scotland, the Scottish Courts had
2ajurisdiction to hear the appeal.—
2.04 There is nothing unusual in finding that fiscal statutes, 
drafted by reference to English Law, have a different meaning or 
different application in Scotland. In 1905, in L.A. v. Countess 
of Moray,— Lord Dunedin said "It is useless not to recognise the fact 
that (revenue) statutes are usually framed by draftsman but little 
conversant with the forms and requirements of (the law of) Scotland" 
In these circumstances the Scottish Courts must apply the law of 
Scotland to the words used.
2.05 In Scots law, the crime of simple fraud is the crime of
deception or false pretence which is linked to, or causes, a practical
result, and it is fundamental that the falsehood should have been
perpetrated with the intent of causing the result. The absence of
intent breaks the link between the two essential elements of the crime.
McDonald’s "Treaties on the Criminal Law of Scotland" (1867 at page 52)
expresses that principle the other way round, as a definite practical
result brought about by false pretences. The false pretences need not,
however, be positive acts. Silence can, in circumstances, be
fraudulent where, for example, a person has a duty to disclose
information which he fails to do. This was the basis of the charge in
4
a leading case on fraud in Scotland, Strathern v. Fogal,—  where a 
landlord fraudulently evaded the payment of rates by omitting 
information from a return sent to the local assessor. The facts in
41
Strathern closely parallel the deliberate failure to make, or the
omission of information from, returns for tax purposes. Fraud may also
exist where a person makes an innocent statement which is subsequently
found to have been false, but which is not corrected. Section 97 of
the 1970 Act says that, in relation to the civil offence, such conduct
amounts to negligence. But it may amount to a fraud at common law.
Dr. Gill, in his thesis "The Crime of Fraud - A Comparative Study1—
£
cites H.M. Advocate v. Livingston— in support of the proposition that 
fraud exists where a person knew that the disclosure of facts would 
lead another to act otherwise than he did and otherwise than the 
accused wished him to act. In Livingston the accused was a bankrupt, 
who ordered goods on credit without disclosing that he was a bankrupt, 
and in full knowledge that the goods bought could not be paid for.
2.06 It does not seem settled as to whether an opinion can be an
element in fraud. An essential feature of the crime seems to be that
there has been a fraudulent act. But Dr. Gill has expressed the view
that an opinion, if not honestly held, could amount to
7
misrepresentation. He cites H.M. Advocate v. Pattison,—  in which a 
deliberately false opinion on the value of stocks was held to be 
relevant in a fraud charge, to support his proposition. For example, 
if a taxpayer claims relief for a trading loss, he may be obliged to 
demonstrate to the Inspector that the business which sustained the loss 
has been carried on commercially and with a view to profit, in terms of 
Section 170 of the Taxes Act 1970. That involves in part at least an 
opinion. If the taxpayer falsely represents to the Inspector that he 
expects the business to make a profit when he believes that it will 
never be profitable, is that fraud? It would seem that the short
answer to the question is "Yes", but even if it were "No" it is
unlikely that the short answer on its own would have satisfied the 
Inspector, and answers to further enquiries might involve falsehood 
amounting to fraud.
g
2.07 The decision in Adcock v. Archibald— shows that the practical 
result which is necessary to establish fraud is sufficiently wide that 
any result whereby the dupe has been prejudiced will be sufficient. 
For practical purposes, fraud in taxation will usually result in a loss
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of tax to the Crown. If there is no loss of tax, there can be no
tax-geared penalty, although there may be a fixed penalty. But if
there is no loss of tax, may not there still be a practical result
9
whereby the taxpayer is guilty of fraud? In Geddes— a man was charged 
with pretending to be a police officer, and asking drivers to produce 
their driving licences. The charge stated that the accused did 
"fraudulently induce them to do acts which they would otherwise not 
have done". Clearly, the persons duped suffered no economic loss, and 
no lasting prejudice except inconvenience. Nevertheless, the Crown 
Office thought that there was sufficient prejudice to mount a charge of 
fraud. It would seem, therefore, that a person who fraudulently 
submits wrong information to the Revenue which does not affect his tax 
liability, may nevertheless be guilty of fraud. However, a leading 
modern authority, Gordon's Criminal Law,—  2nd Edition, suggests that 
in practice a person is unlikely to be accused of fraud if the 
practical result does not include economic loss, or at least some 
measurable prejudice.
2.08 The essential feature of fraud in taxation, and the reason why 
it is so difficult to prove, is that the Revenue must show, in a civil 
case, that on the preponderance of probabilities, the result which was 
obtained by the dishonest conduct was the result which the taxpayer 
intended his conduct to bring about. In Cullens Trustees v.
Johnstone-^- the Lord President said at page 937 "When you are 
considering whether, in making the statement, he acted fraudulently, 
you must go into his mind and purpose and intention and see whether his 
mind was in that corrupt, and I would almost say guilty, state when he 
made these statements. If it appears upon clear evidence,
circumstantial it may be, that there were no reasonable grounds to 
believe the statements or that he did not believe them to be true and 
if it appeared that in making them he had a fraudulent purpose to
deceive .......  that will be sufficient. But they must be pregnant
circumstances, because, I must repeat to you again, that the law in no
case presumes fraud - in no doubtful matter does the law lean to the
conclusion of fraud. Fraud is a thing that must be clearly and 
conclusively established." It follows, therefore, that intent to 
deceive involves two questions of fact; the accused's belief as to the
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truth, or honesty, of what he asserted or did, and his intention as to
the belief of the dupe. The first part of that test is quite clearly a
12subjective one. In the English case of Derry v. Peek—  Lord Herschell 
adopted the following formulation for fraud, incorporating an 
essentially subjective test:- "Fraud is proved where it is shown that a 
false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief 
in its truth, or (3) recklessly, that is careless whether it be true or 
false". His Lordship then qualified his use of the word "recklessly" 
by saying that it might be fraud because "for one who makes a statement 
under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what 
he states". Recklessness may therefore be evidence of the subjective 
intent to deceive. Recklessness or carelessness, however, do not 
constitute an element in fraud unless they are of such a degree as to 
lead to the conclusion that there was indifference to the truth. 
Moreover, this deliberate recklessness, or, at the least, indifference 
to the truth, must have been perpetrated with the intention of 
deception. The intent, or mens rea is the crucial element.
2.09 In the practical circumstances of income tax it is not 
difficult to see the Inland Revenue’s problem in establishing that a 
taxpayer is guilty of tax fraud. If, for example, profits are 
understated, or items of income or expense are wrongly classified, or 
trading stock or work-in-progress is wrongly valued, or provisions are 
wrongly calculated, the result may well be an underdeclaration of
taxable income. But to establish fraud, the Crown would have to show
that the errors were deliberately, or at the very least, recklessly 
made with the intention of evading tax, and in practice, that may be 
difficult. It may be made easier if a pattern can be established. 
Even then, however, false accounts may have been produced to deceive a 
bank, or shareholders, or partners, or an estranged spouse. The 
deception of the Inland Revenue, in these circumstances, would be 
incidental to the purpose of the pretence. Alternatively, it may be 
easier to establish fraud in a case where it can be shown that the only 
person who could have been deceived was the Inspector of Taxes where, 
for example, false wages books are kept with a view to the
underdeclaration of income tax under PAYE, or false self-employed
sub-contractors certificates are produced, or where there is evidence
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of collusion between two or more parties and only the Revenue could
13suffer. The case of L.A. v. Keay-—  was a prosecution of an accountant 
who falsified the accounts and tax computations of clients with the 
result that their tax liabilities were fraudulently reduced. The 
accountant obtained no benefit from these frauds, some of which were 
unknown to his clients. He was found guilty, and sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment. In that case, the accused had pled guilty to the 
charge of fraud perhaps because he could suggest no possible purpose 
for the fraudulent entries in the accounts and statements, except the 
deception the Inland Revenue. More recently, in December 1986, the 
former champion jockey Mr. Lester Piggott was arrested on a warrant 
which alleged that he had made a false statement to the Inland Revenue 
about his tax affairs. Press reports have suggested that he had given 
the Inland Revenue wrong information about certain bank accounts, and 
that the Revenue had alleged that this wrong information had been 
deliberately given to evade taxation.
2.10 In view of the importance of mens rea or intent to the charge
of fraud, and the difficulties experienced in establishing it, it is
not difficult to envisage certain facts and circumstances which are
more indicative of fraud than others. The Revenue gave evidence to the 
13aKeith Committee  that three-fifths of all cases of suspected fraud
referred by tax districts to the Enquiry Branch were regarded as 
serious, because the amount of tax lost was likely to be in excess of 
£20,000 and there were other factors suggesting that the taxpayer had 
intended to deceive the Revenue. These "other factors" included:-
a. the fact that the taxpayer under enquiry was a professional 
adviser in tax matters,
b. evidence of collusion between the taxpayer and others to defraud 
the Revenue,
c. evidence of forged documents intended to deceive the Revenue,
d. the fact that the taxpayer had denied that there were 
irregularities, and the Revenue had proof that there were,
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e. the fact that the taxpayer had completed a "certificate of 
disclosure" or a "statement of assets" which he alleged to be true and 
which was subsequently found to be materially wrong,
f. that one offence was followed by another offence, and,
g. that the fraud was exceptionally large or ingenious.
2.11 The statistics for prosecutions show that most successful
convictions were for frauds under the sub-contractors tax deduction
scheme (about 100 a year on average, over the past five years) with
successful prosecutions for false accounts being, on average, no more
14than 40 a year for a similar period.—  These statistics perhaps 
reflect the very difficult hurdles which the Revenue have to surmount 
in establishing fraud as a criminal matter, and in particular, the 
strict requirement of corroboration in Scots law.
WILFUL DEFAULT
2.12 In practice, there is no difference in taxation between the
civil offence of fraud and the civil offence of wilful default. The
Revenue’s powers to make assessments to recover tax lost due to fraud 
and wilful default are the same, and the same penalties are exigible 
where fraud or wilful default are established. Moreover, the two 
offences are not mutually exclusive. In Frederick Lack v. Doggett-^- 
back duty assessments were made on a company, on the basis that 
expenditure by a director and principal shareholder must have come from 
undisclosed company profits. The Commissioners and the High court 
found for the Revenue. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the taxpayer 
contended that the findings of facts by the Commissioners pointed to 
fraud, and that accordingly, the taxpayer could not be guilty of wilful 
default. The Court held that fraud and wilful default were not 
mutually exclusive, and that the Commissioners had not erred in law in 
finding that wilful default had been established.
2.13 The Taxes Acts contain no definition of "wilful default" for
taxation purposes. The phrase has been considered, however, in the
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context of other legislation. In City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. 
16Ltd.-—  Mr. Justice Romer said, in the High Court:- "But if an act or
omission amounts to a breach of his duty, and therefore to negligence,
is the person guilty of wilful negligence? In my opinion, that
question must be answered in the negative unless he knows that he is
committing, and intends to commit, a breach of his duty, or is
recklessly careless in the sense of not caring whether his act or
omission is or is not a breach of duty." That definition was quoted by
17Mr. Justice Wilberforce in Wellington v. Reynolds-—  as a reasonable 
working definition of wilful default in taxation. In considering the 
word "recklessly" Mr. Justice Wilberforce said:- "No doubt, if one 
considers the word "recklessly", some adjustment may have to be made in 
relation to the particular duty which is cast upon a taxpayer as
compared with the particular duty cast upon a director or an auditor of
a company; but it is clear that what I have to find is some deliberate 
or intentional failure to do what the taxpayer ought to have done, 
knowing that to omit to do so was wrong. What the taxpayer’s duty was, 
in such a case as this, was to make a true and correct return in
relation to income tax to the best of his judgement and belief; so
that is what I have to consider here".
2.14 The term "wilful default" has been considered in the context
of Section 30 of the Trustee Act 1925. It has been held that the
phrase in that section implies either a consciousness of negligence, or
breach of duty, or recklessness in the performance of a duty. In a
18case on earlier English trust law,—  wilful default by a trustee was 
held to be the wilful failure to do something which ought to be done, 
as distinguished from doing something which ought not to be done. It 
must not be assumed, however, that wilful default in taxation, is
limited to a deliberate failure to do something required to be done.
Any error recklessly or carelessly made will amount to wilful default, 
if the recklessness or carelessness amounted to a disregard for the 
truth.
2.15 In practice, there may be no obvious and meaningful
distinction between the civil offence of fraud and the civil offence of 
wilful default, but it seems clear that wilful default is something
47
less than fraud. In Barney v. Pybu&—  Mr. Justice Wynn-Parry said,
"Prima facie a man must be presumed to intend the results which
naturally flow from what he does. Prima facie, therefore, the
conclusion ought to be that he deliberately refrained from making any
returns of income over that period, in which case he was guilty of
20fraud or at least of wilful default." In a later case, Brown v. IRC-—  
the Special Commissioners found that the taxpayer had deliberately 
omitted, from his tax returns, dividends received by his wife, knowing 
that for tax purposes they should be included. In the High Court, Mr. 
Justice Stamp said:- "It seems to me the Special Commissioners are 
perfectly right in holding as they did hold, that Mr. Brown in omitting 
to make proper returns in respect of his income was, if not guilty of 
fraud, at least guilty of wilful default".
2.16 Given that wilful default is less than fraud, what is the
difference? It is submitted that the difference is that it is not
necessary to establish that there was intent to deceive in wilful 
default. So the man who prepared wrong accounts to deceive his
partners does not defraud the Revenue, but if he submits them to the 
Inspector knowing that they are wrong, he is certainly guilty of wilful 
default.
NEGLECT
2.17 For taxation purposes, neglect is defined in Section 118 of
the 1970 Act as "negligence, or a failure to give any notice, make any 
return or produce or furnish any document or other information required 
by or under the Taxes Acts". There is a saving in Section 118(2) which 
provides that "for the purpose of this Act, a person shall be deemed 
not to have failed to do anything required to be done within a limited 
time if he did it within such further time, if any, as the Board or the 
Commissioners or officer concerned may have allowed; and where a person 
who has a reasonable excuse for not doing anything required to be done 
he shall be deemed not to have failed to do it if he did it without
unreasonable delay after the excuse has ceased." The saving does not
apply to the requirements to make returns for corporation tax purposes, 
within Section 10(1) of the 1970 Act.
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2.18 Negligence and wilful default are mutually exclusive. In Day
21v. Williams-—  the General Commissioners found that the taxpayer was 
guilty of "neglect tinged with wilful default". The High Court found 
that the taxpayer was guilty of neglect only, and not of wilful 
default.
2.19 The definition of "neglect" in Section 118 is in two parts.
The second part, neglect through failure, implies an objective test. A 
taxpayer who fails that test is guilty of neglect, unless he can show
either that he was allowed extra time to do what the Taxes Acts
required, or that he had a reasonably excuse for his failure. A
taxpayer may obtain extra time to do something required by the Acts by 
asking the Inspector or other officer for it. Alternatively, he may be 
able to establish that the Revenue have tacitly given him extra time to 
complete a requirement. In one unreported case before the Special 
Commissioners, on interest under Section 88 of the Taxes Management Act 
1970, a taxpayer had failed to report a capital gain within the time 
provided for by the Act. Instead, he submitted business accounts from 
which the gain was omitted. When it was discovered that the gain had 
been missed from the accounts, the Revenue were told, but did not raise 
assessments. The income tax return was then lodged, even later than
the late-reported gain. Some time after that, the Inspector maintained 
that the gain (but nothing else) had been reported late and that 
interest was due under Section 88 of the 1970 Act. The Special 
Commissioners held that the Inspector’s application for an interest 
certificate should be refused. By accepting, without comment, the late
return, the Revenue had tacitly given extra time for the late reported
. 22 gam.—
2.20 Where a taxpayer seeks to avoid a charge of neglect through 
failure, on the grounds that he was given extra time by the Revenue, 
the onus is on him to show that extra time was given. So also with the 
defence of "reasonable excuse". In practice, most arguments about 
"reasonable excuse" arise in connection with Revenue claims for 
interest under Section 88 of the Taxes Management Act 1970. Since 
applications for interest certificates under Section 88 are not capable 
of appeal beyond the Commissioners, none of the Commissioners decisions
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are reported. The phase "reasonable excuse" appears, however, in
Section 15(4) of the Finance Act 1985, in connection with value added
tax, and has been considered by VAT Tribunals in that context. The
decisions show that what is or is not a "reasonable excuse" is largely
a question of fact and impression for the appellate Tribunal. One
principle seems to have emerged, however, that ignorance of the law
should not be taken as a reasonable excuse for value added tax 
23purposes.—  It is submitted that such an unqualified principle is too 
broad. For example, the reason for the ignorance of the law may itself 
be a reasonable excuse where, for example, a taxpayer asks the Revenue 
of Customs for an explanation of the law, and the explanation given is 
wrong. On the other hand, it would not be a reasonable excuse, it is 
submitted, for a taxpayer to know that he may have legal obligations, 
but make no effort to find out what they are.
2.21 Actionable negligence has four main characteristics. First,
there must be some act, or a failure to act, which is voluntary, in the
sense that the taxpayer could have done otherwise than he did. Second,
the act or failure to act must have caused some harm or loss. Next, it
must have been reasonably foreseen that the act, or failure, would
cause the harm or loss. Finally, the person whose act or failure
caused the harm or loss must have had a duty of care to ensure that the
loss or harm did not arise, and the standard of care which he exercised
must have fallen short of the standard of care which a reasonable man
24would have adopted in the circumstances.—
2.22 Applying these principles to taxation disputes, it is plain
that the first three are of little practical relevance. Obligations
under the Taxes Management Act 1970 are statutory obligations. If a
taxpayer fails to meet his obligations, and as a result tax is not
assessed, or not fully and timeously assessed, there has been a loss to
the Crown and it must be reasonable to foresee such a loss arising. It
also seems indisputable that there is a duty on a taxpayer to comply
with his obligations with reasonable care. The law cannot, of course,
expect the taxpayer to do what is impossible, but he is expected to do
25the best he can.—  But when one reaches the last of all the 
characteristics, namely the idea of the "reasonable man", difficulties
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may be encountered. The reasonable man is a central feature of
26actionable negligence. In Muir v. Glasgow Corporation—  Lord
Thankerton said: "In my opinion it has long been held in Scotland that
all that a person can be held bound to foresee are the reasonable and
probable consequences of the failure to take care, judged by the
standard of the ordinary reasonable man." The reasonable man has been
described as "The man who takes the magazines at home and in the
27evening pushes the lawnmower in his shirt sleeves".—  He is not to be
credited with anything more than a pedestrian sort of mind. He is not
expected to deal with the unusual. Not for him the luxury of
28intuition, and he is not expected to take a leap in the dark.—  In
29Muir, Lord MacMillan said—  that the standard of foresight of the 
reasonable man should be judged by eliminating the personal equation. 
He was not, therefore, to be considered as over apprehensive or over 
confident. Accordingly, it would seem necessary to exclude those 
characteristics which the taxpayer in question might display and to 
attempt to define those characteristics which, on average, should be 
displayed.
2.23 It is submitted, however, that the required standard of care
cannot be determined in a vacuum. Income tax returns vary in
complexity. It may be assumed, therefore, that the more complicated
the tax return, the more likely that the reasonable or average man
would seek professional help in preparing it and, conversely, a
taxpayer who employs professional help in the preparation of his tax
return, although not thereby excused of his duty to take care, may
nevertheless, by that very action, have shown that he is anxious to do
what is right. The contrast is, therefore, between the careful man and
the careless man. The careful man may well be in the habit of
carefully preserving the information needed for his tax returns; of
ensuring that his returns are completed and lodged within good time;
and if he employs professional help with his returns, of ensuring that
after they have completed, there are no obvious mistakes in them. In
30an unreported case before the Special Commissioners,—  income tax 
returns prepared on behalf of a taxpayer contained errors arising from 
wrong information obtained from stockbrokers. The taxpayer was found 
guilty of negligence because he admitted that, on receiving the
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completed tax return from his accountants, he signed it without reading
it. Had he read the return, it is unlikely that he would have spotted
the mistake but the Commissioners held that the reasonable man would
read his income tax return before he signed it. This would suggest
that the reasonable man would not seek to "second guess" his
professional adviser, but, nevertheless, he must take reasonable steps
50ato ensure that the adviser has produced an accurate return.  VJhen an
adviser has been negligent, the effect of Section 97(2) of the 1970 Act
is that the taxpayer must pay any penalty, but it is not clear that he
31is liable for default interest on the tax lost under Section 88.—
2.24 Like wilful default, negligence is very much a question of the 
impression gained by the appeal Commissioners. It is submitted that a 
simple mistake will not amount to negligence unless the Revenue can 
show that it was coupled with carelessness, or that there was a pattern 
of such mistakes which in general indicated a falling short of the 
standard of care which the average taxpayer would employ in relation to 
his tax affairs.
TIME LIMITS FOR ASSESSMENTS
2.25 Section 34 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 provides that an
assessment to tax may be made at any time in the six years after the
end of the chargeable period to which it relates. Any objection to an 
assessment on the grounds that it has been made out of time is to be 
made by way of an appeal. Where, however, the Revenue are able to 
establish that tax may have been lost due to fraud, wilful default or 
neglect, assessments to recover the tax so lost may be made outwith the 
normal six year period. Section 36 of the 1970 Act provides that were 
any form of fraud or wilful default has been committed by or on behalf 
of any person in connection with tax, assessments to recover the tax 
attributable to the fraud or wilful default may be made at any time.
Section 36 has its origin in Section 33 of the Finance Act 1942, which
provided that no assessment could be made for any fiscal year before 
the year ended April 5, 1937, and although that date no longer appears 
on the statute, the Revenue have never sought to make assessments for 
years earlier than 1936/37. In practice, of course, that time limit is
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now of academic interest, since it would involve the Revenue in
investigations stretching over fifty years.
2.26 It is to be observed that out-of-time assessments under
Section 36 can be made to recover tax loss due to fraud or wilful 
default only. If, for example, tax has been lost due to fraud or
wilful default in a year outwith the normal six year period, but, for 
the same year, some other item of income, which was properly returned, 
was never assessed, the assessment under Section 36 cannot extend to 
tax on that income.
2.27 Out-of-time assessments on individuals to recover income tax
or capital gains tax lost due to neglect are dealt with in Section 37 
of the 1970 Act. The law is not straightforward. First, before there 
can be an assessment to recover tax lost due to neglect more than six 
years after the year for which the assessment is to be made, the 
Revenue must establish that within the normal six year period an 
assessment has been made to recover tax lost due to fraud wilful
default or neglect. A year for which such an assessment has been made 
is referred to in Section 37(1) as the "normal year". Section 37(3) 
then provides that, where there is a "normal year", assessments to 
recover tax lost due to neglect may be made for any of the six years 
ending with that normal year, but the assessments must be made by the 
end of the year of assessment following that in which the tax due under 
the assessment for the "normal year" has been finally determined. For 
example, if during the fiscal year ended April 5, 1987, the Revenue 
establish that a taxpayer had been guilty of wilful default in the
fiscal year ended April 5, 1975 and had been guilty of neglect in the 
year ended April 5, 1976, an assessment could be made under Section 36 
to recover the tax lost due to wilful default, but no assessment could 
be made for the following fiscal year to recover the tax lost due to 
neglect. If, on the other hand, in the year ended April 5, 1987, the 
Revenue discover that a taxpayer has been guilty of fraud, wilful 
default or neglect in the year ended April 5, 1983, and had been guilty 
of neglect in the year ended April 5, 1977, an assessment to recover 
the tax lost due to neglect in 1976/77 could be made in terms of 
Section 37, provided that it is made not later than the end of the year
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of assessment following that in which the tax payable for 1982/83, due
to wilful default, had been finally determined. An assessment is made
when it is signed by the Inspector, and not when it is issued to the 
32taxpayer.—  An assessment is determined when thirty days have 
expired from the date in which it was made, without there being an 
appeal, or, if there is an appeal, on its determination by the 
Commissioners, or 30 days after the date on which any appeal has been 
settled by agreement between the Inspector and the taxpayer in terms of 
Section 54 of the 1970 Act.
2.28 Where an assessment to recover tax lost due to neglect has 
been made for one of the six years before the "normal year", these six 
years being referred to as the "earlier years", the Inspector may 
apply to the General of Special Commissioners for leave to make 
assessments to recover tax lost due to neglect in any of the six years 
which end with the beginning of an "earlier year" for which a neglect 
assessment was made. In addition, leave may be given to make an 
out-of-time assessment, on the grounds of neglect, where the assessment 
for the "earlier year" was one of a number of assessments made to 
recover tax lost due to fraud or wilful default under Section 36, 
provided that the latest assessment is for a year ending not more than 
six years before the end of the "normal year", and the other 
assessments made under Section 36 were for earlier years in sequence. 
The key in understanding this complex provision is that assessments 
under Section 37 can only be made for the purpose of recovering tax 
lost due to neglect. Assessments for fraud or wilful default are 
covered not by Section 37, but by Section 36. Were it not for Section 
37(5), therefore, the Revenue could go back for six years before an 
"earlier year" provided that the earlier year was a year of assessment 
for neglect, but not if it was a year for assessment for fraud or 
wilful default. Section 37(5) caters for this anomaly. It is to be 
observed, however, that an isolated assessment to recover tax lost due 
to fraud or wilful default is not enough for Section 37(5) purposes. 
The assessment for fraud or wilful default which triggers the right to 
make earlier assessments under Section 37(5), must be one of a number 
of assessments, made seriatim, the latest of which, apart for the one 
for the "normal year" ended within six years before the end of the
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"normal year", the next, if any, ended not more than seven years before 
the end of the "normal year"; and so on for earlier assessments.
2.29 The essential point in Section 37(5) is that the assessment 
referred to in Section 37(6) must be "one of a number" of assessments. 
There must therefore be at least two such assessments, each made to 
recover tax lost due to fraud or wilful default, although one might be 
for the normal year itself. However many assessments there are, they 
must be sequential, and the latest (other than one for the normal year) 
must be for a year which ends within six years before the end of the 
normal year.
2.30 Section 38 of the 1970 Act modifies Section 37 in relation to 
partnerships. For Section 38 to come into operation, there must first 
have been an assessment of the kind described in Section 37(1), that 
is, an assessment to make good a loss of tax due to fraud, wilful 
default or neglect for a "normal year", and the person assessed must 
have carried on a trade, profession or vocation in partnership with 
some other person or persons. Where these conditions are met, 
assessments to recover tax lost due to neglect within Section 37 may be 
made on:-
(a) The person in default, that is, the person who is guilty of
neglect.
(b) Any person who, at any time in the year for which the assessment
is made, was in partnership with the person in default.
(c) Any person, who, at any time in the normal year, was in
partnership with the person in default, and,
(d) Any person who, at any time in the normal year, was in 
partnership with a person who had been in partnership with the person 
in default at any time in the year for which the assessment was 
made.
55
2.31 It is to be observed that Section 38 is not confined to 
partnership income. The section is therefore of wide application, 
since it is capable of affecting individuals who were "partners of 
partners of defaulting partners" and who may be wholly ignorant of the 
neglect, and even of the person who has alleged to have committed it. 
There are, however, two important modifications to Section 38. First, 
sub-section (3) provides that the assessment within Section 37 may be 
made "not only on the person on default but on any person ...." It 
would appear, therefore, that assessments within Section 38 must be 
joint assessments. It is not possible, it seems, for the Revenue to 
abandon the assessment on the person in default, and assess instead 
someone who had been his partner. Given that assessments on two or 
more persons must be joint assessments, Section 38(5) then provides 
that the assessment within Section 37(1) cannot include any income or 
gains of any innocent partner, nor can the tax be recoverable from such 
an innocent partner. The effect of sub-section (5), therefore, is that 
interest and penalties are calculated only on the tax lost due to 
neglect, and the liability does not become the several liability of any 
former partner within Section 38(3). Nevertheless, it would appear 
that the liability is a joint liability of the partnership, and can be 
recovered as such.
2.32 Neglect by a company is dealt with in Section 39 of the 1970 
Act. In substance, Section 39 is no different from Section 37, except 
to the extent that modifications are needed because companies are 
assessed on profits for periods of account, and not for fiscal years.
2.33 The general time limit for assessments on the executors of a 
deceased person is that any assessment, no matter its purpose, must be 
made no later that the end of the third year next following the year of 
assessment in which the deceased died. Difficulties in the 
interpretation of the phrase "next following" are considered in 
paragraph 412 in connection with penalties. Except in cases of fraud, 
wilful default or neglect, the normal time limit of six years will 
apply, so that an assessment made in the third year following the year 
of death can only extend to income or gains for the three years before 
the year in which death occurred. But Section 40(2) modifies this rule
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where assessments are made to recover tax lost due to fraud, wilful 
default or neglect. In such a case, the Commissioners may give leave 
for assessments for any of the six years of assessment ending not
earlier than the year in which death occurred, provided that the
assessment or assessments are made before the end of the third year 
next following the year of assessment in which the deceased died.
2.34 It will have been observed that assessments to recover tax
lost due to fraud, wilful default, or neglect outwith the normal six
year period may only be made with the leave of a General or Special
Commissioner. The sections envisage two types of leave being
necessary. First, there is leave for assessments to recover tax lost
due to fraud or wilful default within Section 36; for assessments
under Section 37 to 39 for any of the six years ending before the
"normal year"; and for assessments on personal representatives to
recover tax lost due to fraud, wilful default or neglect within Section
40(2). Leave for these assessments is governed by Section 41 which, by
its terms, does not give the taxpayer any right to be present at the
application for leave, or to have his views heard. This apparent
injustice was considered by the English High Court in Perlberg v. 
33Varty-—  when it was confirmed that the proceedings for leave under
Section 41 are administrative proceedings only, and that the taxpayer’s
presence is not permitted by the Section itself. In that case, the
Court considered that there was no injustice, because the taxpayer
would have an opportunity to appeal against the assessments, and so to
have his case considered by the Commissioners. Section 41(2) provides
that a Commissioner giving leave to make the assessments shall not take
any part in any subsequent appeal hearings on these assessments.
Despite this apparent safeguard, however, the Section can work against
taxpayers, as was shown in the recent case of R. v. Special
34Commissioners ex.p. Stipplechoice Ltd.-—  when an application was 
successfully made for a judicial review of the circumstances in which 
leave to make out of time assessments, within Section 41, was granted.
2.35 Next there are two instances where a taxpayer may be present, 
and give evidence, at a hearing of an application by an Inspector for 
leave to make an out of time assessment. These circumstances arise
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when in terms of Section 37(5) or Section 39(5), leave is sought to 
make assessments to recover tax lost due to neglect for any of the six 
years before the "earlier year" referred to in these Sections. In 
these cases, the taxpayer is permitted to be present when the Inspector 
makes his application, and is entitled to be heard by the 
Commissioners.
INLAND REVENUE ERRORS
2.36 What is the position of a taxpayer who, having complied with 
all the provisions of the Taxes Acts on returns, etc, finds that he is 
asked to pay less tax than he ought, because of an Inland Revenue
error? For example, an amount of income, properly and timeously
returned, may not be assessed: an assessment may be raised in the
wrong amount, because something has been omitted, or due to a simple 
error of arithmetic: an item of expense may be allowed more than once: 
or an income tax repayment may be wrongly calculated and too much may 
be repaid.
2.37 It is submitted that the obligations on a taxpayer under the
Taxes Management Act 1970 do not include an obligation to point out to
an Inspector of Taxes that an amount of income or gain, properly
returned, has never been assessed. The duty to make an assessment
rests with the Inspector of Taxes, and so a taxpayer cannot be guilty
of any offence if the Inspector fails to do his job. The same position
would follow, it is submitted, if the Inspector raises an assessment
for an amount which is too low, provided that full returns have been
made. No default or neglect can be alleged against someone who accepts
the assessment, and pays the inadequate tax demanded. This should be
35contrasted with the situation which arose in Amis v. Colls-—  where a 
taxpayer who had failed to make proper returns accepted estimated 
assessments which he knew were too low. In that case, the Court held 
that the taxpayer was guilty of wilful default.
2.38 It is submitted that the situation may be different if a 
taxpayer makes a claim for relief which, subsequently, he discovers to 
be wrong. In that case, he is obliged to correct the false claim,
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otherwise he may be guilty of negligence in terms of Section 97 of the
1970 Act. It is to be observed that the negligence arises, not by
having made the claim, but having failed to correct it once it is known 
to be wrong.
2.39 It is not uncommon for the Inland Revenue to make a repayment
of tax in excess of the correct amount which is repayable. In these
circumstances, any interest (called repayment supplement) on the
repayment will also be wrong. Before 1982, the Revenue had only a
limited power to recover such over-repayments of tax. The legislation
itself was inadequate, and there was no power whatever to recover
overpayments of repayment supplements. Moreover, a civil action
through the Courts for recovery of the amount was unlikely to succeed.
Court actions to correct such mistakes are not competent unless the
36mistakes are of fact. In Taylor v. Wilson1s Trustees,—  the Court of
Session held that an arithmetical error in the calculation of tax was
an error of law, and on the basis of this judgement, it is difficult to
see how any mistake in taxation could be anything other than an error
of law. A taxpayer in such a position, of course, could offer to repay
the amount of the excess, but if he does not, is he guilty of any
offence? It has been suggested that the Theft Act 1968 created a
category of crime of “stealing by finding", and that a taxpayer who
knowingly keeps an excessive tax repayment might be guilty of such a
crime. But the Theft Act is an English Act. It has no counterpart in
Scotland, where the crime of theft, which is a common law crime, is the
dishonest taking by one person of the property of another, without the
owner’s consent. It is submitted that by keeping an excessive
repayment of tax, a taxpayer cannot be guilty of the Scots crime. It
is this aspect which, it is understood, the Theft Act sought to change
in England, but which remains unchanged in Scotland. It is submitted,
however, that the position might be different if the Inspector had
agreed the amount of the repayment of the taxpayer and then paid more
37than the agreed amount. In the case of Robert Potter,—  fraud was 
established where a person tried to exploit an innocent error made by a 
bank clerk in the person’s favour. But in that case it was beyond 
doubt that the accused and the Bank both knew what the correct amount 
was.
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2.40 It is also submitted that by keeping an over-repayment of tax, 
a taxpayer is not guilty of fraud. First, there can be no deception if 
the taxpayer has complied with all the provisions of the Taxes Act, and 
submitted true and correct returns. In addition, without some evidence 
of misrepresentation or deception, it is difficult to see ho\<r the 
Revenue could ever sustain an argument that there was intent to 
deceive. Finally, it seems that there is no offence under the Taxes 
Management Act 1970, because every such offence presupposes that the 
taxpayer either failed to do something required by the law or did 
something which was wrong, either wilfully or carelessly.
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CHAPTER 3 
DEFAULT INTEREST
3.01 The Crown’s right to interest on overdue tax is contained in 
Part 9 of the Taxes Management Act 1970. Although the 1970 provisions 
originated in 1960, when the tax code for interest and penalties was 
substantially recast, interest on overdue tax as a statutory right was 
first introduced in 1947. Prior to that time, the Revenue had to sue 
for recovery of interest on tax lost due to fraud or neglect.—
INTEREST ON OVERDUE TAX
3.02 Until 1975, tax which had been assessed was not overdue unless 
it was not paid from the later of the due date for payment, and 30 days 
after the day on which the assessment had become final and conclusive. 
The law is contained in Section 86 of the Taxes Management Act 1970. 
If, therefore, the Inspector failed to raise the appropriate assessment 
before the normal date for payment had been reached, no interest could 
be charged provided that the tax was paid within 30 days of the 
assessment, once it was issued, having become final and conclusive. 
And if the assessment was appealed against, so much of the tax as was 
in dispute was not due and payable until 30 days after the appeal had 
been settled, either by agreement under Section 54 of the 1970 Act or 
by the Commissioners. Because of the many opportunities afforded by 
the legislation for taxpayers to delay paying tax without incurring an 
interest charge, new rules, amending Section 86 were introduced by the 
Finance (No. 2) Act 1975 to enable the Revenue to collect interest on 
tax which had been assessed, even where there was an appeal not yet 
determined. Section 86 does not, however, apply until an assessment 
has been raised.
DEFAULT INTEREST
3.03 Where an assessment has been raised to make good a loss of tax 
due to the taxpayer’s fault, Section 86 of the Taxes Management Act 
1970 does not apply. Instead, Section 88 directs that interest is to
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apply from the date when the tax lost would have been payable if the 
assessment had been raised before the normal payment date. These dates 
are set out in sub-section (5), the appropriate date being used in 
calculating the interest charge, notwithstanding that it was a 
non-business day within the meaning of Section 92 of the Bills of 
Exchange Act 1882. The taxes to which Section 88 applies are income 
tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax. Section 88 does not apply 
to advance corporation tax or to income tax on annual payments and 
interest paid by companies, collection of which is governed by Schedule 
20 to the Finance Act 1972. Instead, Section 87 charges interest when 
payment of these taxes is overdue.
3.04 Section 286 of the Taxes Act 1970 provides that where a close 
company, otherwise than in the course of a money-lending business, 
makes a loan or advances any money to an individual who is a 
participator of the company, the company is to be assessed to an amount 
equal to 27/73rds (the current rate of advance corporation tax) of the 
loan or advance. It is to be observed that although the amount which 
is assessed is tax which is due for payment within fourteen days after 
the issue of the notice of assessment, it is neither corporation tax, 
income tax, nor advance corporation tax. Section 286 sets out a number 
of situations in which the charge to tax is not to apply, as well as 
defining other transactions which are to be treated as within the scope 
of the section. The Inspector1s right to obtain information about 
transactions within Section 286 is contained in paragraph 19(5) of 
Schedule 16 to the Finance Act 1972, which allows a request for 
information to be incorporated in a return of distributions received 
and paid. In practice, it is on this return that a loan to a 
participator would be declared.
3.05 Where a close company fails to make a return of a loan or 
advance within Section 286, Section 109 of the Taxes Management Act 
1970 says that the due date of payment of the tax, for the purposes of 
default interest under Section 88, is to be April 1st following the 
date on which the loan or advance was made. Thus if, due to fraud, 
wilful default, or neglect, a close company fails to report a loan or 
advance made to a participator who is an individual, Section 88
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interest can be charged on the amount which ought to have been paid to
the Revenue calculated from April 1st following the date when the loan
was made. Before the law was changed by the Finance Act 1986 the
interest charge continued even if, before the company gave notice of
the loan, the loan was repaid, because although Section 286(5) provided
that the close company could claim a repayment of the tax paid if the
loan or advance was itself repaid, that repayment could only be made
after the tax had been assessed, and this could not happen if the loan
or advance was never reported to the Inspector. In practice, the
Revenue did not take the point, and it has now been rectified by the
1986 Act, so that default interest cannot be charged for any period
2
after which the loan has been repaid.—
3.06 In order to show that interest is due under Section 88, the
Revenue must prove that:-
1. the taxpayer was guilty of fraud, wilful default, or neglect;
2. tax was lost to the Crown as a result of that fraud, wilful 
default, or neglect, and,
3. the interest has been charged on an assessment made to make good 
that loss of tax.
3.07 The meaning of "fraud, wilful default, or neglect" has already
2abeen discussed.—  The phrase "loss of tax" was considered by the Court
3
of Appeal in Knight v. I.R.C.— In that case, following a back duty 
enquiry, assessments on the profits of a cattle dealer were confirmed 
in the figures advanced by the Inspector, based on capital statements 
prepared by him. The assessments were for the four fiscal years ended 
April 5, 1956, and were all raised by the Inspector in 1955. The
taxpayer contended that these assessments had not been made to make 
good a loss of tax, because they had been made within the normal six 
year period for making assessments, and that a loss of tax could not 
arise unless the normal six year period had expired. The Court in 
dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal, held that the phrase "loss of tax" 
meant tax which had not been assessed because the taxpayer had either
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failed to make a return, or had not made a correct return. In a later
case, R. v. Holborne Commissioners (ex parte Rind Settlement
4
Trustees)the taxpayers, a solicitor and two accountants who were 
trustees of a settlement, were late in making returns of income and 
chargeable gains. When pressed to do so by the Revenue, the trustees 
made payments to account of approximately one-third of the tax 
ultimately found due. On appeal to the Queens Bench Division the 
trustees contended that the tax had not been lost, but had merely been 
delayed; but the Court rejected that contention, holding that tax was 
lost within the meaning of Section 88(1) where payment was delayed for 
an unreasonable period, as a result of the taxpayer's fault.
3.08 It is, of course, not sufficient for the Crown to show that
there has been a loss of tax. It must also be shown that the loss was
due to the fraud, wilful default, or neglect of the taxpayer, and that
the assessment which charges the tax on which interest is claimed was
made for the purposes of making good that loss. In J.O'Mullan & Co. v.
Walmsley^- estimated assessments to income tax, made in the absence of
accounts, were confirmed by the Special Commissioners, who found that
the taxpayer had been guilty of neglect. On appeal to the High Court
in Northern Ireland, it was contended that it was for the Crown to
establish that the assessments had been made for the purposes of making
good a loss of tax, that no evidence had been led by the Inspector to
show the purpose for which the assessments had been made, and that
accordingly, the Special Commissioners erred in law in reaching their
conclusion. The Court decided in favour of the taxpayer, holding that
in the absence of evidence of the purpose of the Inspector in making
the assessments, the assessments could not be said to have been made
for the purpose of recovering tax lost due to the fraud, wilful
default, or neglect of the taxpayers. As a result of the O'Mullan
decision, which decided that the test of the purpose of the assessment
was a subjective test, it became the practice of the Revenue to state,
on the face of the assessment or in correspondence, that the assessment
had been made for the express purpose of recovering tax lost due to
fraud, wilful default, or neglect. However, six years later, the
6Chancery Division held, in Thurgood v. Slarke— that the test to be 
satisfied was not a subjective test, but the objective test of what the
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assessment achieved. If, therefore, tax had been lost due to fraud, 
wilful default or neglect and the assessment did in fact recover that 
tax, or part of it, then the assessment had been made for the purposes 
of recovering the tax so lost. The Crown must, however, do more than 
merely show that an assessment includes tax which has been lost due to 
fraud, wilful default, or neglect. It must show that the assessment 
was made for the purposes of recovering that tax. If, therefore, an 
estimated assessment is made in amounts greater than those shown on the 
return and that assessment is increased by agreement, or on appeal, to 
include tax which has been lost, due to fraud wilful default or 
neglect, interest under Section 88 cannot be charged unless the 
Inspector can show that at the time when the original assessment was 
made, fraud wilful default or neglect where known or suspected. To 
overcome this difficulty, the Revenue may make estimated assessments 
for tax lost due to fraud wilful default or neglect while earlier 
estimated assessments, not so made, are still under appeal. The recent 
case of Duchy Maternity Ltd. v. Hodgson^- shows that the Inspector is 
entitled under Section 29(3) of the 1970 Act, to issue a discovery 
assessment when an existing assessment is still under appeal.
3.09 Section 88(4) gives the Board of Inland Revenue power to 
mitigate interest due under Section 88, whether before or after 
judgement, and entitles it to stay or compound proceedings for the 
recovery of interest. In practice, this sub-section is used where a 
taxpayer agrees that interest is due under the section. The procedure, 
which is more fully described in the context of penalties, is for the 
taxpayer to make an offer in settlement of the tax and the interest, in 
return for which the Revenue undertake not to assess the tax or to take 
proceedings for the interest. Where, however, the taxpayer disputes 
the Revenue’s entitlement to interest under Section 88, the Revenue 
will be obliged to take proceedings against the taxpayer to recover the 
interest due. The provisions for the collection and recovery of tax, 
contained in Part 6 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 are extended, by 
Section 69, to interest on overdue tax, charged under Part 9. There is 
no time limit for the commencement of proceedings for recovery of 
interest.
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3.10 The evidence which the Collector of Taxes needs to recover 
interest charged under Section 88 is a certificate by the General or 
Special Commissioners that the tax, or some of the tax, charged by an 
assessment carried interest under the section. To obtain such a 
certificate, the Inspector or the Board of Inland Revenue must apply to 
the General or Special Commissioners and at the hearing of the 
application, the taxpayer (or the personal representatives of a 
deceased taxpayer) is entitled to be heard. No application for a 
certificate of interest under Section 70(3) is competent unless the 
assessment in question has become final and conclusive. This principle 
is based on the decision of the Attorney General of the Irish Freeg
State v. White,— which was approved by the House of Lords in I.R.C. 
v. Hinchy.—
3.11 It is somewhat surprising, given the radical nature of the new 
interest and penalty provisions introduced in 1960, that the relevant 
clauses of the 1960 Finance Bill received so little attention in 
Committee. Clause 52 of the Bill ( now Section 88 of the 1970 Act) was 
afforded only the briefest comment by the Economic Secretary to the 
Treasury, Sir Anthony Barber who said, in relation to certificates of 
interest, "The certificate will be evidence of the facts stated, but 
not conclusive evidence. It will be open to the taxpayer, if he wants, 
to question this procedure in any Court proceedings." Just what the 
Economic Secretary meant by this statement is far from clear, but if he 
meant that the taxpayer could appeal against a certificate of interest 
he was to be proved wrong. In R. v. General Commissioners of Income 
Tax for Holborne (exp. Rind Settlement Trustees),—  the Court confirmed 
that since the hearing for a certificate of interest was an 
application, and not an appeal, neither the taxpayer nor the Revenue 
had any right to demand that the Commissioners state a case for the 
opinion of the Court. This means that the decision of the 
Commissioners on an interest certificate is final and conclusive, 
although it may be possible for the taxpayer to have manifest 
procedural defects examined by means of a judicial review. 
Alternatively, if the taxpayer could show in proceedings that the 
interest certificate was not a true record, the onus would fall on the 
Crown to establish that the interest shown on the certificate was 
payable.
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3.12 Although an application for a certificate of interest under 
Section 70(3) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 may be made to either 
the General or the Special Commissioners, it is understood that the 
Board of Inland Revenue does not consider that the taxpayer has any 
right in terms of Section 46 of that Act, to elect as to which body of 
Commissioners the application should be made. The Board’s reason for 
this view is that Section 46 applies to appeals and proceedings; 
Section 70(3) on the other hand refers to an application, which is 
therefore outwith the scope of Section 46. It is considered that this 
view is correct.
3.13 It seems to be Revenue practice to apply for a certificate of
default interest to the Commissioners to whom any appeal against the 
relevant assessment was made, or in the absence of that appeal, to the 
General or Special Commissioners as the Board of Inland Revenue may 
direct, although a request from the taxpayer to have the application 
made to a particular body of Commissioners is often acceded to.
There are no time limits for applying for an interest certificate.
AGENTS
3.14 It is known that the Inland Revenue take the view, that where
a taxpayer has been assessed to recover tax lost due to fraud, wilful
default, or neglect, that taxpayer is the person who must pay the 
default interest, notwithstanding that some other person may well have 
been guilty of the fault which resulted in interest being due. It 
follows, therefore, that the Revenue do not normally consider neglect 
by the taxpayer’s agent (e.g. his accountant or solicitor) as a good
defence against Section 88.
3.15 It seems that the Revenue have three main reasons for this
view. First of all, it is maintained by the Revenue that the phrase
"any person” in Section 88 includes a third party acting on behalf of a
taxpayer; secondly, the Revenue contends that a solicitor or 
accountant who prepares income tax returns for the taxpayer is that 
taxpayer’s alter ego; and thirdly, attempts may be made to show that a
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taxpayer is vicariously liable for the actions of an accountant or 
solicitor who acts for him in his income tax affairs.
3.16 The use of the word "agent" to describe a person who prepares
income tax returns for others may be misleading. "No word is more
commonly or constantly abused than "agent"" - Lord Henshill in
Kennedy v. De Trafford.—  Much of the law on agency is concerned with
mercantile agency, where two parties contract with one another through
an agent or agents. That relationship, it is submitted,is not relevant
to taxation, because the dealings between a taxpayer and the Revenue
are not contractual but statutory. The overriding rule of construction
of taxing statutes is that they must be interpreted by reference to the
words of the Acts, and the onus is clearly on the Revenue to show that
the legislation, by its terms, imposes the tax or duty on the subject.
Mr. Justice Rowlatt’s famous comments in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. 
12IRC,—  which are quoted in paragraph 1.03, are an early example of the
13principle. In a later case, Potts1 Executors v. I.R.C.,—  Lord Simond
said "It was finally urged that, if this appeal is allowed, an easy way
of evading tax will be open to the taxpayer. This is an argument which
is of no weight whatever. The question is: What is the fair meaning
of words in a taxing Act?". If these principles are applied to Section
88 it is clear that, by its terms, no concept of agency can be imputed
except by reference to the phrase "any person". It is submitted,
however, that that phrase cannot have its literal meaning otherwise the
taxpayer could be prejudiced by the actions or failure of persons
totally unconnected with him. If, as seems reasonable, the phrase "any
person" is to be restricted, then it is submitted that what it means is
"any taxpayer". That meaning would give the sub-section some
14consistency with the head-note of the section itself,—  which refers to 
tax lost "due to the taxpayer’s fault". In addition, it would be a 
meaning consistent with the structure of the section which encompasses 
income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax. This is in contrast 
with the legislation on penalties, in part 10 of the Taxes Management 
Act 1970, where separate sections are required for income tax and 
capital gains tax, on the one hand, and corporation tax, on the other, 
and where, by Section 97(2), accounts submitted on behalf of a taxpayer 
are to be treated as submitted by him unless he can show that they were
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submitted without his consent or connivance. Against this view is the
decision in Mankowitz v. Special Commissioners^- where the taxpayer was
held liable for penalties due to the continued delay of his accountant
in submitting tax returns. But in that case, the taxpayer knew full
well that his accountant was unsatisfactory and did nothing about it,
and it seems from the judgement that the Court considered that the
taxpayer’s failure to find a more satisfactory accountant was itself
16default. In an earlier case, Clixby v. Pountney—  the General 
Commissioners found, in relation to penalty proceedings under Section 
47 of the Income Tax Act 1952, that while the taxpayer himself was not 
guilty of wilful default, his accountant had been guilty. The relevant 
legislation imposed a penalty on a taxpayer where fraud or wilful 
default had been committed on his behalf. On appeal to the High Court, 
the taxpayer contended that he could not be liable for any penalty 
unless it could be shown that he had known of, or had been a party to, 
fraud or wilful default committed on his behalf. The taxpayer’s 
contentions were decisively rejected, the Court holding that the words 
”on his behalf" were not confined to situations where the taxpayer had 
knowledge of the fraud or wilful default committed by an agent. The 
decision is of particular interest because the judgement includes 
commentary on the development of this branch of the law, from Section 
125 of the Income Tax Act 1918 to Section 33(1) of the Finance Act 
1942, which by its terms, rendered a taxpayer guilty of fraud, wilful 
default or neglect committed on his behalf. Counsel for the taxpayer 
emphasised that the introduction of the words "on behalf of" showed 
that the previous legislation could apply only to fraud, wilful default 
or neglect committed by the taxpayer himself and not, for example, by 
an agent acting for him. Although the analysis presented by the 
taxpayer’s Counsel is not fully discussed in the judgement, there is no 
doubt that the taxpayer failed primarily because the plain meaning of 
the phrase "on behalf of" included acts of an agent whether or not the 
taxpayer was aware of them. It is the absence of express words in 
Section 88, linking the taxpayer and his agent, which suggests that the 
guilt or fault of an agent of which the taxpayer himself is completely 
innocent, does not render the taxpayer liable to default interest.
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3.17 Revenue contentions that an accountant or other person 
preparing income tax returns is the alter ego of the taxpayer and that 
the taxpayer is vicariously liable for the default of his professional 
adviser really amount to the same argument, and can be dealt with 
together.
There is no direct authority for the application of the principles of 
vicarious liability to taxation, and so the analysis must be made by 
reference to other branches of the law.
3.18 The general rule in Scots law is that a fault or delict binds 
the perpetrator only, so that a person cannot be held responsible for 
the actions of another. The underlying principle here is that fault or 
culpa requires intent and the intention of one person cannot be imputed
to another. There are, however, important exceptions to this rule.
The exceptions fall into two main categories. First of all, strict 
responsibility may be imposed on a person by statute so that if an
offence is committed, the person upon whom statute lays the
responsibility cannot avoid it in any circumstances. For example, 
strict responsibility normally applies to offences under the Road 
Traffic Acts, so that if a person commits a road traffic offence, he is 
guilty irrespective of the reason or circumstances which caused the 
offence. It is submitted that the doctrine of strict responsibility 
has no application to taxation obligations, because fraud, wilful 
default, or neglect all involve some degree of fault, or at least 
carelessness. This involves a degree of intent, either intent to 
deceive, as in fraud, or a lack of interest in ensuring that the law is 
complied with, as in wilful default or negligence. Intent, or lack of 
it, is irrelevant in cases of strict responsibility. Vicarious 
responsibility is similar to strict responsibility, in that the person 
responsible need not have had any guilty intent - if he had, he could 
be held liable as art and part in the actions of a third party, and 
therefore his accomplice. Vicarious responsibility is therefore 
concerned with situations where conspiracy or complicity are not 
alleged.
72
3.19 Vicarious responsibility exists in private as well as public
law. An employer is vicariously liable for the actions of his employee
acting in the course of that employment, even although in breach of his
duties. Thus in Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co.—  the managing clerk of a
solicitor defrauded a client in the course of a property transaction.
The Court of Appeal held that the solicitor was vicariously liable for
the fraudulent conduct of his employee. Vicarious liability can also
arise in actions of an agent on behalf of a principal, although in
Scots law, it has been held that not all principals are vicariously
18liable for the actions of an agent.—  Given that an accountant or other
person, preparing an income tax return for a taxpayer is not his
employee, and is unlikely to be his "agent" except in a very loose
sense, the question of vicarious responsibility must be approached on
general principles. In the leading case of Mousell Bros. Ltd v.
19London & North Western Railway,—  At ken J. said that in applying 
vicarious liability in the absence of express statutory words, the 
Courts must have regard "to the object of the statute, the words used, 
the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, 
the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed, and 
the person upon whom the penalty is imposed". Two aspects of this 
judgement are striking, in the context of Section 88. First of all, 
the express words of the Section imply no vicarious liability, 
particularly when they are contrasted with other sections which 
specifically link the fault of an agent to that of the taxpayer. 
Secondly, the person who would in ordinary circumstances complete a tax 
return, is the taxpayer himself. Relatively few income tax returns are 
completed by accountants or others on behalf of taxpayers.
3.20 Finally, since offences dealt with in this thesis are often
"quasi-criminal", cases involving vicarious responsibility in
quasi-criminal situations are probably most helpful. A recent case on
vicarious liability under Section 134 of the Road Traffic Act 1960,
20G. Newton Ltd. v. Smith,—  demonstrates the limitation of the concept 
in quasi-criminal cases. The legislation made it an offence for the 
holder of a public service vehicle licence "wilfully or negligently" to 
fail to comply with the conditions of the licence. The accused company 
held a public service vehicle licence which required it to use a
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specified route for its vehicles. A driver employed by the company
wilfully took a different route, and the accused was convicted of
wilfully failing to comply with the terms of the licence. The grounds 
for the conviction were that the duty was laid on the company, no 
penalty was provided for the employee, and that any contravention would 
normally be committed by an employee. It seems, however, that if the 
driver had negligently taken the wrong route, no conviction would have 
been made. The case seemed to closely mirror many of the practical 
situations in which Section 88 is applied and seems to support the
argument that a taxpayer is not vicariously liable, on general
principles, for at least the negligence of a person engaged by him to 
complete tax returns, in circumstances where it would not be 
unreasonable for him to rely on the competence of that person to do so.
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CHAPTER 4 
PENALTIES
4.01 Penalties for tax offences may be either fixed, that is of a 
fixed upper monetary limit, or tax-geared, that is, based on the amount 
of tax lost. A tax geared penalty is often imposed in addition to a 
fixed penalty.
4.02 The present penalty code can be traced to the origins of 
income tax. Section 197 of the Income Tax Act 1842 provided that where 
a Schedule D assessment had been made in excess of the income returned 
by the taxpayer, or where the Commissioners had discovered that income 
had not been fully assessed to tax, a penalty of £20 plus three times 
the tax charge could be imposed, unless the taxpayer could show to the 
satisfaction of the Commissioners that the omission did not "proceed 
from any fraud covin art or contrivance or any gross or wilful 
neglect", the words quoted having themselves been taken from the Act of 
1799. The Commissioners were also empowered to impose a penalty not 
exceeding three times the amount of tax with which a taxpayer should 
have been charged if he neglected or refused to deliver a "statement or 
schedule".
4.03 Maximum penalties of treble the tax which ought to have been 
charged remained on the Statute Book until 1960. The change to the 
present system was as a result of the decision of the House of Lords in 
I.R.C. v. Hinchy.— Mr. Hinchy, a retired Officer of Customs & Excise, 
returned Post Office Savings Bank interest of £18.30 when the correct 
amount of interest credited to his account for the relevant year was 
£51.29. The Crown’s claim to a penalty was based on the words of 
Section 25(3) of the Income Tax Act 1952, which stated that the amount 
due by the taxpayer should be "treble the tax which ought to be charged 
under this Act", plus a fixed penalty of £20 and, of course, the tax 
itself. The decision of the High Court was that the penalty due was 
£20. In the Court of Appeal, it was held that the penalty was £62.75. 
The House of Lords, however, decided that the penalty due was £20 plus 
treble Mr. Hinchy’s total tax liability for the year, giving a combined
76
liability of £438.72. The Crown had urged that this interpretation of 
the phrase had been applied ever since it had been used in a tax 
statute. There was, however, some doubt as to when the words were 
first used. Lord Radcliffe thought that the first use had been in 
Section 181 of the Income Tax Act 1805, although he alluded to the 
possibility of the Act of 1799 as having been the source. Lord Reid 
and Lord Keith both referred to the origin of the phrase in the 
earliest of the Income Tax Acts. In fact, the phrase was first used in 
Section 92 of the Income Tax Act 1799. What is interesting, however, 
is not so much the origin of the section as the fact that the original 
words could never have resulted in the interpretation put by their 
Lordships on Section 25 of the Income Tax Act 1952 which led to a 
result so absurd that the law was amended by the Finance Act of the 
same year. Section 92 of the 1799 Act provided that the penalty 
exigible should be "double the amount of the charge which ought to have 
been made on such person (if no such charge shall have been made), and 
if any such charge shall have been made which shall be less than the 
charge which ought to have been made on such person, then such person 
shall be assessed and charged for the purposes of this Act over and 
above such former charge, double the amount of the difference between 
the sum with which such persons shall have been charged and the sum 
with which he ought to have been charged". The effect of the 1960 
amendments, which form the basis of the present penalty code, was 
therefore to bring the law into line with what it had been when income 
tax was first introduced over 150 years earlier.
PENALTIES FOR FAILURE
4.04 The law provides for both fixed and tax-geared penalties where 
a taxpayer has failed to meet a requirement of the Taxes Acts. Section 
7 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 requires every person who is 
chargeable to income tax for any year of assessment, and who has not 
made a return of his income or gains for that year, to give notice to 
the Inspector that he is so chargeable. The notice must be made within 
one year after the end of the year of assessment, and failure can 
result in a penalty not exceeding £100. Section 10 of the 1970 Act 
contains a similar obligation in relation to corporation tax while
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Section 12 applies these provisions to capital gains tax. The 
obligation of a taxpayer to give notice of liability to tax was 
introduced in 1942. Before then, two forms of notice were in force, 
both dating from the Income Tax Act 1842. The first was a general 
notice under, latterly, Section 98 of the Income Tax Act 1918. This 
was usually referred to as the "Church Door" notice, because it was 
affixed to the local church door or other public place. The other 
notice, under Section 99 of the 1918 Act, was a particular notice 
incorporated in the income tax return form. On consolidation Section 
99 found its way into Section 115 of the Taxes Management Act 1970.
4.05 Part 3 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 requires certain 
persons to make returns of income paid to, or to provide information 
about, third parties. The provisions deal with, inter alia, fees and 
commissions paid to third parties, employees1 emoluments, and interest 
paid or credited by banks. In some cases, fixed penalties may be 
charged by virtue of the section which imposes the requirement or 
responsibility. But for many of the provisions, Section 98 provides 
for a penalty not exceeding £50 plus £10 for each day after the failure 
has been declared an offence by the Court or by the Commissioners. 
Where the failure was due to neglect or wilful default, the penalty is 
a maximum of £250, while in the case of fraud, it is a maximum of £500. 
Fixed penalties under Section 98 are not to be imposed for failure to 
comply with a notice where the failure is remedied before penalty 
proceedings are commenced. However, because of the structure of Section 
98, it is not always possible to avoid a penalty by putting right a 
failure before penalty proceedings start. The reason is that the 
relieving sub-section (3), applies only to returns which are required 
on notice from the Inspector, such returns being set out in the first 
column of the Table at the end of Section 98. The second column of the 
Table refers to measures under Acts and Regulations for which returns 
are required without notice. A failure, for whatever reason, to 
furnish a return under the second column results in a penalty, whether 
or not the failure is put right before penalty proceedings are 
commenced. In practice, a common offence under Section 98 is a 
failure, by an employer, to make a return required under Section 204 of 
the Taxes Act 1970. Section 204 provides for the collection of tax
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from wages, salaries, and other emoluments of employed people under the 
"pay as you earn" system. Section 204(2) permits the Board of Inland 
Revenue to control the PAYE system by means of Regulations, the 
principle such measure at present in force being the Income Tax 
(Employments) Regulations 1973. Regulation 30 of the 1973 Regulations 
requires an employer, at the end of each fiscal year, to make a return 
in respect of each employee of the amount paid to that employee in that 
year, together with the income tax deducted from it. These returns are 
required to be made not later than fourteen days after the end of the 
fiscal year. Where such a return is incorrect, (because, for example, 
the employer has failed to treat as an emolument a reimbursement of 
expenses not covered by a dispensation,) the obligation imposed by 
Regulation 30 will not have been met. If the error is discovered 
subsequently, for example, as a result of a PAYE inspection, a penalty 
will be due under Section 98 in respect of that incorrect return, even 
if the return was made innocently and a correct return is made before 
penalty proceedings start. It is the view of the Revenue that 
Regulation 30 requires separate returns to be made in respect of each 
employee so that if returns for all employees are incorrect, the 
maximum penalty for innocent error is £50 per employee, or £10 a day, 
for each employee, after the date on which the Commissioners have 
declared that an offence has occurred. This is the basis on which the 
Revenue can claim very large penalties for PAYE offences. It is, 
however, to be observed that the nature of the PAYE procedure does not 
allow for interest under Sections 86 or 88 of the 1970 Act to be 
charged on overdue tax.
4.06 Section 53 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 permits the 
Commissioners to award penalties summarily in connection with offences 
under Section 51 or 52, notwithstanding that proceedings for the 
recovery of penalties have not been commenced. Section 51 gives the 
Commissioners power to obtain information from an appellant in a tax 
appeal, including books, accounts, and other documents, being 
information needed to determine the appeal. The section also permits 
an Inspector or other Officer of the Board to take copies of any 
information which the Commissioners have requested. The information is 
to be obtained by a notice served on the taxpayer or other party to the
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appeal (but not the Inspector) and the maximum penalties are set in 
Section 98(1) and (2). Section 52 is concerned with evidence, and 
provides for the amount of a summary penalty against a person who, 
after being duly summoned, neglects or refuses to appear before the 
Commissioners, or refuses to take the oath, or refuses to answer 
questions concerning the appeal. The obligation is not, however,
imposed on an agent or employee of the taxpayer who cannot be obliged 
to answer any question to which he objects. The maximum penalty for an 
offence under Section 52 is £50.
4.07 Sections 93 and 94 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 provide
for both fixed and tax-geared penalties for offences of failure 
resulting in loss of tax. Section 93 deals with a taxpayer’s failure 
to comply with a notice served on him under Sections 8 or 9 of the 
Taxes Management Act 1970 or Section 39(3) of the Taxes Act 1970. 
Sections 8 and 9 of the Taxes Management Act 1970, as extended by 
Section 12 of that Act deal with returns of income and chargeable
gains. Section 39(3) of the Taxes Act 1970 empowers the Board to
obtain returns of total income from a husband or a wife in a case where 
they have elected for separate assessment. Section 94 is concerned 
with failure to comply with Section 11, that is, with failure to make 
corporation tax returns.
4.08 It is to be noted that a failure under Section 7 is covered
neither by Section 93, nor by Section 95 (which deals with incorrect
returns made fraudulently or negligently). This produces the odd 
result that failure to notify the Revenue of chargeability gives rise 
to a fixed penalty of £100 only, whereas a taxpayer who tells the
Inspector that he is chargeable to tax, but fails to send in a return,
may be liable to a much higher penalty, based on the tax due.
4.09 Where the taxpayer’s failure to comply with a notice is not a 
prolonged failure, the penalty is not tax geared. Section 93(1) 
provides that in the first instance the penalty payable for failure is 
to be a maximum of £50 plus £10 for each day during which the failure 
continues after it has been so declared by the Commissioners or the 
Court. The taxpayer can avoid the fixed penalty in one of three ways:-
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(a) If, in the course of proceedings to recover a penalty, the 
taxpayer can show that he had neither income nor chargeable gains to 
be included in his tax return, the penalty cannot exceed £5 
(S.93(7)).
(b) In terms of Section 118(2) a taxpayer will not be regarded as 
having failed to comply with a notice served on him within the time 
allowed by the notice, if he can show that the Revenue allowed him 
extra time to comply with the notice, or that he had a reasonable 
excuse for his failure and put the failure right without unreasonable 
delay after the excuse has ceased. This defence is more fully 
discussed in the chapter on Fraud, Wilful Default and Neglect.
(c) If, before proceedings commence, the taxpayer puts right the 
failure, the Revenue cannot obtain penalties under Section 93(1).
4.10 Where the failure continues after the end of the fiscal year 
following that during which the notice was served Section 93(2) says 
that the penalty payable is to be a maximum of £50 plus the total 
amount of the tax charged on income or chargeable gains which were 
omitted from the return, and which are assessed after the end of the 
year next following the year of assessment in which the notice was 
served. In the case of a taxpayer who has died, the tax-geared penalty 
is calculated by reference to tax assessed on the deceased1s personal 
representatives. A taxpayer cannot avoid a tax-geared penalty under 
Section 93(2) by putting his failure right before penalty proceedings 
start. It is to be noted that the penalty is based on the tax which 
"is assessed". Such an assessment would normally be made after 
allowing any reliefs or deductions to which the taxpayer may be 
entitled. The recent case of Khan v. First East Brixton General
letCommissioners-—  shows that the assessment can only be reduced by 
reliefs to which the taxpayer is entitled when the assessment is made. 
In Khan the taxpayer objected to a tax-geared penalty on the grounds 
that he had another business which had sustained a loss, and that it 
might be possible to reduce the assessment by carrying back the loss 
under Section 30 of the Finance Act 1978. The taxpayer’s contention 
was dismissed. Tax was payable on the due date after the making of an
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assessment. The fact that a future claim might reduce the assessment 
was irrelevant.
2
4.11 The decision in Moschi v. Kensington General Commissioners— 
shows that the obligation under Section 93(1) is not simply an 
obligation to send back the income tax return form which the Inspector 
has issued. It is an obligation to comply with the requirements of 
Section 8, that is, to make a return of income and gains computed in 
accordance with the Income Tax Acts and specifying each source of 
income and gain and the amount from each source. In Moschi, the 
taxpayer delivered forms of return in which he had inserted in four 
places, the words "not yet finally ascertained", and against "Dividends 
Already Taxed" the words "not exceeding £5" without specifying any 
source. The Court upheld the findings of the Commissioners that the 
taxpayer had not complied with his requirements under Section 93(1) and 
that that was a failure within the meaning of the section.
4.12 For the Crown to obtain a tax-geared penalty, it is not 
sufficient for the Inspector to show that there has been failure; he 
has to show that the failure continued beyond the end of the year 
following that in which the notice was served. Since income tax return 
forms are normally issued early in the fiscal year, this means that the 
taxpayer will, in practice, have almost two years within which to 
complete his requirements under Section 8 without the risk of incurring 
a tax-geared penalty. The Inspector must also show that the assessment 
by reference to which the tax-geared penalty is calculated was made
after the end of the year next following that in which the notice was
served. The phrase "year next following" will have different meanings,
depending on whether "next" governs "following", or "following" governs
3
"next". The word "next" is an abbreviation of the word "nearest".— 
The phrase "year next" could, therefore, signify the nearest year 
before or the nearest year after a particular year. Thus if "next" 
governs "following" then the "year next following" must be the nearest 
year following a particular year, that is, the immediately following 
year. It would follow, therefore, that if a notice was issued in the 
fiscal year 1980/81 then the "year next following in the year of
assessment in which the said notice was served", within Section
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93(2)(b) would mean the year 1981/82. But if this interpretation is 
correct, is creates an inconsistency with the opening words of Section 
93(2) which refer to a failure continuing "after the end of the year of 
assessment following that during which the notice was served". That 
year must be the immediately following year, that is, in the example 
given, 1981/82 and the effect would be that the "following" year and 
the "next following" year would be the same year. It is submitted that 
that cannot be so. Apart from the inconsistency, the only support for 
treating "following" as governing "next" is to contrast it with the 
"next before" year. It is submitted that no penalty could ever be 
based on an assessment issued after the end of the year next before the 
year in which the notice was served because that interpretation renders 
the section meaningless. It is therefore submitted that the word 
"next" governs "following" so that the "year next following" is the 
year after the following year, that is, two years from the year in 
which the notice was served. If this view is correct, it means that, 
in the example given, a tax-geared penalty in respect of failure to 
comply with a notice issued in 1980/81 could only be based on an 
assessment issued after the end of 1982/83, being the year next 
following 1980/81.
4.13 It is believe that the opinion expressed in the previous 
paragraph is not shared by the Revenue. The Revenue view seems to be 
that the phrases "next following" must be contrasted with "next 
before". Therefore, according to the Revenue, the "next following 
year" is merely the next year. This interpretation accords with the 
explanation given, in the Committee debates on the 1960 Finance Bill, 
by the Solicitor-General, Sir Jocelyn Simon. But the Solicitorfs 
analysis was confined to what is now Section 93(2)(b) of the 1970 Act. 
Sub-section (2) was not fully analysed, and the relationship between 
the "following" year, and the "next following" year, was not 
considered.
4.14 Section 93 deals with returns for income tax or capital gains 
tax. Section 94, on the other hand, is concerned with corporation tax. 
Under that section, a company's failure to deliver a return, after 
having been served with a notice to do so, gives rise to a penalty of
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£50 plus £10 a day for each day after which the failure has been so 
declared by the Court or the Commissioners but, as in Section 93, this 
penalty may be avoided if the failure is put right before penalty 
proceedings start, or if, in terms of Section 118(2), the company can 
show that it was given extra time, or had a reasonable excuse for its 
failure. If the company can show that it had no profits to be included 
in a return, the penalty is not to exceed £5. If the company!s failure 
continues after the end of two years from the date on which the notice 
was served the penalty is a maximum of £50 plus the total amount of 
corporation tax charged on assessments based on the profits which 
should have been returned but were not, and made after the end of the 
two year period. The clear words of Section 94(2), in imposing a 
tax-geared penalty on a company, are inconsistent with the suggested 
interpretation of "next following year” in Section 93(2). It is to be 
observed, however, that while Section 93(2) refers to the "following" 
and the "next following" year, Section 94(2) deals, quite simply, with 
a two year period and so there is nothing, it is submitted, in Section
94(2) which is an aid to the construction of Section 93.
PENALTIES FOR INCORRECT RETURNS
4.15 Where a taxpayer, fraudulently or negligently, delivers an
incorrect return for income tax or capital gains tax purposes, when 
required to do so by notice under Section 8 or 9 of the Taxes
Management Act 1970 (or Section 39(3) of the Taxes Act 1970) or makes 
an incorrect return or declaration in connection with a claim for 
relief from income tax or capital gains tax, or submits incorrect 
accounts in connection with an income tax or capital gains tax 
liability, Section 95 of the 1970 Act provides for a maximum penalty of 
£50 plus the amount of the difference between the income tax or capital 
gains tax payable for the "relevant years of assessment" and the 
amounts which would have been payable for those years if the returns or 
accounts had been correct. In the case of fraud, the penalty is a 
maximum of £50 plus twice the difference for the "relevant years". The 
relevant years of assessment are the year of assessment in which the 
return or accounts were submitted, any preceding year of assessment, 
and the "next following" year of assessment. It is thought that the
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phrase "next following" in this context means the immediately following
year, that is, the year in which the returns or accounts are submitted
to the Revenue. The Revenue are thus protected against possible
difficulties if income is assessed in a year other than that for which
a return or accounts are submitted. For example, special rules apply
in the first year of a source of income assessable under Schedule D
Cases 1 to 5, whereby income for the first fiscal year of the source
4
forms the basis of assessment for the first three fiscal years.— A 
return showing income from a new source taxable under Cases 1 to 5 of 
Schedule D would normally be delivered to the Revenue not earlier 
than in the year following that in which the source arose. Since the 
"relevant years of assessment" include the year immediately following 
that of the delivery of the return, then each of the first three years 
of assessment of the new source will be within the scope of Section 95, 
should the return or accounts be incorrect due to fraud, wilful default 
or negligence.
4.16 Section 96 provides for tax-geared penalties on companies or 
bodies corporate liable to corporation tax, in respect of incorrect 
returns, statements, or accounts made fraudulently or negligently. The 
penalty is a maximum of £50 plus the difference between the corporation 
tax payable by the company for the accounting period or period covered 
by the incorrect returns, statements, or accounts and the amounts which 
would have been payable if the returns or accounts had been correct. 
In the case of fraud, the maximum penalty is £50 plus twice the 
difference in tax.
4.17 Sections 95 and 96 deal with returns or accounts submitted 
"fraudulently or negligently". In R. v. Havering Commissioners 
(ex parte Knight)— the Court concluded that that phrase included wilful 
default. Lord Justice Russell— said "It would be, in my view, quite 
absurd to hold under Section 95 that it embraces a careless breach of 
duty - that is to say negligence, but not a careful breach of duty - 
that is to say wilful default". The Court did not reach a conclusion, 
however, on whether wilful default was implied as part of fraud, or as 
part of negligence. The important point here is that the maximum 
penalty for fraud is £50 plus twice the excess tax, whereas for
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negligence, the penalty is a maximum of £50 plus the excess tax itself. 
It is understood that in practice the Revenue do not seek penalties in 
excess of the amount of the tax on the difference except in cases where 
fraud is alleged.
4.18 It is submitted that the word "negligently11 implies negligence 
and not mere neglect. This distinction is important because the 
definition of "neglect" in Section 118(1) encompasses both negligence 
and failure. The restricted interpretation must follow, it is 
submitted, because Sections 93 and 94, on the one hand, and Sections 95 
and 96, on the other, are mutually exclusive, in that a taxpayer cannot 
be accused of having fraudulently or negligently submitted incorrect 
returns or accounts when he failed to submit them at all. However, the 
border line between a submitted return which is incorrect due to an 
omission, and a failure to comply with Sections 8 and 11, is a narrow 
one. The obligation under Section 8 is to make a complete return of 
income and gains showing each source, and the amount from each source, 
separately. The obligation under Section 11, in relation to 
corporation tax, is to make a return of "profits" that is income 
computed by reference to each source (and the amount of each source), 
chargeable gains or allowable losses, and charges on income to be 
deducted from profits. A person who fraudulently or negligently 
submits a return which is wrong fails to comply with his obligation to 
make a return, as described in Section 8 and 11. He is therefore 
guilty under both sets of provisions. It seems, however, that the 
correct position is this. If the taxpayer has not sent back his income 
tax return, the appropriate penalty sections are Sections 93 and 94. 
If he has sent back an incomplete return showing entries against 
particular items "to be agreed" or "figures to follow" then he has 
failed to comply with the obligation under Section 8 or 11, and once 
again Sections 93 and 94 are the appropriate penalty sections. But if 
he has submitted an income tax return or accounts showing income or 
gains from particular sources which are wrong due to fraud, wilful 
default or negligence, then the appropriate penalty sections are 
Sections 95 and 96. The question to be asked is, therefore, has 
information been supplied? If the answer is "Yes" but it is wrong, 
then incorrect returns have been submitted. If the answer is "No"
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because no income or gains were shown, then there has been a failure to
comply with the requirements to make a proper return.
ASSISTING IN MAKING AN INCORRECT RETURN
4.19 Section 99 imposes a penalty not exceeding £500 on any person 
who assists in or induces the making or delivery, for any purposes of 
tax, of any return or accounts which he knows to be incorrect. When 
the predecessor of Section 99 was introduced, by the Finance Act 1960, 
doubts were expressed in Parliament on its efficacy, and, in 
particular, as to its interaction with the penalty provisions for 
fraud. The Attorney-General, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller, clearly 
regarded the Section as of limited application, and in particular, 
expressed the view that he could imagine no case where, for example, 
Section 99 would be applied to a guilty accountant, where a prosecution 
for fraud was an alternative.
Almost 20 years later the Attorney-General’s assertion was to be proved 
wrong.
4.20 The phrase "for any purposes of tax" was considered in Lord 
Advocate v. Ruffle,— the only reported case on this section. Mr. 
Ruffle, a chartered accountant, was the auditor of a company in the 
printing industry. It was the company’s practice to value
stock-in-trade, for the purposes of its annual accounts, at the lower
of cost or market value, but to disregard the last few stock sheets in 
any year, so that the total trading stock shown in the account was 
valued at a figure below the lower of cost or market value, the minimum 
valuation acceptable for taxation purposes. When this practice came to 
light, the Revenue brought an action against the auditor under Section 
99* on the grounds that he had assisted in the preparation of accounts 
for the purposes of tax which he knew to be incorrect. In fact, Mr. 
Ruffle did not submit the accounts of the company, or computations of 
tax liabilities, to the Inland Revenue, as this was done by the 
company’s own staff. The Court of Session therefore decided that no 
penalty was payable by Mr.Ruffle, on the footing that, although he had 
assisted in the preparation of accounts which he knew to be incorrect,
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he had not done so for the purposes of tax. Lord Jauncey in the Outer 
House said that the clear intention of Parliament was that tax must 
have been the sole or one of the purposes for the making of the 
accounts. The fact that accounts were used for the purposes of tax was 
not sufficient.
4.20a A further weakness in Section 99 is that it is limited to 
"returns and accounts", and not to other information. This weakness 
may, however, be more apparent than real, since the section would 
presumably extend to information given in support of a return or 
accounts. Nevertheless, it would appear that the wording is not as 
comprehensive as it might be.
4.21 Despite the limitations on Section 99, as explained in the 
Ruffle case, the section is still a formidable one which the Revenue 
will use when circumstances warrant it. Lord Jauncey seems to have 
been misinformed by Revenue Counsel who said that Ruffle was the first 
occasion on which the Revenue sought to enforce the section, or the 
previous enactments of it. It is understood that the Revenue regularly 
bring cases under Section 99 before the General or Special 
Commissioners. The reason is that an award of a penalty against a 
person under Section 99 entitles the Revenue, in terms of Section 
20A(1)(b) of the Taxes Management Act 1970 to take possession of 
documents or other information relating to any of his clients. 
Moreover, the scope of the section is wide. There is no need for the 
Revenue to show that the incorrect accounts produced a loss of tax, 
because the penalty under Section 99 is not tax-geared, and the 
standard of accuracy needed to produce "correct" accounts might well be 
higher than the standard normally implied by accounts showing a true 
and fair view. Thus, for example, the omission or mis-classification 
of an item not material by reference to accounting standards might well 
be an error of sufficient size to give rise to an offence under Section 
99.
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PARTNERSHIPS
4.22 Section 152 of the Taxes Act 1970 says that income tax on the 
profits of a trade or profession carried on by two or more persons in 
partnership is to be computed and stated jointly, and a joint 
assessment on partnership profits is to be made in the partnership 
name.
g
4.23 In Income Tax Commissioners v. Gibbs— the Revenue, following a
change in the partnership of a firm of stockbrokers, assessed the old
firm and the new firm as two separate taxing entities. The House of
9
Lord upheld the Revenue’s approach. Lord MacMillan said—
"Justification is thus not wanting for the view that for taxing
purposes a firm is treated as an entity distinct from the persons who
constitute the firm". Other decisions which emphasise this principal
include Reynolds & Gibson v. Crompton-^- and Watson & Everitt v.
Blunden.-^- A contrary view was, however, expressed by Lord Denning in
12Harrison v. Willis Brothers,—  as follows:- "It is suggested that for
taxing purposes a partnership firm is treated as an entity distinct
from the persons who constitute the firm but I do not think that this
is correct the partnership firm is not an entity for taxing
purposes or any other purposes. Its name is simply a convenient way of
13describing the persons who constitute the firm."—  Lord Denning’s
comments, however, were obiter comments in a case which was concerned
with the complex question of the machinery of assessment following a
back duty enquiry into the affairs of a two-partner partnership where
one of the partners had died. It is not, therefore, thought to
overturn the view expressed in the Gibbs case. In a very recent case
13a
on partnerships, MacKinlay v. Arthur Young McClelland Moores & Co.---
the Court of Appeal upheld a finding of the Special Commissioners, that 
expenditure incurred by a partner in relocating to another office, was 
wholly and exclusively incurred for trading purposes, on the footing 
that the firm was an entity separate from the partners. The case will 
go to the House of Lords. It therefore seems clear that in England, 
for the special purposes of income tax, a partnership is a separate 
unit of assessment, and the partners are jointly liable for the tax of 
the firm. In Scotland, a partnership is a recognised legal entity for
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1A 15all purposes. In Mair v. Wood—  Lord President Cooper said—  "It is
fundamental to the Scots law of partnership that the firm is a legal
persona distinct from the individuals who compose it. .... Partners
are, of course, liable jointly and severally in a question with a firm
creditor for the obligations of the firm the partners being in
substance guarantors or cautioners for the firm’s obligations and each
being entitled on the payment of a firm debt to relief pro rata from
the others".
4.24 The legal position of partners and partnerships in relation to 
taxation is subject to a special rule in Section 118(3), concerned only 
with the Revenue's power to make out of time assessments for neglect, 
and for penalties within Part 10 of the Taxes Management Act 1970. 
Section 118(3) provides that in Scotland as well as England, tax 
charged on such an assessment is to be treated as an assessment on the 
partners, as though the tax charged by the assessment was charged on 
and payable by them. This seems to convert the liability for penalties 
under Part 10 into a joint liability of the partners themselves.
4.25 In England as well as Scotland, the partners in a firm may
become liable to penalties for failure or for rendering incorrect
returns or accounts due to fraud, wilful default or negligence. A
failure to comply with a notice under Section 9, that is a notice
served on the first-named or precedent acting partner, affects all the
partners, since that obligation is to make a return under Section 8 on
all the partners’ behalf. Any resultant penalty charged under Part 10
will therefore be by law a joint liability of the partners of an
English firm, and by Section 118(3) a joint liability of the partners
of a Scottish firm. The same position would seem to apply to an
offence under Section 95. It is thought to be impossible for a partner
to avoid a penalty under Section 95 by maintaining that another partner
submitted false accounts, because one partner, acting on behalf of a
14afirm, acts as an agent for all the partners.  In addition, Section
10 of the Partnership Act 1890 provides that where, as a result of a 
wrongful act or omission by a partner acting in the ordinary course of 
the firm’s business, a penalty is incurred, the firm is liable for that 
penalty to the same extent as the partner who was responsible for the
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unlawful act or omission. Default interest under Section 88 is a joint 
liability in England, and a joint and several liability in Scotland, 
because the interest forms part of the assessment and the liability 
therefore forms part of the liability for the tax itself. Despite the 
legal position, it is Revenue practice in back duty settlements, to 
ensure that the partners are jointly and severally liable for the 
amount offered in settlement.
4.26 In practice, it would seem equitable to allocate penalties 
among partners according to their respective shares of the partnership 
tax on which the penalty was charged. But it is by no means certain 
that this is correct. There appears to be no reason why a penalty, or 
interest on overdue tax, should not be treated among the partners as a 
partnership expense and allocated according to profit sharing ratios. 
Section 10 of the Partnership Act 1890, provides that the firm is 
liable for any penalty incurred by any partners in performing the 
duties of partnership. In these circumstances, it would seem to be the 
firm which meets the penalty, and not the partners as individuals.
RECOVERY OF PENALTIES
4.27 Unlike default interest under Section 88, which is "carried"
by the assessment to make good the tax lost, the procedure for the
recovery of penalties is separately provided for in Section 100 of the 
Taxes Management Act 1970.
Section 100 permits an Inspector to commence penalty proceedings before 
the General Commissioners for a penalty under Section 93(1) or 98(1) 
that is, for failure. The maximum penalty which can be so obtained 
under Section 93(1) is £50. Penalty proceedings, in all other cases 
governed by Section 100, may only be commenced by order of the Board of 
Inland Revenue. Proceedings are to be instituted either in the name of 
an officer of the Board or, in Scotland, in the name of the Lord
Advocate, and may be commenced before the General or the Special 
Commissioners or before the High Court or, in Scotland, before the 
Court of Session as Court of Exchequer in Scotland. An application to
the Commissioners for an award of a penalty is by way of information in
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writing to the Commissioners who may summon the taxpayer to appear 
before them. Any penalty awarded is to be collected in the same way as 
though it were tax charged by an assessment. The Commissioners or the 
Court may award penalties, whether fixed or tax-geared, for less than 
the maximum amount. This differs from default interest, where the 
Commissioners have no power to mitigate the full amount due.
4.28 A penalty awarded summarily under Section 53 is due and 
payable as though it were tax charged in an assessment, notwithstanding 
that proceedings for its recovery have not been commenced.
4.29 Where a person has died, penalty proceedings which could have
been taken again him when he was alive, may be commenced, or continued,
against his personal representatives. Any penalty awarded is a debt
due from the deceased’s estate. The relevant legislation is contained
in Section 100(5) of the 1970 Act and clarifies doubt created by the
16decision of the Court of Appeal in A-G v. Canter.—  In that case, a 
taxpayer who was liable to penalties under Section 30 of the Income Tax 
Act 1918, died before penalty proceedings were commenced. Although the 
Court held that the Revenue could commence penalty proceedings against 
the deceased's executors, some emphasise was placed by Sir Wilfred 
Greene M.R. on the fact that the penalties were, in that case, fixed. 
Section 100(5) now makes the position clear that penalty proceedings 
against personal representatives of a deceased’s taxpayer can be 
commenced whether the penalties are fixed or tax-geared.
4.30 In penalty proceedings, the evidence needed by the
Commissioners or the Court of the tax charged, is an assessment or
assessments which are final and conclusive.—  This means that
proceedings are premature until the relevant assessment has become
final and conclusive, as was confirmed in the Irish case of A-G 
18v. White.—  It is, however, open to the Commissioners to determine an 
assessment, and immediately thereafter, to award penalties in respect 
of that assessment.
4.31 The decision of the Commissioners in penalty proceedings under 
Section 100 may be appealed against by either party on a question of
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law, and by the taxpayer against the amount of any penalty awarded. 
Appeals are to be heard by the High Court, or in Scotland, the Court of 
Session as Court of Exchequer. The Court has no power to vary the 
award of a penalty in an appeal on a question of law - the Court must 
either set the decision aside, or confirm the amount of the penalty 
awarded by the Commissioners. Where the taxpayer appeals to the Court 
against the amount of a penalty, the Court has the power to confirm the 
decision, or to increase or reduce the amount of the penalty.
4.32 The procedure for an appeal against the summary award of 
penalties under Section 53 differs from an appeal under Section 100. 
It seems that either party may under Section 53 appeal against the 
Commissioners decision to the High Court, or in Scotland, the Court of 
Session as Court of Exchequer. There is, however, no reference to an 
appeal on a point of law in Section 53, which merely provides that the 
decision of the Commissioners may be confirmed or reversed, and that 
the penalty may be reduced or increased.
4.33 Appeals against assessments to tax, are by way of a case
stated for the opinion of the Court. Appeals against the award of
penalties under Section 53(2) was considered by the English High Court
in the recent case of Q.T. Discount Food Stores Ltd. v. Warley General 
19Commissioners.—  In that case, the taxpayer company had failed to
comply with notices under Section 51 and had summary penalties awarded
against it by the General Commissioners. Mr. Justice Vinelott, in a
lengthy judgement discussing the company's appeal, drew a distinction
between appeals under Section 100(6), which are restricted to questions
of law and the amount of a penalty, and appeals under Section 53(2),
which were not so restricted. The Judge confirmed that except where
appeals are restricted to questions of law, the Court is not precluded
from considering the evidence of the parties. Applying this principle
to appeals under Section 100(6) it would appear that the Court can only
consider the law in the context of the evidence admitted or proved
before the Commissioners. In Salmon v. General Commissioners for
20Havering^- Lord Donovan, in the Court of Appeal, said in relation to a
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Section 100(6) appeal "Finally, we are asked to mitigate the penalty on 
the grounds that domestic expenditure met out of cash receipts - in 
other words met out of the till - had been grossly over-estimated. 
Speaking for myself I find it quite impossible even to embark on that 
enquiry. This depends on evidence, upon going into facts and figures, 
and it is not for us to do that. One can see this jurisdiction being 
exercised in a case where plainly something has gone wrong, but for 
myself I am not in that position with regard to this domestic 
expenditure nor could I put myself in that position without conducting 
some sort of accountancy investigation, which it is not the function of 
this Court to conduct." So an appeal under Section 100(6) proceeds in 
broadly the same way as an appeal by Case Stated, that is, on the law, 
including the conclusions in law drawn from the facts found. An appeal 
under Section 53(2) is, however, quite different. Under the Rules of 
the English Supreme Court Order 55 Rule 7(2) an express power is given 
to permit an appeal by way of rehearing, except where the statute 
provides otherwise. The English Court therefore decided in Q.T. 
Discount that the findings and reasons of the Commissioners are to be 
treated as evidence which can be challenged by either party. If the 
primary facts found by the Commissioners are challenged, the rules of 
the English Supreme Court permit further evidence to be adduced in such 
manner as the Court directs. It is submitted that the position in 
Scotland would be the same.
4.34 Appeals by taxpayers against the quantum of penalties awarded
have only rarely been successful. In Taylor v. Bethnal Green General 
21Commissioners—  penalties of £1,198.55 imposed by the Commissioners for
"gross negligence" in failing to make proper returns were reduced to
£1,000 by the Court, on the basis, so it seems, that the taxpayer had a
life policy which was likely to yield £987. In Stableford v. Liverpool
22General Commissioners,—  penalties were sought from a taxpayer, under 
Section 93(1), in respect of his failure to make returns of income for 
the two years ended April 5, 1980. The taxpayer did not appear, nor 
was he represented, before the General Commissioners who awarded 
penalties against him of almost £2,000. On appeal to the High Court 
the taxpayer stated that he was an undischarged bankrupt and that the 
Inspector had agreed not to press him for any return for the period up
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to April 5, 1978. No returns had, in fact, been submitted for 15
years. Mr. Justice Vinelott, who described the case as "wholly
exceptional", decided that the Inspector’s failure to explain the
circumstances of the case had misled the Commissioners, who had awarded
a penalty which was excessive. The penalty was therefore reduced to
£100, with additional costs of £250. The authorities show, however,
that the amount of penalties awarded will only be interfered with if
the Court can be satisfied, as in the Stableford case, that the
Commissioners were not justified in reaching the conclusion which they
23reached. Fresh evidence may, of course, be put forward,—  but if the
Court proceeds on the Commissioners note of findings, it is unlikely
that it will feel justified in varying the award previously given. A
24recent example is Sen v. IRC-—  where penalties of less than the maximum
were imposed by the Commissioners. Although the Court regarded the
penalty imposed as lenient, the amount payable was not varied. The
general principle which the Court should adopt when considering the
quantum of a penalty was stated by Vinelott J. in Lear v. Leek General 
24aCommissioners- when he said that the Court should only interfere with
an award when the penalty was plainly disproportionate to the possible
24bfault. In the recent case of Broat v. Wells General Commissioners---
Scott J. said that it was desirable that a uniform approach to
penalties should be adopted by Commissioners in different parts of the
24a 24ccountry. The judge compared Lear,  with Willey v. IRQ  to
illustrate differing approaches of different Commissioners. It is
submitted, however, that differences will always occur, unless
legislation is introduced to restrict the discretion open to
Commissioners.
MITIGATION OF PENALTIES
4.35 The term "back duty" is applied to tax lost due to fraud, 
wilful default or neglect, and a "back duty settlement" is the amount 
which a taxpayer offers the Revenue, in consideration for the Revenue 
not taking formal proceedings against for the recovery of tax, interest 
and penalties. The Revenue’s power to mitigate penalties is contained 
in Section 102 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 and gives the Board 
complete discretion to mitigate a penalty, or entirely remit it before
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or after judgement, and to "stay or compound" any proceedings for the
recovery of a penalty. Section 88(4) gives the Board similar powers in
relation to default interest. The great majority of back duty cases
are settled in this way, by negotiation, between the taxpayer, or his
professional adviser, and an Inspector on behalf of the Board. In
serious cases, an Inspector from the RevenueTs Enquiry Branch will have
carried out the investigation, and will negotiate with the taxpayer on
the Board’s behalf. Normally, the Inspector will ask the taxpayer to
complete a Certificate of Disclosure certifying that he has made a
complete disclosure of all information relevant to his taxation
25affairs. In R. v. Hudson,—  a taxpayer who had submitted a Certificate 
of Disclosure which he knew to be wrong was held to be guilty of fraud.
4.36 The power of the Revenue to reach informal settlements with
taxpayers in back-duty cases was considered in the English High Court
26in A-G v. Johnstone.—  In that case, a taxpayer who had entered into a
voluntary agreement with the Revenue for a voluntary settlement,
following a back-duty enquiry, failed to meet the final two instalments
of the settlement. In giving judgement in favour of the Crown, Mr.
Justice Rowlatt described the Revenue’s practice which was based on
Section 222 of the Income Tax Act 1918 (now Section 102 of the Taxes
Management Act 1970) as "An extremely beneficial and merciful practice
to the parties" which enabled taxpayers "To put their cards on the
table and make arrangements with (the Revenue) to pay something in
respect of the penalties on account of the injustice which they have
inflicted on the other taxpayers...... " More recently, the question
of the Board of Inland Revenue’s right to reach compromises with
taxpayers was considered by the House of Lords in
27IRC, v. National Federation of Self Employed & Small Businesses Ltd.,—  
a case concerning the Board’s right to grant a general tax "amnesty" to 
individuals employed in the printing industry where there was clear 
evidence that PAYE irregularities had occurred. The House decided 
unanimously in favour of the Crown, emphasise being laid on the wide 
discretion placed by Parliament on the Board of Inland Revenue, by the 
Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890 and the Taxes Management Act 1970 to 
make such arrangements as were necessary for the good management of the 
taxes under the Board’s jurisdiction.
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4.37 The final monetary settlement will consist of a composite sum
which the taxpayer offers the Crown in exchange for immunity from
prosecution, immunity from penalty and interest proceedings, and an
undertaking by the Board that he will not be assessed to the tax. The
form is drafted in such a way so as to ensure that, when it is signed,
it is binding on the taxpayer as a debt due under contract. In A-G v.
28Midland Bank Executor & Trustee Co. Ltd.-—  the Bank, as executor of a 
taxpayer who had died, attempted to repudiate the terms of such a 
contract entered into by the taxpayer while he was still alive. It was 
held that the Bank, as executor, were bound by the contract which the 
deceased had made.
4.38 The Board does not normally mitigate default interest except
in cases of financial hardship, or where the application of Section 88 
produces a manifestly unjust result. But in evidence to Lord Keith’s 
Committee on Inland Revenue Powers, the Board made it plain that there 
is scope for substantial mitigation of penalties, depending on the 
circumstances of each case. In informal settlements, penalties sought 
never exceed the amount of the tax due. From this, the following 
"discounts” can be expected:-
(a) For disclosure a discount of up to 20%. If the disclosure by 
the taxpayer is immediate when challenged by the Inspector and no 
material facts are withheld, the full discount of 20% can be 
expected, the discount being reduced to 5% where disclosure has been 
piecemeal. If the taxpayer denies the irregularities, but they are 
confirmed by the Commissioners, or where the Revenue are forced to 
complete an investigation to prove that irregularities exist, no 
discount for disclosure will be given. At the other end of the 
scale, it is understood that the Revenue will accept a discount of 
30% in a case where the taxpayer has volunteered information 
regarding irregularities in his tax affairs.
(b) An abatement of up to 40% can be secured for co-operation by 
both the taxpayer and his agent in the course of an investigation. 
Co-operation consists of a willingness to provide all information 
requested by the Revenue, quickly and efficiently.
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(c) An abatement of up to 40% can be obtained depending on the size 
and gravity of the offence. The amount of tax lost is one factor. 
Other factors include the way in which the irregularities occurred - 
whether they amounted to negligence or carelessness, or whether 
profits were deliberately omitted from returns or accounts. 
Substantial omissions over a long period, the use of false records, 
or deception, will substantially reduce the amount of the abatement.
4.39 By publishing its practice in relation to the mitigation of
penalties, the Revenue may have exposed itself to a claim that it has
exercised its discretionary powers unfairly. Judicial review may lie
against an Inspector who fails to give due weight to the mitigating
29factors described above.—  Thus an Inspector who offers to accept a 
voluntary monetary penalty may have difficulty in contending for a 
higher amount should the case go to Commissioners. It is even possible 
that, as a matter of natural justice, such a list is ultra vires, 
although the National Federation case suggests otherwise.
4.40 A further point arises, in this connection, from the fact 
that, under Section 88(4) and Section 102, it is for the Board and not 
the Inspector, to exercise discretion. If, therefore, the Board never 
hears of a decision to impose default interest, or a penalty, it cannot 
exercise its discretion. That failure may be an abuse of 
administrative power.
TIME LIMITS FOR RECOVERY OF PENALTIES
4.41 Strict time limits for the recovery of penalties are contained 
in Section 103 of the Taxes Management Act 1970.
The general rule in Section 103(1) is that proceedings for recovery of 
a penalty may be commenced at any time within six years following the 
date on which the penalty was incurred. It is to be observed that 
there is no reference to fiscal years - the time limit is six calendar
years from the actual date of the penalty being incurred. The
legislation is silent on when a penalty is incurred. It is thought
that it will be incurred on the date, or at the time, when the relative
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offence was committed, that is, in relation to a failure, the latest 
time when the statutory obligation could have lawfully been completed.
4.42 The normal time limit for the recovery of penalties is
extended in two situations. The first situation is where a penalty is
sought in connection with a loss of tax due to fraud or wilful default.
In that case, penalty proceedings may be commenced at any time within
three years from the final determination of the amount of the tax
covered by the assessment, that is when the assessment can no longer be
29a
varied on appeal to the Commissioners, or by an order of the Court.---
The second extension of the normal recovery time limit is where an
assessment for a chargeable period is made within six years of the end
of that chargeable period. In that case, proceedings may be commenced
within three years from the final determination of that tax. However,
the tax so charged must not include any tax lost due to neglect which
has been assessed, with leave from the Commissioners, outwith the
normal six-year time limit by virtue of Sections 37, 39, or 40(2). The
effect of these provisions, therefore, is that the Revenue have three
years in which to commence penalty proceedings in relation to tax lost
due to fraud or wilful default, no matter when the offences took place,
but they cannot recover a tax-geared penalty due to neglect, if the
neglect took place more than six years before the date when the
relevant assessment was raised. The three years time limit in cases of
fraud etc. was considered by the Court of Session in Carco Accessories 
30Ltd. v. I.R.C.-—  In that case the company paid tax on estimated 
assessments of tax far short of the actual profits earned. After an 
enquiry, the Revenue raised additional assessments in amounts which the 
company agreed were due. But the Inspector, in correspondence, made 
the additional assessments conditional on statements of the directors’ 
personal assets. The Court confirmed the Commissioners findings that 
that agreement was not final. Penalty proceedings could therefore be 
commenced.
4.43 Section 100(5) permits penalty proceedings to be taken against 
the personal representatives of a deceased person who has incurred a 
penalty. The extended time limit in Section 103(2) does not, however, 
apply to these proceedings. If the Revenue seek to recover a
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tax-geared penalty from personal representatives, they must, of course, 
have a valid assessment which has become final and conclusive. Section 
40, which has already been discussed, permits assessments to income tax 
or capital gains tax to be made on the personal representatives of a 
deceased’s person within the three fiscal years following that in which 
the individual died. The period prior to death for which assessments 
may be raised is extended by Section 40(2) where tax has been lost due 
to fraud, wilful default or neglect. But Section 103(4) provides that 
a penalty based on tax recovered by virtue of Section 40(2) is to be 
left out of account in determining the Revenue's powers to recover a 
penalty from personal representatives. The position therefore seems to 
be that penalty proceedings against personal representatives must be 
commenced within six years of the date when the offence was actually 
incurred, with the proviso that if the penalty is tax-geared it will be 
necessary for the Revenue to produce a valid assessment which has 
become final and conclusive.
4.44 Where a fixed penalty is imposed under Section 99 of the 1970 
Act, or a person who assists in the preparation of accounts for the 
purposes of tax which he knows to be wrong, only the six year time 
limit for penalty recovery can apply, unless the Revenue can show that 
the person has committed fraud or wilful default.
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CHAPTER 5 
APPEALS AND OTHER REMEDIES
5.01 Although many disputes on back-duty matters are settled by 
agreement between the Revenue and the taxpayers, not all of them are. 
In the absence of an agreement, the Inspector will raise assessments to 
tax, and it may well be that these assessments will cover fiscal years 
outwith the normal six year period. In due course these assessments 
may have to be adjudicated on appeal to the General or Special 
Commissioners. The appeals procedure is therefore a pertinent one for 
the purposes of this study.
5.02 The appeal code is contained in Part V of the Taxes Management 
Act 1970. The legislation provides for appeals to be heard, in the 
first instance, by either the General or the Special Commissioners of
Income Tax. Some matters, usually on complex provisions of the law,
can be heard only by the Special Commissioners. A few matters are 
confined to the General Commissioners. But the great majority of 
appeals can be heard by either the General or the Special
Commissioners, although as a result of legislation introduced in 1984, 
disputes for which there is a choice of jurisdiction go first to the
General Commissioners, unless the taxpayer elects otherwise, and the
General Commissioners and the Inspector agree that the appeal should be 
heard by the Special Commissioners.—
5.03 The General and Special Commissioners exercise very
considerable judicial power over taxpayers’ affairs. This power flows 
from Section 50(6) of the 1970 Act which provides that "If on an
appeal, it appears to the majority of the Commissioners present at the 
hearing, by examination of the appellant on oath or affirmation, or by 
other lawful evidence, that the appellant is overcharged by an
assessment, the assessment shall be reduced accordingly, but otherwise 
every such assessment shall stand good". Sub-section (7) permits the 
Commissioners to increase the amount of an assessment, where they 
consider it appropriate to do so. The main consequence of Section 
50(6) is that it places on the taxpayer the onus of showing that an
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assessment to tax is too high. That onus may only be discharged by the 
testimony of the taxpayer himself, or by other lawful evidence. But 
the power in Section 50(7) to increase the amount of an assessment 
shows that the Commissioners are not judges, deciding which of two 
parties to an appeal should succeed. Instead "they are merely in the 
position of valuers whose proceedings are regulated by statute to 
enable them to make an estimate of the taxpayer’s liabilities for the
lclyears in question".—  In modern practice, however, the quasi-judicial 
role of Commissioners has developed to the point that they are now 
closer to being judges than valuers, mainly because their 
administrative duties, including the making of assessments, are now 
carried out by the Inspector.
5.04 There is no doubt that, by placing the onus of discharging an 
assessment on the taxpayer himself, the legislation has conferred a 
considerable advantage on the Inspector. Like so much in income tax, 
this advantage has it origins in history. Originally, the General 
Commissioners existed, not only to hear appeals against assessments in 
dispute, but to make the assessments themselves. The function of the 
Inspector, or the surveyor as he was known until 1922, was
administrative, and included the collection of information on which the
Commissioners could base their assessments. This arrangement had the
effect of offering some protection to the taxpayer against the 
overzealous Inspector, because at that time, the appeals procedure was 
less well developed than it is now. It was not until 1964 that the 
last remnants of the original arrangements were abolished, leaving 
Commissioners’ hearings as the surviving part of what was once a 
two-part process, namely the making and the determination of 
assessments. It is for this reason that an assessment once made 
"stands good" unless the taxpayer can show that it is excessive, and so 
by accident, the Inspector has therefore inherited a very real
advantage. A second aspect of procedure, arising from history, is the 
nature of the evidence needed to determine an appeal. Originally, in 
the absence of a return, the Commissioners had to make assessments 
according to the best evidence available. As a result, the words in
Section 50(6) "Where ..... it appears to the Commissioners ....... by
.....  lawful evidence", do not restrict the Commissioners to hearing
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lawful evidence put forward by the parties to the appeal. In
2
Forestside Properties (Chingford) Ltd. v. Pearce— the Commissioners 
took into consideration facts not advanced by either party, and this 
practice was upheld by the Court on the footing that this local 
knowledge was the equivalent of judicial knowledge. It is for this 
reason that General Commissioners are selected from local people of 
standing, with knowledge of business and local affairs. The Scottish 
system of written pleadings, with an appeal based on a Closed Record 
from which the parties cannot then depart, has no place in appeals to 
Income Tax Commissioners. At the same time, however, Commissioners are 
a quasi-judicial body. They are bound by the rules of natural justice, 
and if their conduct infringes these rules, either party may petition 
the Court to have the wrong righted. This aspect is dealt with later 
in this chapter.
5.05 The end product of an appeal to Commissioners against an 
assessment to tax is the Commissioners' determination. Section 56 of 
the 1970 Act provides that, immediately after the determination of an 
appeal by the Commissioners, the taxpayer or the Inspector may declare 
that he is dissatisfied with the determination as being wrong in point 
of law, and, within 30 days thereafter, he may require the 
Commissioners to state a case for the opinion of the Court. Section 
56(4) directs that the Stated Case is to contain both the 
determination, and the facts on which it is based. An examination of 
the Stated Case procedure therefore gives valuable insight into the 
operation of the General and Special Commissioners' Hearings.
5.06 It may be said that the two functions of the Commissioners are
to find facts, and to draw conclusions from the facts so found. In
back duty cases, Commissioners' conclusions are often no more than a
3
matter of credibility. Thus in Jacobs v. Eavis— the taxpayer
maintained that a deposit of £40 in his bank account represented
betting winnings. In their Stated Case, the Commissioners declared
that they did not consider this explanation as satisfactory. In
4
another case, Frowd v. Whalley,— the taxpayer, a grocer, sought to 
explain low personal drawings in his accounts by maintaining that his 
diet consisted of unsaleable meat, cracked eggs, and the trimmings from
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the bacon machine. The Commissioners refused to believe him, and the 
Court held that they were entitled to do so. In cases such as these it 
seems unnecessary for the Stated Case to say whether the evidence was 
accepted or rejected. It is enough for the Commissioners to say 
whether the taxpayer had discharged the onus on him.
5.07 Although many back duty cases are simply cases of credibility, 
not all of them are. Cases arise where Commissioners, having accepted 
certain facts as proved, are then obliged to draw inferences from these 
facts. These inferences may be factual inferences, often referred to 
as secondary facts, as opposed to the primary facts which are led in 
evidence. For example the question as to whether a transaction of 
purchase or sale is an adventure in the nature of a trade is a matter 
of law, but it is essentially a secondary fact based on the primary 
facts of how and why the transaction came to be undertaken. In back 
duty disputes, the issue may be whether primary facts showing 
dishonesty can lead to the conclusion of a dishonest course of conduct. 
An example is the decision of the High Court in Rosetta Franks (King 
Street) Ltd. v. Dick— where the Revenue successfully established fraud 
before the Commissioners on the basis of the evidence of a single 
customer who had been asked to pay for goods by means of a bearer 
cheque; had received a receipt not in the name of the taxpayer's 
business; and where the amount paid was never recorded in the 
taxpayer’s books. It is sufficient, in a case such as this, for the 
Commissioners to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that 
certain proven facts lead to a factual conclusion. They are not 
seeking to arrive at a conclusion only if the conclusion is beyond 
reasonable doubt.
5.08 Apart from the submissions in law by Counsel for the parties, 
the Stated Case is all that the Court has to work with, and in 
particular, contains the sum of the factual information available. The 
duty of the Court, in this situation, is to consider whether the 
determination is sound on the basis of the facts. The Courts cannot 
consider whether the facts are to be accepted, unless the question is 
whether, on the basis of the evidence, the facts should have been 
accepted by the Commissioners themselves. In I.R.C. v. Fraser— Lord
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Normand said "In cases where it is competent for a tribunal to make
findings in fact which are excluded from review, the Appeal Court has
always jurisdiction to intervene if it appears either that the Tribunal 
has misunderstood the statutory language - because a proper 
construction of the statutory language is a matter of law - or that the 
Tribunal has made a finding for which there is no evidence or which is 
inconsistent with the evidence and contradictory of it. It is not as a 
rule possible to say whether the Tribunal, in any particular case where 
the Court finds that it has erred, has failed to appreciate the meaning 
of the statute or whether it has made a finding without having evidence 
to support it".
5.09 In the later case of Edwards v. Bairstow^- Lord Radcliffe put
the same point in the following way "......  the Commissioners are the
first Tribunal to try an appeal, a n d ...... their decisions can only
be upset on appeal if they have been positively wrong in law. The
Court is not there to give a second opinion where there is a reasonable
ground for the first".
5.10 It follows from these and other decisions that conclusions 
from primary facts may be reversed, as a matter of law, if the Stated 
Case contains something which is bad law and affects the determination, 
or the facts found are such that no person properly instructed in the 
relevant law could have reached that determination. The question for 
the Court, in the latter situation, is whether there is evidence to 
support the determination. It is only if there is no evidence to 
support it, that the determination can be upset. Time and again, 
judges have been at pains to state that determinations by Commissioners 
are final and binding, notwithstanding that, had the judge himself been 
a Commissioner he would have reached a different conclusion on the sameg
evidence. In Pilkington v. Randall,— Lord Justice Salmon expressed the
point in the following way "But it is important to guard oneself
against the temptation, to which I suppose we are all prone ........
When we think a conclusion of fact is one at which we would not have
arrived ourselves, we are tempted to say that it follows that no
reasonable person could have come to that conclusion". This limitation
9
was also expressed by Lord Brightman in Furniss v. Dawson— when he 
said:-
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"I agree with the proposition (that the inference to be drawn from 
facts is a question of law) only if it means that the appellate 
Court, where jurisdiction is limited to questions of law, can and 
should interfere with an inference of fact drawn by the fact-finding 
tribunal which cannot be justified by primary facts. I do not agree 
with it if it is intended to mean that, if the primary facts justify 
alternative inferences of fact, an appellate Court can substitute its 
own preferred inference for the inferences drawn by the fact-finding 
tribunal".
These aspects have been stressed because of their importance in back 
duty appeals. It is rare for Commissioners to state a case where the 
facts found are such that there is no evidence to support the 
determination. Accordingly, it is the normal practice of the Revenue, 
when they are unsuccessful before Commissioners on a back duty appeal - 
and they are sometimes unsuccessful - to accept the decision of the 
Commissioners. As a result, almost every appeal to the Court on a back 
duty case has been an appeal by an unsuccessful taxpayer, and with one 
or two minor, and only partial, exceptions, the taxpayer has been 
unsuccessful in every case. This fact serves to emphasise a 
fundamental aspect of Commissioners Hearings namely, the nature and the 
quality of the evidence which is led before them. An exception to the 
usual attitude of the Revenue when unsuccessful in a back duty appeal
9a
is Brimelow v. Price.—  In that case the evidence before the General 
Commissioners pointed to wilful default, but the Commissioners found 
against the Revenue. No reason was given in the Stated Case. Even 
then, the Court refused to reverse the decision. Instead the Stated 
Case was sent back to the Commissioners, who were merely asked to 
explain their findings.
ONUS OF PROOF
5.11 In an appeal against an assessment, it is for the taxpayer to 
show that the assessment is too high, and to do this he must present 
evidence to satisfy the Commissioners on this point. In the early case 
of Haythornwaite v. Kelly^- the capital of a company was increased by 
£22,920 without a satisfactory explanation being given to the
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Inspector, who issued an additional estimated assessment of £50,000.
In an attempt to obtain information from the shareholders, the
Commissioners issued a demand, or precept, requiring the shareholders 
to submit their bank passbooks. The precept was not complied with, and 
the assessment was confirmed. The taxpayers appealed, on the grounds 
that the precept was ultra vires. In finding for the Revenue the
Master of the Rolls, Lord Hanworth said: 11.....  That, (the
precept), was wrong, as I had pointed out, but on the other hand, right 
or wrong, one cannot but give effect to this, that the company, whose 
Counsel has revealed the fact that some other profits had been made, 
which enabled the shareholders to provide capital for the company, did 
not call any of those persons to speak either to the facts relating to 
those speculations, or to offer the books for criticism - the books as 
well of the company, as of the persons whose resources were challenged, 
and the details of which were given - and there is no doubt that 
whether the Commissioners could demand them by precept or not, in as 
much as the onus lay upon the company to displace the assessment, those 
who were concerned for the company had a great responsibility in not 
producing, if they were available, materials which would undoubtedly 
have been of serious import and great business value for the purposes
of forming the Commissioners’ opinion". In the later cases of
11 12 Stoneleigh Products Ltd. v. Dodd^ —- and Pierson v Belcher-—  the
Commissioners confirmed assessments for lack of evidence that they were
excessive, and the determinations were upheld by the Court. In a
13recent case on this point, Bookey v. Edwards,—  the Inspector made 
estimated assessments under Schedule D Case 1 on a taxpayer, in the 
absence of returns from him. On appeal, the taxpayer produced the 
return but no accounts or records to support the figures. The taxpayer 
was a driver and a company which had engaged him gave evidence of the 
amounts paid to him by way of fees and expenses. The amounts paid for 
expenses were much higher than the fees, but there was no satisfactory 
evidence to support the taxpayer’s contention that the amounts 
reimbursed by way of expenses had actually been paid away by him in the 
course of his trade. On the basis of the evidence, however, the 
Commissioners decided that the estimated assessments were too high, and 
confirmed them in amounts less than the Inspector's figures, but much 
greater than the figures for which the taxpayer contended. The Court
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held that the Commissioners were entitled to infer the amount of profit 
from the evidence before them and refused to interfere with their 
determination.
5.12 However, although the onus is on the taxpayer to displace the
amount of an assessment, the onus is clearly on the Inspector if he
maintains that an assessment has been made for a special purpose, such
as the recovery of tax lost due to fraud, wilful default or neglect.
14In Hillenbrand v. IRC,—  the Lord President expressed this principle in 
the following way:-
11 It was contended to us on behalf of the Crown that wilful default 
within the meaning of the Income Tax Acts, can be established by the 
Inland Revenue by means of a presumption of guilt without the Inland 
Revenue requiring to establish wilful default on the taxpayer's part. 
An obiter dictum of a single Judge in an English case was quoted to 
justify this startling proposition. In my opinion, the dictum, which 
was obiter in that case, does not support such a contention, and I 
should like to make it perfectly clear that in my view there is no 
warrant whatever for the idea that under the Income Tax Acts people 
are presumed to be guilty of wilful default unless they can disprove 
it. To establish wilful default within the meaning of those words in 
the Income Tax Act 1952 Section 47 the onus is quite clearly on the 
Crown and the taxpayer is not in the position of having to prove 
himself innocent of such a charge without proof by the Inland Revenue 
that he is guilty of default".
5.13 This shift of onus is important in two respects. First, if 
the Revenue seek to recover penalties or default interest in respect of 
an assessment it is necessary for them to show that the assessment is 
tainted with one of the three offences of fraud, wilful default or 
neglect. Even if the assessment has been confirmed by the 
Commissioners, it does not necessarily follow that the tax recovered 
was lost due to the taxpayer's fault so that, in theory at least, the 
onus would be on the taxpayer, in the first instance, to show that the 
assessment should be discharged, but if confirmed it is then for the 
Inspector to show that there is evidence to support a finding of fraud,
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wilful default or neglect. Although in theory these two aspects are 
different, in practice they are rarely so. If an estimated assessment 
has been made in the absence of returns, or other satisfactory 
evidence, then it is plain that the assessment and the basis on which 
it is made are so closely connected that the taxpayer, in producing 
evidence to show the assessment is excessive, must also produce 
evidence to show that he is not guilty of any offence. If, therefore, 
the assessments are confirmed, and the Inspector succeeds in the 
assessment, he will have little difficulty in establishing the offence.
5.14 The second aspect where the onus is important is in connection 
with out of time assessments under Sections 36 to 40 of the 1970 Act. 
To make an assessment outwith the normal 6 year period, the Inspector 
has to have the leave of a General or a Special Commissioner, who must 
be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that tax 
has or may have been lost to the Crown "owing to the fraud or wilful 
default or neglect of any person". It has been held that the duty of 
Commissioners in this regard is a purely administrative one, and that 
the taxpayer has no right to be present when the application is made, 
although in the recent case of R v. Special Commissioners, ex parti 
Stipplechoice Ltd.—  the taxpayer company successfully obtained a 
judicial review of the power of a Commissioner to grant the Inspector 
the right to raise an assessment outwith the normal six year period, on 
the grounds that the evidence presented by the Inspector was not 
factually correct.
STANDARD OF PROOF
5.15 Proceedings before the General and Special Commissioners are
civil proceedings, and accordingly, the standard of proof is not the
criminal standard of "beyond reasonable doubt". This is so, even where
16the Revenue allege fraud. In Fen Farming Co. Ltd. v. Dunsford,—  an 
Inland Revenue enquiry into the tax affairs of a company and several of 
its directors was concluded by an offer in settlement of the 
outstanding tax, plus interest and penalties. Some years later, 
following the death of the company's managing director, a concealed 
bank account came to light, and it was apparent that during the earlier
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enquiry the profits of the company had not been fully disclosed to the
Revenue. On appeal to the General Commissioners, the company offered
no evidence as to the source of the funds in the bank account, while
the Revenue produced rather flimsy evidence from which it could be
inferred that the account contained undisclosed profits made by the
company. The Commissioners found that the company was guilty of wilful
default. On appeal to the Court, the company contended that the
proceedings before the Commissioners were quasi-criminal, and that
accordingly, the standard of proof required was higher than the civil
standard of "balance of probabilities". In advancing this contention,
the taxpayer relied on dicta in the earlier case of Amis v. Colls.—
The High Court rejected the taxpayer’s contention, however, and held
that in a civil case, the criminal standard of proof was not required.
It may be, however, that when the Revenue allege fraud before the
Commissioners, a standard of proof higher than "balance of
probabilities" is required. In Lennon v. Co-operative Insurance 
17aSociety Ltd.-  a case on civil fraud, the Lord Ordinary said "I accept
  that the standard of proof .... is lower than the criminal
standard, namely, beyond reasonable doubt but higher than on the 
balance of probabilities. I am not able to state in words the extent
of that onus but it is ...... somewhere half-way between that and
reasonable doubt". The standard of proof therefore depends on the 
offence, and not on the nature of the proceedings.
5.16 It is, of course, open to the Revenue, where fraud is
suspected, to seek to prosecute the taxpayer. In England, the Revenue 
is its own prosecuting authority, but in Scotland the decision to 
prosecute is for the Procurator Fiscal, or the Crown Office, on the 
basis of the evidence presented by the Revenue. If the Revenue decide 
to take criminal proceedings against a taxpayer, the civil standard of 
proof will not apply. Instead, it will be necessary for the Crown to 
show that the taxpayer is guilty "beyond reasonable doubt".
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EVIDENCE
5.17 The starting point in any commentary on the importance of 
evidence in back duty appeals is Section 50(6) of the Taxes Management 
Act 1970 which provides that, on an appeal, an assessment may only be 
reduced if a majority of the Commissioners present so decide, by 
examination of the appellant on oath or affirmation, or by means of 
other lawful evidence. Section 51 of the 1970 Act gives the 
Commissioners power to obtain information from an appellant in a tax 
appeal, and entitles any officer of the Board to inspect books or 
documents and to take copies. Section 52 entitles either party to an 
appeal to adduce any lawful evidence in support of his contentions and 
gives the Commissioners power to summons witnesses to give evidence. 
Commissioners are entitled to hear such evidence on oath. Penalties 
may be imposed for failure to comply with these provisions.
5.18 The law of evidence in Scotland is a large and complex 
subject. Its purpose is to regulate proof and it does this by placing 
obstacles in the path of anyone who, by forensic means, seeks to 
establish facts as true. If the obstacles are successfully surmounted, 
it may be said that the facts in issue are proved.
5.19 Evidence may be:-
(a) Direct or circumstantial. Evidence is direct where it is 
evidence of a fact in issue; indirect or circumstantial when it is 
evidence of a fact from which the Commissioners may infer a fact in 
issue. In taxation appeals, this inference can normally be made only 
by combining a number of pieces of circumstantial evidence.
(b) Primary or secondary. Primary evidence is evidence proceeding 
from a witness’s own knowledge or from an original document. 
Secondary evidence is evidence by a witness of what he has heard 
someone say, or from a copy of a document. Hearsay evidence is 
secondary evidence.
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(c) Written oral or real. Written evidence, if not probative, must 
be spoken to by oral evidence, as must all items of real evidence.
(d) Evidence of fact or of opinion. What a witness perceives with 
any of his senses may be spoken to by him. But his opinion can only 
be founded on if he is an expert on the subject on which he gives 
evidence.
5.20 The rules on "best evidence" say that evidence put forward to 
a Court or a Tribunal must be the best which is available. Thus, a 
photocopy of a document is not best evidence if the original document 
can be produced. It seems however that this rule, although in the past 
strongly observed, has now been considerably weakened, and may be of 
little relevance in taxation appeals.
5.21 To be admissible before a Court or Tribunal, evidence must be
relevant to the dispute. For example, if the Revenue allege that the 
reported profits of a trader are incorrect, it is unlikely to be
relevant, without qualification, that the profits of some other trader 
are higher. This aspect can be important in back duty appeals. One 
technique adopted by the Revenue (and by Customs) is to obtain details 
of a trader's purchases and then see whether the gross profit 
percentage earned on his sales is adequate. Adequacy may be tested in 
one of two ways. One way is by looking at average rates of gross 
profit returns for similar traders in the same area. It is
questionable whether this evidence is relevant, and, it is submitted, 
it would not be admissible as opinion evidence unless put forward by 
someone acceptable as an expert witness. A more acceptable alternative 
is to take the gross profit percentage which the taxpayer himself seeks 
to obtain and then see whether his accounts support this.
5.22 In taxation appeals hearsay evidence merits special attention.
Hearsay evidence is evidence of what another person has said or 
written. As such, it is good evidence so far as it goes - as testimony 
of what has been said or written. But it cannot go beyond that, by 
proving the truth of the matter stated. The main reason why hearsay
evidence is of limited value is that it is not the best evidence - that
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can be obtained only from the person who made the written or spoken 
comment. For example, if a witness says that a taxpayer admitted that 
his accountancy records were inaccurate that evidence is not primary 
evidence of the fact of the inaccuracy. It is only evidence that the 
taxpayer said that his books of account were inaccurate. Hearsay 
evidence may be admissible, however, in exceptional circumstances, 
such as where the maker of the original statement is dead.
5.23 A difficulty with hearsay evidence is that, unless it is
objected to at the outset, it may be impossible for Commissioners to
reach a conclusion without, admittedly inadvertently, taking it into
18account. In Spedding v. Sabine-—  an Inspector put before General 
Commissioners hearsay evidence of what the manager of a business had 
told him about the owner’s alleged business dealings. The General 
Commissioners found for the Revenue. In confirming the Commissioners’ 
decision, the Judge said:-
"The burden was on the taxpayer to discharge the assessments and he
has failed to do so ...... it is clear to me that here was this
improbable story told, and the Inspector was entitled to say; I 
wrote to this man and told him this was quite different from the 
story I had in my possession from another source, and he never chose
to answer They (the Commissioners) might suppose that he did
not have an answer. That would be quite enough to justify them in 
rejecting the appellant’s story."
5.24 This is an example of primary hearsay. The Inspector was 
quite entitled to tell the Commissioners that he had written to the 
taxpayer asking for an explanation of information which was at variance 
with the taxpayer’s version. The evidence did not prove, or seek to 
prove, that the Inspector’s version was correct. But the Commissioners 
concluded that it was, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation 
from the taxpayer. The decision demonstrates the fine dividing line 
between hearsay evidence being acceptable as to what was said, but 
unacceptable as to what actually happened. The Spedding case is not 
however, authority for the proposition that the rules against hearsay 
evidence are to be disregarded, although the Judge did remark that the
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evidence might not have been properly obtained. Although, in practice,
an Inspector’s suspicions may be aroused by hearsay evidence, and he
may even construct his enquiries around such evidence, the Revenue, in
an appeal, will be quick to object to such evidence advanced by a
19taxpayer if it suits them to do so. In Forth Investments Ltd. v. IRC-—  
a company sought by means of statements by its company secretary, and 
by the Barbados Inland Revenue, to establish before Commissioners that 
it was resident in the Barbados. The Inspector successfully objected 
to the documents on the grounds that they were hearsay and that better 
evidence was available but had not been produced. The Commissioners 
found for the Revenue, and the Court upheld the finding.
19a5.24a In the recent case of Schister v. Scott----  the Inspector had
prepared estimates of omitted profits based on figures supplied by the 
taxpayer. The estimates were held to be admissible. The fact that 
they were based on the taxpayer’s own figures meant that they were not 
hearsay.
5.25 Facts which are admitted may be taken as evidence, without
formal proof. It is a common practice, in appeals to the General or
Special Commissioners, for the parties to jointly submit a statement of
agreed facts for which no formal proof is necessary. The booklet on
tax appeals published by the Special Commissioners encourages the
production of such statements. There is no doubt that a statement of
agreed facts can save much time and trouble but it is dangerous to take
20the practice too far. In Bolson & Son Ltd. v. Farrelly,—  the Court of 
Appeal expressed some nervousness over the use of such statements in 
the following way ”1 do not say it is wrong .... for an appellant 
before the General Commissioners to submit a statement which is 
accepted by the Inspector without objection as presenting correctly the 
facts of the case. That course, from a practical point of view, may be 
economical and convenient but I think it should be adopted with 
discrimination."
5.26 Having considered the general principles, it is now necessary 
to see how they apply to appeals to the Commissioners on back duty 
matters. Earlier in this chapter, it was explained that the onus was
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on the taxpayer to show that an assessment was too high. However, the
burden lies with the Crown in establishing that an assessment was made
for a special purpose, for example, to recover tax lost due to fraud,
wilful default, or neglect. On the face of it, therefore, the burden
of proof in a back duty appeal seems to be at cross purposes. On the
one hand, the taxpayer must show that the assessment is too high. On
the other hand, the Revenue have to show the purpose for which the
assessment was made. It would appear that, if the purpose of the
assessment is central to its validity, it is for the Crown to
establish, at the outset, the presence of fraud, wilful default, or
22neglect. In Hudson v. Humbles-—  Mr. Justice Pennycook, in the High 
Court said:-
11 It is well established that, where the Revenue make an assessment 
which would be out of time apart from the proviso as to sub-section 
(1) of Section 36 of the Taxes Management Act 1970, the burden lies 
upon the Revenue to establish that some form of fraud or wilful 
default has been committed by the taxpayer in connection with or in 
relation to income tax. If the Revenue succeed at this stage, the 
burden then shifts to the taxpayer to displace the assessment, for 
example, on the grounds that it is excessive in amount."
5.27 In the Hudson case, the Inspector’s evidence consisted of a
capital statement. This was prima facie evidence only, but no evidence
was put forward by the taxpayer to challenge it, and accordingly, it
was accepted. Where, however, it is not necessary for the Inspector to
establish that an assessment has been made for a special purpose, the
onus of discharging the assessment would lie, in the first instance,
with the taxpayer. If he succeeds, the question of fraud, wilful
default, or neglect will not arise. But if he fails, then it seems
reasonable to assume that the evidence of the alleged fraud etc. will
22ahave been put before the Commissioners in the course of the Hearing.---
Normally, therefore, the allegation of fraud etc. would immediately
follow the determination of the assessment. There is no need for the
Revenue to give particulars of the alleged fraud, etc. at the outset,
23if it appears from the evidence that fraud is present.—  But it does 
not follow that because estimated assessments are confirmed, fraud,
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wilful default, or neglect are present. In Wellington v. Reynolds-—  a
taxpayer was able to show that his income had been understated because
his wife had misled him as to the full amount of profits from her
business. It was held that the taxpayer was not himself guilty of
wilful default. But the close connection between the amount of the
assessment and its purpose makes such a circumstance unusual in
practice. Another circumstance which is unusual is for Commissioners
to refuse to accept the evidence of one party, in the absence of
22evidence by the other. In Hudson v. Humbles,—  the taxpayer refused to
put forward any evidence, and the Commissioners found in favour of the
Inspector. The Court confirmed the Commissioners findings. In another
25case, Nicholson v. Morris-—  Inland Revenue enquiries into the fees
received by a Barrister’s Clerk resulted in estimated assessments being
made on him. Some of the assessments were out of time, but had been
made with the leave of a General Commissioner. On appeal, the taxpayer
did not put forward any evidence to discharge the onus on him of
showing the assessments were excessive. Instead, he cross-examined the
Inspector of Taxes on the account book which had formed the basis of
the Revenue’s contentions. The book however, was never formally proved
in evidence. The taxpayer’s appeals were dismissed, and the
assessments confirmed. On appeal to the High Court, the taxpayer
contended that the Commissioners were not entitled to infer that he was
guilty of fraud or wilful default for all the years under appeal. His
contentions were dismissed. The burden was on him to show that the
assessments were excessive. If he failed to produce evidence to that
effect, he could not succeed. The Hudson and Nicholson cases are
examples of the folly of relying on the Revenue’s inability to put
forward a satisfactory case. It is dangerous for a taxpayer to say
"The Revenue have no case, so I can win by saying nothing". Such an
attitude merely strengthens the Revenue’s hand, no matter any inherent
weakness. The general position of the Court where a taxpayer has
contended that he has no case to answer was set out by Mr. Justice
26Upjohn (as he then was) in IRC v. White Brothers Ltd.,—  in the 
following terms
"The Commissioners when hearing cases where the onus is on the Crown 
ought not to listen to a submission of "no case to answer". It must
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be met with the polite riposte "Do you or do you not elect to call 
any evidence in this case?" If the taxpayer elects to call no 
evidence then, of course, he cannot complain if the Commissioners or, 
on appeal, this Court comes to the conclusion that the Crown has 
discharged the onus which is upon it, and it would be too late for 
him then to ask for leave to call evidence."
5.28 The practical consequences of the law described in this 
chapter can be shown by an examination of a selection of the many cases 
on back duty appeals which have reached the Courts. In all of these 
cases, it will be observed that the Inland Revenue have acknowledged an 
onus to produce at the very least a prima facie case showing that 
taxable income has been understated, and the question for the 
Commissioners has been whether the taxpayer can satisfy the onus placed 
on him of showing that his returns, or business accounts, have 
disclosed the true amount of taxable income.
275.29 In George Deacon & Sons v. IRC-—  the Inspector discovered that 
the partners in a firm had over £29,000 among them in private bank 
accounts. In an attempt to discover the source of this money, the 
Inspector asked for the production of business books. Some of the 
books were produced, but the production of others was refused. At a 
hearing before the General Commissioners, the only evidence put forward 
by the taxpayers was the audited accounts, which they maintained were 
correct. They also maintained that the accountancy records supported 
the annual accounts, but the records were not produced in evidence. 
The Inspector produced figures showing that the rates of gross profit 
on the annual accounts had fluctuated wildly from year to year, and 
that in two years, personal drawings were very high in comparison with 
other years. The taxpayers alleged that the source of the monies in 
the private bank accounts was betting winnings, and produced a 
bookmaker who gave evidence to that effect. But under 
cross-examination, the bookmakers’ evidence proved unsatisfactory and 
in the end, the Commissioners did not accept the evidence which he 
gave. Accordingly, the General Commissioners determined the 
assessments in the amounts brought out by the Inspector in his 
calculations. On appeal, Counsel for the taxpayer argued that "without
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some direct evidence of improper entries or omissions from the books of 
the business, the Commissioners has no right to draw the conclusion of 
fact that the business profits had been understated". Mr. Justice 
Donovan, in dismissing the appeal said that this argument was "just as
fallacious ...... as to argue that no-one should ever be convicted on
circumstantial evidence alone".
It would seem that the weakness of the taxpayer's case in Deacon was 
that the refusal to produce books and records supporting the accounts 
was seen by the Commissioners as tantamount to an admission of guilt. 
Although the decision of the Commissioners was largely one of inference 
on circumstantial evidence, the case shows that that will be enough to 
satisfy the Court.
285.30 In another case, Horrowitz v. Farrand,—  the private assets of 
the director of a private company could not be reconciled with his 
known sources of income. He was therefore assessed to income tax on 
the footing that he was carrying on a trade separate from his company. 
His accountants had reported that they had been unable to vouch £650 of 
the company's purchases, and that the purchases had been paid for by 
Horrowitz out of his own pocket. However, a proper receipt for the 
purchases was not available. Before the Commissioners, the taxpayer 
maintained that his capital increases came from betting winnings and 
the sales of jewellery and furniture. His accountants did not give 
evidence since they had resigned before the appeal was heard. The 
Inspector's evidence was a capital statement which he had prepared 
before the hearing, and on which he had invited the taxpayer to 
comment. The taxpayer had produced figures for the sales of jewellery 
and furniture, and for betting winnings. At the hearing a witness 
testified that he had bought furniture from the taxpayer and paid him 
in cash, but no documentary evidence was produced to substantiate this 
evidence. The Inspector succeeded. The Court held that the 
Commissioners had evidence to justify their findings. The findings 
were clearly based on the inferences from the evidence, but once again, 
that was enough.
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295.31 Moschi v. Kelly—  was a case where, in the High Court, the 
question of onus of proof was important. The taxpayer, who had come to 
the United Kingdom in 1933 and had carried on a trade, had introduced 
new capital of £29,500 into his business between 1938 and 1944, and by 
1945, owned jewellery worth £10,000. He was assessed on these sums on 
the footing that they represented undeclared business profits. On 
appeal, the taxpayer maintained that he brought cash into the country 
in 1933, and converted it into sterling through a bank. But the bank 
could not support the contentions. He also said that he had brought 
diamonds into this country in 1933. That was accepted by the Revenue, 
although it was still maintained that there were profits not fully 
taxed. The General Commissioners found for the Revenue. In the Court 
of Appeal counsel for the taxpayer submitted that once the Revenue 
accepted that the taxpayer had brought diamonds into this country in 
1933, the onus was on them to show that the apparent deficiencies had 
come from undisclosed profits, and not from the sale of the diamonds. 
Lord Justice Somerville did not agree. In his view the appellant had 
not given evidence in support of his contention that he had brought 
diamonds into the U.K. in 1933, and there were documents and other 
facts which were considered by the Commissioners as leading to the 
inference that the appellant had not had the diamonds in his possession 
for twelve years. Instead, there was evidence that a cheque for £1500 
paid by a customer had been misappropriated by the taxpayer. On the 
basis of this evidence, the Commissioners were entitled to infer that 
the Inspector’s calculations were correct, and that the assessment 
should be confirmed. The point here was that the onus of proof had 
never shifted from the taxpayer at all, because he had not 
substantiated the basis upon which the onus could have been shifted 
from him. Accordingly, the evidence of the Revenue, although flimsy, 
was sufficient. Another case in which relatively flimsy evidence
enabled the Revenue to succeed was Rosette Franks (King Street) Ltd.
30v. Dick-—  where the Crown’s case that the accounts of the taxpaying 
company were wrong was based on the evidence of a witness who, having 
made a purchase for £39.45 was asked to make out the cheque in favour 
of the owner of the company, and not the company itself. As a cheque 
had already been made out in favour of the company, a fresh cheque had 
to be drawn, and a receipt was given without the shop’s name on it.
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The customer reported the matter to the Revenue. Capital statements 
were prepared, and they succeeded in establishing the Crown’s case 
although only one faulty transaction was ever proved. The case is 
unique since it hinged on a single proved omission, and in practice, it 
is often relied on by the Revenue, not always successfully, to show 
that if business books are not wholly accurate, they cannot be relied 
on.
5.32 The general conclusion to be drawn from these four cases is
that the Revenue can prove an omission from tax returns without proving
that the taxpayer’s accounts are wrong. But they can only succeed if 
the Inspector can put forward at least a prima facie case to show that 
there are undeclared profits, and if the taxpayer cannot put forward 
any satisfactory alternative explanation. Since Commissioners findings 
of fact cannot be challenged on appeal, and since their conclusions 
will not be reversed unless they are wholly inconsistent with the 
facts, there is very little prospect of the losing party succeeding
before the Court. This is true where the losing party is the Crown,
which is why the Revenue do not normally appeal against adverse
Commissioners decisions in back duty matters. Examples of cases which 
go the other way are therefore not usually reported. In one such case 
before the General Commissioners, Rafferty v. IRC (unreported) the 
taxpayer, a hairdresser, had a cash hoard which he kept at home. He 
maintained that the money had come from his father-in-law, a doctor in 
Canada, who was in the habit of giving substantial cash gifts in 
foreign currency to his daughter, when he visited her from time to
time. He told the Inspector that he had not lodged these amounts in 
his bank account because the account was overdrawn, and he feared that 
if he paid off his overdraft, his bank manager would not give him
another one. So he used the cash for private purposes, such as
holidays. The Inspector refused to believe him, and raised estimated 
assessments. Before the General Commissioners, the taxpayer’s 
father-in-law gave evidence on oath that he had given substantial sums 
to his daughter and his grandchildren, in foreign currency. The 
taxpayer gave evidence on oath that these gifts were the source of the 
cash hoard, and that he had converted the currency into sterling by 
selling to a local bank, although he produced no evidence to support
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this. The accountant gave evidence that the annual accounts, although 
not audited accounts, were correct according to the books and records, 
some of which were produced. The Inspector who had examined the 
accountancy records in depth, produced evidence of a number of 
discrepancies between an appointments diary and a cash book. 
Nevertheless, the Commissioners accepted the taxpayer’s evidence, and 
the assessments were discharged.
In another unreported case, the taxpayer carried on the trade of 
selling newspapers, cigarettes, and sweets from a corner kiosk. It was 
admitted that the accountancy records were "scrappy". There were wide 
fluctuations in profit, and in gross profit margins, and the Inspector 
maintained that these fluctuations, together with the inadequate 
records, showed that the annual accounts could not be relied on. He 
raised estimated assessments. Before the Special Commissioners the 
taxpayer admitted that she had little knowledge of book-keeping. She 
explained the discrepancies in the profit pattern by saying that 
customers did not stop at the kiosk during bad weather, and that to
keep her business going, she had to offer cigarettes and confectionery
at reduced prices, from time to time. Her evidence, which was given on 
oath, was accepted by the Special Commissioners, who said that although 
they could not be convinced that the true profit had been returned, the 
evidence as to the reasons for the apparent discrepancies in the annual 
accounts had satisfied them. The annual accounts were therefore 
evidence of the taxpayer’s profits, and the Inspector had failed to 
discharge the onus on him of showing that the accounts were wrong.
CONCLUSION ON APPEALS
5.33 Reports of cases on back duty matters show clearly the 
function and duties of Commissioners to find and evaluate facts, and to 
reach conclusions based on these facts. Although the law is complex, 
it very rarely figures in appeals of this sort. If, therefore, a
taxpayer is challenged by an Inspector who believes that his returns
are incorrect, and the explanations are not accepted, the taxpayer 
cannot expect to succeed before the Commissioners unless he can shift 
the onus of proof back to the Inspector, and keep it there. If he
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fails at that point, or if the onus moves back to him, and he cannot 
discharge it, then it is unlikely that he will succeed in the Courts.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
5.34 The power of Judicial Review is based on the duty of the 
United Kingdom Courts to right wrongs. Originally, in England, a 
citizen could ask the Court to right a wrong by applying for a writ (or 
order) of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition. These common law 
procedures were consolidated by the Administration of Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1938. They are now contained in Order 
53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of 1977. Judicial review in 
Scotland stems partly from the nobile officium of the Court of Session, 
and partly from English procedures imported into Scotland by the 
Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act 1856. It seems, however, that the 
absence of a clear procedure in Scotland was thought to put the Scots 
at a disadvantage, and so new Scots procedure for judicial review has 
recently been introduced.
Judicial review has rarely been successful in back duty matters, but 
the climate is changing and so a brief review of the subject, 
particularly in Scotland, is merited.
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ENGLAND
5.35 An order of mandamus is a prerogative order by which the 
Queens Bench Division of the High Court in England may direct a person, 
or an inferior Court or Tribunal, to do a particular thing which it is
its duty to do. The order is at the discretion of the Court, and it
will only be granted in the absence of an alternative, more convenient, 
remedy. To obtain an order of mandamus, an applicant must show, first, 
that he has a sufficient interest in the proceedings, and second, that 
the person, or body, concerned has an obligation to the applicant to 
perform the duty in respect of which the order is sought. In taxation 
appeals, an order of mandamus is rarely granted because the normal 
course in a dispute, is recourse to the Commissioners by way of an
appeal. Mandamus is not an alternative to the appeals procedure.
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5.36 An order of prohibition is a prerogative order issued to an
inferior Court or to a Tribunal having judicial or quasi-judicial
functions ordering it not to proceed or continue with proceedings which 
are outwith its jurisdiction. Once again, an order of prohibition is
not an alternative to an appeal to Commissioners.
5.37 An order of certiorari operates to modify or quash a decision
of an inferior Court or a Tribunal acting judicially or 
quasi-judicially. In such a case, it has to be shown that the Court or 
Tribunal concerned did not have the authority or jurisdiction to do 
what it did.
5.38 Two leading modern authorities on judicial review in England,
31in taxation disputes, are Rossminster Ltd. v. I.R.C.-—  and
R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte National Federation of
32Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd.—  The former was an attempt to 
obtain a judicial review of a raid carried out by Inspectors on 
Rossminster Bank Ltd. and on the homes of a number of its executives. 
The latter was an attempt, by a organisation representing small 
business, to obtain an order of mandamus requiring the Revenue to 
pursue certain taxpayers for tax allegedly due, which the Revenue had 
waived. Both cases went to the House of Lords.
5.39 The National Federation case arose out of an Inland Revenue
enquiry. For many years, it had been the practice of newspaper owners 
in London to employ men on a daily basis. These "Fleet Street casuals" 
were paid by the day, and under a long-standing practice, they were 
paid without deduction of income tax under PAYE. Instead, each 
employee was required to sign a receipt showing his name and address 
and the amount paid, this being the basis on which the Revenue could 
check that the amounts were duly shown in the recipients’ income tax 
returns. Inevitably, many of the names used were fictitious. The 
Revenue’s investigation disclosed that "Mickey Mouse of Sunset 
Boulevard" regularly worked on the National Press, sometimes putting in 
two or three shifts a day. Although it was estimated that considerable 
sums of tax had been lost to the Exchequer, the Inland Revenue decided 
that for fiscal years before 1977-78, they would take no proceedings to
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recover the lost tax, but would concentrate on 1977-78, and subsequent 
years of assessment. The National Federation petitioned the Courts for 
a judicial review, first, to declare that the Revenue were ultra vires 
in granting the amnesty, and second, to obtain an order of mandamus 
requiring the Board of Inland Revenue to collect the outstanding tax 
for the years for which the amnesty had been granted. To obtain the 
remedies sought, the National Federation had to show that, first, it 
had somehow been prejudiced or had suffered as a result of the 
Revenue’s discretion, and that, second, the Revenue did not have the 
power to exercise its discretion in the way in which it had been 
exercised. Although the principles involved had been before the Courts 
many times, this was the first case of its kind on a taxation matter. 
Accordingly, there were no direct authorities to assist the Court. In 
the House of Lords, the Revenue were successful, on the grounds that 
the Federation did not have a sufficient interest to complain about how 
they treated other taxpayers and that, in any event, the Revenue had 
not been guilty of a breach of duty, or an unlawful act, in the 
agreement which it made with the Fleet Street casuals. This case is 
therefore of great importance in demonstrating the wide, and unique, 
powers of discretion vested in the Board of Inland Revenue in its care 
and management of direct taxation. It was these wide powers which were 
at the root of the decision of the supreme court which confirmed that a 
taxpayer’s right to seek redress of a wrong is confined to a wrong 
against him, or a wrong by virtue of which he himself has directly 
suffered.
5.40 The Rossminster case was altogether different. Rossminster 
Ltd. was a bank, which was openly engaged in tax avoidance, but the 
Revenue believed that some of its transactions amounted to fraudulent 
evasion. Accordingly, the Revenue obtained warrants under Section 
20(c) of the Taxes Management Act 1970, and raided the Bank and the 
homes of certain directors. Various documents were seized. Judicial 
review was sought on the grounds that the warrants did not state the 
alleged offences and that the documents seized had been illegally 
taken. The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal 
and refused the application, on the grounds that (a) the warrant 
strictly complied with the terms of Section 20(c) of the 1970 Act, and
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(b) that in all the circumstances, the officers of the Revenue had been 
entitled to seize the documents taken. However, the decision exposed 
the exceptional powers conferred on the Revenue by Section 20 of the
Taxes Management Act 1970, and as a direct result, a Committee was set
up, chaired by Lord Keith of Kinkel, to review the workings of the 
enforcement powers of the Revenue departments. The Committee’s work is 
referred to briefly in Chapter 1.
5.41 At the outset, it must be stated that judicial review is more
of a reserve power than an alternative to an appeal under Section 56 of
the Taxes Management Act 1970. Section 56 entitles either party to an
appeal before Commissioners to express dissatisfaction with the
Commissioners' decision, on a point of law, and to require the
Commissioner to state a case, setting out the facts and the
determination, for the opinion of the Court. The power of the Court is
contained in S.56(6). That sub-section is widely drawn, and entitles
the Court to amend, review, or affirm the decision on any point of law;
to remit the case back to the Commissioners with instructions; and to
make "such other order .... as the Court may seem fit". In the recent
34case of R v. Brentwood Commissioners (ex.p. Chan),—  Taylor J. said at 
p.7 "It is wide open to a judge on a Section 56 appeal to deal with 
procedural irregularities such as a wrongful refusal of an adjournment 
....". Only in exceptional circumstances was judicial review 
competent, and since Chan contained no such circumstance, judicial 
review was refused.
5.42 It is not proposed to examine the legal principles underlying 
the power of judicial review, but merely to comment on some of the 
cases which have been before the Courts.
Before examining situations where judicial review in taxation has been 
held to be competent, it is important to set out, by reference to the 
authorities, those matters in respect of which judicial review is not 
available. They are summarised as follows
1. Other than in exceptional cases, judicial review is not an 
alternative to an appeal, within the normal taxation appeals
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procedure (R. v. Special Connnissioners ex parte Morey,—  R. v.
36Inspector ex parte Frost,—  R. v. Kensington Commissioners ex
37parte Wyner.— ) It cannot be used to circumvent the workings of the
38Taxes Act 1970 (R. v. Special Commissioners, ex parte Elmhirst).—
2. Judicial review is not competent to challenge the jurisdiction of
particular Commissioners to hear an appeal, since that matter is
itself within the scope of the normal appeals procedure (Parikh v.
39Birmingham North Commissioners).—
3. The procedure cannot be used to challenge Commissioners’
decisions, on matters of fact or law (R. v. Winchester
40 41Commissioners,—  R. v. St.Marleybone Commissioners.— )
4. A taxpayer cannot use the judicial review procedure to oblige
Commissioners to hear evidence which ought to have but did not, come
42before them on appeal (Argosam Finance Co. Ltd. v. Oxby)-—  nor can 
the procedure be used to require Commissioners to reconsider evidence 
which was brought before them on appeal (R. v. Special Commissioners, 
ex parte Phillipi)
5. A taxpayer cannot obtain judicial review by claiming unfair
treatment by reference to the treatment of other taxpayers (National
Federation). However, in the very recent case of R. v. A-G ex parte
44Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. pic,—  the taxpayer claimed that 
the behaviour of the Revenue had resulted in commercial disadvantages 
as compared with its competitors. Judicial review was granted. 
Locus standi was established in that the other companies referred to 
were the taxpayer’s competitors.
6. Finally, judicial review is not an alternative to an appeal to 
the Court by way of Stated Case (R. v. Special Commissioners ex 
parte Rogers) . ~
5.43 In recent years taxpayers have had some success in the use of 
judicial review in challenging the use, by the Revenue, of their 
statutory and discretionary powers. A review of these more recent
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cases is therefore a valuable indicator of developments in this branch 
of the law.
5.44 In R. v. Special Commissioners ex parte Stipplechoice Ltd.—
the taxpayer company successfully obtained a judicial review of the
power of a Commissioner to grant an Inspector the right to raise an
assessment outwith the normal six year period, under Section 41 of the
Taxes Management Act 1970. The case arose from a dispute between the
company and the Inspector as to whether the company had ceased to trade
on a date, as maintained by the Inspector, or had continued to trade
beyond that date, as was contended by the company. Originally, an
assessment to tax had been made on the basis that the company had not
ceased to trade, and that assessment had been agreed, and the tax
assessed had been paid. Some years later, the Inspector wrote to the
taxpayer company contending, on the basis of undisclosed information,
that trading had ceased before the date to which final accounts had
been made up. The information had been made available to the Inspector
by one of the company's shareholders. By this time, the normal six
year time limit for raising assessments had expired, but the Inspector
successfully obtained leave from a Special Commissioner to make an
assessment out of time, on the grounds that tax had been lost due to
the fraud, wilful default or neglect of the taxpayer. The decision in 
46Perlberg v. Varty—  showed that where an Inspector, in terms of Section 
41 of the 1970 Act, seeks leave from a Commissioner to raise an
assessment out of time, the taxpayer has no right to make 
representations to the Commissioner. Nevertheless, the statute
requires that the Commissioner has to be satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that tax has been lost to the Crown 
due to fraud, wilful default or neglect. The Commissioner therefore 
has a duty to act fairly. In this case, a director of 
Stipplechoice Ltd. had informed the Inspector that the information 
which he had was wrong, but the Inspector refused to say, in 
correspondence, whether or not the taxpayer company's contentions had 
been put before the Commissioners when the application for the 
assessment had been made. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal decided 
that the decision of the Commissioner was susceptible to judicial 
review, and that leave for judicial review should be given. It was, of
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course, stressed that it was perfectly possible that, on review, it 
would be found that the Commissioners’ decision was justified, and it 
seems at least possible, from the closing comments of Lord Justice 
Ackner, that had the Inspector been more forthcoming in his
correspondence, judicial review would have been refused as unnecessary. 
The case shows that in matters of private application decisions of 
Commissioners are judicial decisions, and in consequence, there is an 
obligation on them to act fairly, notwithstanding that the result of 
that decision, for example, the issue of the assessment, could itself 
be challenged on appeal.
475.45 The case of R. v. Inspector, ex parte Lansing Bagnall Ltd.-—
concerned the improper use of Revenue discretion. The taxpayer company 
was a closely controlled company, and as such, liable to have its
income apportioned among shareholders, insofar as the income did not 
have to be retained for the purposes of the company’s business. The 
company's expenses included payments to charities by way of covenant 
which, in terms of paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 16 to the Finance Act 
1972, were to be treated as added to the amount of the distributable 
income. In respect of any covenanted payment, paragraph 3 provided
that "(It) may be apportioned...........  as if it were income of
(the) close company". The Inland Revenue took the view that the word
"may" in paragraph (1) of Schedule 16 was a direction which required 
the amounts paid by way of covenant to be apportioned amongst
shareholders. The company maintained that there were good business
reasons why these amounts should not be so apportioned, but the
Inspector, relying on her belief that apportionment was compulsory, 
refused to consider these representations. The taxpayer company’s 
application for a judicial review in this case was granted on the
grounds (a) that the Revenue interpretation of paragraph 3(1) was
incorrect - the word "may" conferred a discretion on the Inspector, not 
a direction, and (b) that discretion could only be properly exercised 
after taking into account the representations which the taxpayer
company had made. This case is of some importance, since discretionary 
powers are widespread in fiscal legislation, embracing matters such as 
the extension of time limits, and the mitigation of interest and 
penalties on overdue tax.
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5.46 A third case which merits consideration is unusual in that
judicial review was granted in circumstances where an appeal would have
48been competent. In R. v. Inspector ex parte Kissane,—  a firm of 
solicitors were assessed to tax on certain transactions in land, under 
Section 488 of the Taxes Act 1970. The gain assessed accrued from a 
transaction by a Jersey company which had acquired land in the U.K., 
and later sold it to a U.K. company of which the partners were 
directors, making a profit of about £800,000. There was no evidence 
that the partners who were assessed were ever beneficially entitled to
the gain, or to any of the property. The grounds on which judicial
review was sought were that (1) there was no evidence on which the
Inspector could have judged that the tax assessed was due from the
appellants, and (2) the Inspector had acted improperly, or by way of an 
abuse of power, in that the assessments were made with an intention 
other than that of recovering tax genuinely believed to be due from the 
taxpayers, and for the purpose of making enquiries about other 
individuals of a kind not authorised by statute. Although these 
matters could have been pursued on appeal, judicial review was granted
on the grounds that the Inspector's decision to make the assessment
amounted to an excess of the proper use of statutory powers, and that 
on appeal before the Commissioners, the taxpayer, if successful, would 
not have been entitled to an award of costs. This case shows that 
"discovery" assessments, under Section 29(3) of the Taxes Management
Act 1970 can be the subject of judicial review of the Inspector's
statutory grounds for making them.
5.47 It can therefore be said that judicial review in England is, 
in practice, and in the absence of special circumstances, confined to 
remedying breaches of administrative procedure or natural justice, not 
catered for in the Taxes Management Act itself, and in particular, 
where an appeal by way of Stated Case cannot be made. Judicial review 
has been granted where
1. A General Commissioners’ Hearing took place, without the taxpayer
having been served with a notice to attend (R. v. Tavistock
49Commissioners ex parte Adam).—
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2. One of two General Commissioners * hearing an appeal was a
competitor of the taxpayer, and might have been prejudiced in his
50judgement (R. v. Holyhead Commissioners ex parte Roberts).—
3. Prior to a General Commissioners' Hearing, the Inspector told the 
taxpayer's agent that the case had been adjourned, but the 
Commissioners did in fact hear the appeal, and subsequently refused 
to re-open it (R. v. O'Brien ex parte Lissner)
4. Before General Commissioners, evidence was led in a manner which
52subsequently was accepted as being incorrect (Khan v. Edwards).—  
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SCOTLAND
5.48 Mandamus, prohibition and certiorari are English legal
concepts, and their procedure is English procedure. Although mandamus
and certiorari were imported into Scots procedure by the Exchequer
Court (Scotland) Act 1856, they are not known in the common law of
Scotland. Nevertheless, the Scottish Courts have the power of judicial
review, rooted in Scots common law. Whereas in England the Courts of
Equity and the Courts of Common Law were traditionally separate, and
developed along different lines, in Scotland equity has always been an
integral part of Scots common law. This point was emphasised by Lord
53President Clyde in a case on charities in 1933, Gibson's Trustees-—  
where he said:-
"Owing to its peculiar history, the law of Scotland has never known 
either distinction or conflict between common law and the principles 
of equity. It is often said and truly said that in the law of 
Scotland law is equity and equity is law; and when a Scots lawyer 
uses the expression common law, he uses it in contra-distinction to 
laws made by Parliament."
5.49 Thus the Scottish Courts have a duty to ensure that the law is 
administered fairly. They have a power to right manifest wrongs. In 
addition, the Court of Session and the High Court of Judiciary have a 
common law power, the nobile officium, to provide equitable remedies,
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in the absence of any other procedure. In the case of the High Court
of Justiciary, the nobile officium is restricted to a power of
interfering, in extraordinary circumstances, in criminal causes, where
no other procedure for review is available. The Court of Session1s
nobile officium is, by precedent, normally limited to correcting a
manifest defect in a statute; to equitable jurisdiction with reference
to trusts, in particular charitable trusts; to applications by
petition not founded on statute, for example, for the appointment of
judicial factors; and to applications for the appointment of public
officers in the event of the death or incapacity of an existing
officer. In practice, it is unlikely to be extended to other matters.
54However, in the recent case of Royal Bank of Scotland v. Gillies-—  the
Lord Justice-Clerk said that the nobile officium gave the Court the
55right to assist a petitioner where no other remedy is available.—  
Accordingly, the power is not limited, save that it is a remedy of last 
resort. In addition to its nobile officium, however, the Court of 
Session in Scotland has a general power, at common law, to right 
wrongs; to review the judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of 
inferior Courts and Tribunals; and in general, to ensure that justice 
is administered in a fair and proper way. Like the nobile officium, 
this common law power is an old power. Lord Karnes, in the 4th edition 
of his "Historical Law Tracts" said, at page 228:-
"Under the cognisance of The Privy Council in Scotland came many 
injuries, which by abolition of that Court, are left without any
peculiar remedy; and the Court of Session have with reluctance been
forced to listen to complaints of various kinds ...... Thus it is
the province of this Court to redress all wrongs for which no other
remedy is provided."
This power may be of relevance in taxation disputes.
5.50 A leading authority on the Court of Session’s common law power
of review is McDonald & Ors. v. Lanarkshire Fire Brigade Joint 
56Committee.—  In that case, three members of a fire brigade were 
disciplined by a committee constituted under the Fire Services 
(Discipline) (Scotland) Regulations 1953. At the hearing before that
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Committee, two of the firemen were found guilty of disobedience, and 
the third was found guilty of making a false statement. The Committee 
punished all three by stoppage of pay. The three firemen brought an 
action against the Lanarkshire Fire Brigade Joint Committee for a 
reduction of the decision of the Committee and of the punishment 
imposed. The pursuers' case was that there had been a breach of 
procedure under the regulations in that they had not been properly 
served with notice of the charges against them until four days before 
the hearing, and that at the hearing itself their representative, 
himself a fireman, who asked for an adjournment, first, to prepare his 
case properly, and second, on the grounds of his physical exhaustion, 
was refused the adjournment which he had sought. The pursuers averred 
that this was contrary to natural justice. The case became before Lord 
Guthrie in the Outer House. The defenders maintained that the Court 
had no power to intervene, since the Committee was dealing with a 
domestic matter of internal discipline in the fire service, and was 
not, therefore, a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal. In rejecting 
this argument, Lord Guthrie stated that in a case involving a breach of 
regulations, or of the conditions of service imposed on them, the 
pursuers were entitled to seek the assistance of the Court to enforce 
these conditions, unless the Court's assistance was excluded by 
statute. Next, his Lordship held that since the Committee operated in 
terms of Regulations which included the requiring of a written charge, 
the issue of documents to the accused, the attendance of witnesses who 
could be examined and cross-examined, and the possibility that parties 
may be represented, showed that the proceedings were to be conducted in 
a judicial or quasi-judicial manner. His Lordship concluded that since 
there had been a manifest breach of regulations the Committee's 
proceedings were null and void and that in consequence, the punishment 
imposed on the pursuers should be set aside. In these circumstances, 
it was not necessary for the Court to consider whether or not there had 
been a breach of natural justice because the firemen had had 
insufficient time to prepare their defence, and had been denied an 
ajournment at the hearing itself. The judgement, however, implies that 
if, on a proof, there had been evidence showing that insufficient time 
to prepare the defence had been given, that would have been a breach of 
natural justice.
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5.51 The Lanarkshire Fire Brigade’s case was not, of course, a tax
case. Nevertheless, it is of importance in showing that, without
reference to statutory authority or any other statutory appeals
procedure, a citizen has the right to enlist the support of the Court
to obtain justice. A more recent case of interest, Wordie Property Co.
57Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Scotland-—  concerned the Secretary of 
State’s discretionary power in a planning appeal. In the course of his 
judgement, the Lord President set out the basis on which the exercise 
of an administrative discretion may be quashed by the Court. Lord 
Emslie said:-
"A decision of the Secretary of State acting within his statutory 
remit is ultra vires if he has improperly exercised the discretion 
confided in him. In particular, it will be ultra vires if it is 
based upon a material error of law going to the root of the question 
for determination. It will be ultra vires, too, if the Secretary of 
State has taken into account irrelevant considerations, or has failed 
to take account of relevant or material considerations which ought to 
have been taken into account. Similarly it will fall to be quashed 
on that ground if, where it is one for which a factual basis is 
required, there is no proper basis in fact to support it. It will
also fall to be quashed if it .............  is so unreasonable that
no reasonable Secretary of State could have reached or imposed it."
5.52 Several English and Scottish authorities were quoted to
support Lord Emslie’s statement of the law. Although the statement was
made in the context of planning law, it is of wide application. In a
case on the provision of housing accommodation (Kelly v. Monkland 
58District Council)-—  it was quoted with approval.
5.53 The broad uniformity of the law between England and Scotland
was confirmed by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in another case on homeless
59persons, (Brown v. Hamilton District Council).—  At page 414, Lord
Fraser said:-
"It is not necessary for me to consider the grounds on which judicial 
review may be open. The decisions in the English cases ...........
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so far as they relate to matters of substance and not of procedure 
are accepted as being applicable in Scotland. There is no difference 
of substance between the laws of the two countries on this matter
it
5.54 His Lordship also dealt with the question of procedure, when 
he said, at page 418:-
"(It) is for consideration whether there might not be advantages in 
developing special procedure in Scotland for dealing with questions 
in the public law area, comparable to the English prerogative 
orders.11
5.55 As a consequence of Lord Fraser’s comments in Brown, and in
60Stevenson v. Midlothian District Council,—  a committee was set up 
under Lord Dunpark to devise procedures for judicial review in 
Scotland. The result of the committee's work in Rule 260B of the Rules 
of Court in which the Scots procedure for judicial review is embodied.
5.56 The English authorities show that judicial review is a process 
apt for dealing with taxation matters in appropriate circumstances. It 
has not been used in Scotland, however, so far as the writer is aware, 
and it is an open question whether the Scottish Courts would regard the 
Scottish procedure as an alternative to the normal appeal procedure.
In the context of taxation the position is, of course, that there is a
statutory appeals framework, which provides for a hearing of a tax
appeal before General or Special Commissioners. Either party may
appeal against a decision of Commissioners to the High Court, or, in
Scotland, to the Court of Session, on a point of law. The meaning of
the phrase, "on a point of law" has already been analysed and has been
held to include procedural matters before the Commissioners. In
61R. & D. McKerron Ltd. v. I.R.C.-—  a solicitor was appointed to 
represent taxpayers at an appeal hearing before the Aberdeen General 
Commissioners on May 25, 1978. The appeal was a "delay case", and was 
set down for 10.30 a.m. on the appointed day within the Sheriff Court 
Building. The solicitor duly arrived in good time for the appeal
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hearing, but at 10.38 a.m., before his case had been called, he went to 
the Sheriff Court, in the same corridor in the building in which the 
Commissioners were sitting, to check on the progress of a criminal 
trial, in which he had been instructed to tender a plea of guilty. He 
returned to the Commissioners1 waiting room at 10.40 a.m. In the two 
minutes of his absence, his case was called, and the Commissioners, in 
the absence of the appellant or his representative, confirmed the 
assessment. When the solicitor asked the Commissioners, through their 
Clerk, to hear him, on behalf of his clients, they refused. All he 
wanted to do was to ask for a continuation of the appeal, which, almost 
certainly, would have been granted. The Commissioners dispersed at 
11 a.m. Since the Commissioners had the discretion to hear the 
appellant’s agent, but had refused to do so, the taxpayers appealed on 
the grounds that the Commissioners’ failure was a breach of natural 
justice.
5.57 The case came before the First Division of the Court of
Session in November 1978, at which the Lord President, Lord Emslie,
reformulated the question of law for the Courts’ consideration as 
"Whether, in refusing the solicitor's request to be heard, the 
Commissioners exercised their discretion reasonably and in a judicial 
way". That reformulation was necessary, in the opinion of the Lord
President, in order that the Court could consider a question which was 
a question of law. In all the circumstances, the Court concluded that 
the Commissioners had failed to exercise their discretion properly, and 
that accordingly, judgement was given against the Crown. The 
determination was quashed, and the Commissioners were instructed to 
rehear the appellant’s appeal.
5.58 The McKerron decision is in line with an earlier income tax
62
case, Pxoss & Coulter v. I.R.C.,—  a case on excess profits tax where, 
in the House of Lords, Lord Simonds said that the decision of 
Commissioners was not judicially exercised if its statutory basis was 
misconceived. It seems, therefore, that despite different procedures 
the Scottish Courts are in line with the English Courts in treating 
procedural errors before Commissioners, and abuse of Commissioners' 
discretion, as matters of law, apt for the appeals procedure contained
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in Section 56 of the Taxes Management Act 1970, as opposed to a
judicial review. In adopting this approach, the Scottish Courts, in
relation to taxation disputes, have avoided the undecided controversy
as to whether, in Scotland, the Court can interfere with an inferior
Court or Tribunal, to quash a decision for non-jurisdictional error of
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law. The Franks Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries—  
said that the Courts in Scotland do not exercise such jurisdiction. 
Sheriff Middleton, in an article in the 1958 Juridical Review, at page 
183 supported the Franks approach, and said "The distinction between 
error of law, on the one hand, and excess of jurisdiction or oppression 
or failure of duty, on the other hand, is fundamental, even if not 
always quite clear cut, and it would be unfortunate if the Scottish 
Courts were to follow English Courts in mixing them up". Professor 
J.D.B. Mitchell, on the other hand, in an article entitled "The Scope 
of Judicial Review" 1959 Juridical Review at page 197, maintains that 
Sheriff Middleton1s distinction is a distinction in name only, and that 
the Scottish Courts have always regarded themselves capable of 
correcting manifest errors of law. This argument becomes somewhat 
academic, in the context of taxation appeals, given that the practice 
of the Scottish Courts, wherever possible, is to encourage such matters 
to be brought forward for appeal by way of Stated Case. Thus Scottish 
procedure would appear to conform with English procedure, although 
perhaps for different historical reasons.
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS IN SCOTS LAW
5.59 Before the introduction of Rule 260B, there was only one 
statutory procedure for judicial review of taxation decisions in 
Scotland. Its origin and background are something of an historical 
curiosity.
Article 19 of the Scottish Act of Union of 1707 provided for the 
establishment of a "Court of Exchequer in Scotland after the Union, for 
deciding questions concerning the revenues of Customs and Excise there, 
having the same power and authority in such cases, as the Court of 
Exchequer has in England." By 1856 it had been found that "the 
practice and procedure in the Court of Exchequer in Scotland (was)
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inconvenient and troublesome", and so by the Exchequer Court (Scotland) 
Act of that year the authority and jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court 
was transferred to and vested in the Court of Session in Scotland. The 
1856 Act remains in force; the Court of Session still sits as Court of 
Exchequer in Scotland, and its procedures are still governed, in 
principle, by the Act of 1856.
5.60 Section 15 of the 1856 Act provides for procedure in lieu of 
mandamus. Section 17 contains procedure for the issue of a writ of 
certiorari. Prohibition is not mentioned, and is foreign to Scots law, 
but it would appear to be similar in nature to the "injunction" 
referred to in Section 14.
5.61 The procedures provided for in the Act of 1856 have rarely
been invoked in relation to any matter. In the context of income tax,
so far as the writer can ascertain, there is only one reported case,
64that of I.R.C. v. Hood-Barrs,—  which is therefore the only source of 
judicial guidance on how these procedures apply in direct taxation 
appeals.
5.62 The Hood-Barrs case concerned tax relief for losses. Under 
Section 34 of the Income Tax Act 1918, which consolidated Section 23 of 
the 1890 Act as amended by the Acts of 1907 and 1916, a person who had 
sustained a loss in a trade profession or vocation could apply to the 
General or Special Commissioners to have the loss set against his other 
income for the year in which the loss was sustained. Where the 
Commissioners were satisfied on the amount of the loss and had evidence 
that tax on the other income had been paid, they were authorised, by 
Section 34(2) to issue a certificate authorising the appropriate income 
tax repayment. Upon receipt of the certificate, the Commissioners 
(Board) of Inland Revenue were instructed to repay tax, in conformity 
with the certificate. It is an interesting feature of the legislation 
that no right of appeal was provided for until 1953.
5.63 Mr. Hood-Barrs was a timber merchant who, in November 1958, 
submitted computations of business losses for the years 1947 to 1951 to 
the local General Commissioners. The losses totalled £4221. The
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taxpayer’s figures were not computed for the purposes of a loss claim 
under Section 34 of the Income Tax Act 1918, and the General 
Commissioners took them into account only in deciding that he had not 
made a taxable profit. In January 1959, the Clerk to the General 
Commissioners sent the taxpayer and the local Inspector of Taxes a 
"directive” signed by the General Commissioners, which purported to 
make certain legal findings concerning the computation of these losses, 
and directing the parties to agree the amount of the trading losses in 
accordance with these findings. This was the first occasion on which 
any Inspector of Taxes had ever received any intimation of these 
losses. In February 1959 the General Commissioners proceeded to issue 
four loss certificates for the four years ended 1951, amounting to 
£34,348. These certificates were issued without the prior knowledge or 
agreement of the Inspector. Accordingly, the Solicitor of Inland 
Revenue (Scotland) appealed to the Court of Session, as Court of 
Exchequer in Scotland, in terms of Section 17 of the Exchequer Court 
(Scotland) Act 1856, for a writ of certiorari to quash the loss 
certificates which had been issued.
5.64 The first problem for the Lord Ordinary was whether an appeal
under Section 17 of the Act of 1856 was competent. For it to be
competent, it had to be shown that such an action would have been
competent in the Court of Exchequer itself before its jurisdiction was
transferred to the Court of Session. The difficulty here was that the
loss relief claimed had first been introduced in 1890, that is, 34
years after the Court of Exchequer had ceased to exist. In finding in
favour of the Revenue on this point, the Lord Ordinary was assisted by
65the decision in Balfour—  in which the Lord President had concluded 
that the correct approach was to consider whether a writ of certiorari 
could have been brought before the Court of Exchequer, if such Court 
had continued to exist. It followed, therefore, that the fact that the 
demise of the Exchequer Court pre-dated the introduction of the loss 
relief did not prevent Section 17 of the 1856 Act from applying.
5.65 The next problem was to see whether a writ of certiorari was 
the appropriate course of appeal. The Lord Ordinary judged that an 
application for a writ was the appropriate course, since in Bruce v.
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Burton,—  the English Court had decided that it was not open to 
Commissioners to state a case for the opinion of the Court in relation 
to loss certificates. In the absence of a statutory appeals procedure, 
therefore, the Court held that an application under Section 17 of the 
1856 Act was competent.
5.66 The third question considered by the Court was whether, having 
applied for the writ, the pursuers had established that there were 
grounds for certiorari. This depended on whether certiorari extended 
to a review of the Commissioners decision, for error in law, or whether 
all that Section 17 did was to authorise the Court to review the 
Commissioners findings on the grounds of a breach of natural justice 
which, in the view of the Lord Ordinary, excluded a review for error in 
law. The Lord Ordinary does not seem to have dealt in any detail with 
the point. However, he concluded that although there was no error of 
law on the face of the certificates, the General Commissioners were in 
breach of a fundamental principle of natural justice by failing to give 
the Inspector the opportunity of considering the claim for loss relief 
and making representations. The Lord Ordinary therefore set aside the 
four loss certificates.
5.67 On appeal, the first division of the Court of Session 
confirmed the opinion of the Lord Ordinary, and held that:-
1. The appeal was competent.
2. The proceedings before the General Commissioners were
quasi-judicial proceedings.
3. The loss certificates were to be quashed on the grounds that
there had been a denial of natural justice because the Inspector had
had no opportunity to challenge the taxpayer’s computation of loss 
before the certificates were issued, and (reversing the Lord Ordinary 
on this point) that there was an error of law on the face of the
proceedings, since although the certificates themselves betrayed no 
such error, the directive on which they were based mis-stated the 
law.
141
5.68 The House of Lords, in dismissing the taxpayers appeal, held
that (a) proceedings before the Commissioners were quasi-judicial and
(b) no tribunal, however informal was entitled to reach a decision
against any person without giving him a chance to put forward his case.
5.69 The position in Scotland therefore appears to be this. Equity
is part of the common law of Scotland. A breach of equity is therefore
a breach of law. A taxpayer who, on appeal by way of Stated Case,
maintains that the hearing before Commissioners was unfair, has grounds 
in law for his appeal. Where there is no appeal by way of Stated Case 
a taxpayer, or for that matter, the Inland Revenue, may have grounds 
under the Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act 1856. These grounds import 
English principles, and in consequence, the English decisions may be of 
some value to the Scottish Courts. In addition, there may be grounds 
for judicial review of matters not capable of appeal, such as the 
exercise of Revenue discretion, or the abuse of power, along lines 
similar to those in England.
CONCLUSION ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
5.70 It would seem that the place of judicial review in taxation
appeals may be summarised thus:-
(a) Despite differing history and procedure, the Courts in England
and Scotland are likely to apply judicial review of taxation matters
in the same way.
(b) Judicial review is not normally an alternative to any remedy 
catered for by the Taxes Management Act 1970.
(c) Judicial review is normally given where
1. there has been an abuse of Inland Revenue discretion, or
2. an abuse of some procedural matter for which the 1970 Act does 
not cater, or
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3. a breach of natural justice has occurred for which a remedy 
under the 1970 Act is not, or is no longer, available.
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